FEDERAL FORCES OPPOSED TO JACKSON. 285 who approached first. The force on the south branch was now commanded by General Lander, and was concentrated about a locality on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad called Paw Paw, thirty-five miles from Winchester. The importance of the expedition which Jackson had been so anxious to make in January, to destroy the great bridges about Cumberland, was now manifest. This force was able to draw its supplies by railroad from the west, and to bring them unobstructed to the Great Capon Bridge. That work they were rapidly rebuilding, and nothing could be anticipated but that, on its completion, they would break into the valley, in concert with General Banks, from the northeast. The latter commander had been hitherto inactive, but it was known that he had a large force cantoned at Frederick City, Hagerstown, and Williamsport, in Maryland. His first indications were, that he was moving his troops up the northern bank of the Potomac, and effecting a junction with General Lander, by boats constructed at Cumberland and brought down the stream. But this movement, if it was not a feint, was speedily reconsidered. On the 25th of February he crossed at Harper's Ferry with 4000 men, and by the 4th of March had established his head-quarters at Charlestown, seven miles in advance. The remainder of his force was brought over, from time to time, until he, with General Shields, had now collected about 36,000 men at that place, Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg. A General of less genius than Jackson would have certainly resorted to laborious entrenchments, as an expedient for repairing the inequality of his force. But he constructed no works for the defence of Winchester. To an inquiry of General Hill, he replied, "I am not fortifying; my position can be turned on all sides." Knowing that, if he enclosed himself in forts, the superior forces of the Federalists would envelop him, he refused to construct works for them to occupy, after his enforced evacuation. He hoped to return upon them some day, and did not desire to have the necessity of reducing his own fortifications. His strategy sympathized always with that of the Douglas, who "preferred rather to hear the lark sing, than the rat squeak." General Jackson, perceiving that the Commander-in-Chief would not be able to give him the aid he desired, looked next for co-operation to the force stationed at Leesburg, in Loudoun county, under General D. H. Hill. By providing means of rapid transit across the Shenandoah at Castleman's Ferry, and establishing a telegraph line between Leesburg and Winchester, he proposed to secure a concentration of the two forces by two days' march at most. He also advised that General Hill should proceed to the Loudoun heights, in the northwest corner of that county, and station some artillery upon the mountain there overlooking Harper's Ferry, so as to make the ferry across the stream so hazardous, and the village so untenable, as to compel General Banks to relinquish that line of approach. But the duty of guarding his own position forbade General Hill to extend to him the proposed assistance. He therefore busied himself in removing his sick, and his army stores to Mount Jackson, in Shenandoah county, in order to be prepared either for a desperate resistance at Winchester, or for a safe retreat. While he was thus occupied, the winter ended, and the spring campaign opened in good carnest; and, before the summer was over, General Jackson, up to this period comparatively unknown, won for himself a world-wide reputation, by a series of the most brilliant achievements; in which, with a mere handful of troops, he again and again swept thousands of the enemy before him, and, passing swiftly and silently from point to point, burst like a thunderbolt upon the foe, when least expected, and at the decisive hour. GENERAL VIEW OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1862. 287 CHAPTER IX. GENERAL VIEW OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1862. THE campaigns of 1861 had been but a prelude to the gi gantic struggle which was to be witnessed in 1862. The prowess and superiority which the Confederates everywhere displayed, rudely awakened the people of the United States from their dreams of an easy conquest, and exasperated their pride and revenge. The Washington Government now resolved upon a new policy. This was, to raise armies so vast, and to add to their momentum by such deliberate preparation, as to overwhelm their gallant enemies by material weight. Under the industrious management of General M'Clellan, their levies reached, if they were to be believed, the enormous number of seven hundred thousand men; and it is probable that more than half a million were actually under arms, and drilling with the greatest care. Hitherto, the different campaigns had been detached, but in 1862 they assumed connexion with each other. The movements in Virginia were related to those in the Great West, and the brilliant events in the district commanded by General Jackson had a vital influence upon the campaign in Virginia. In writing the military history of this great commander, two objects must be kept in view. One will be to explain the strategic grounds which support the propriety of his own movements: the other, to show the intimate connexion of his successes with the fortunes of the war. Many persons have claimed his career as an illustration of the uselessness of the science of warfare, and an instance of success in defiance of it. They have conceived of him as a leader who discarded rules, and trusted only to his fortunate star, to rapidity of movements, and to hard blows. They suppose his victories were the results of his boldness only, with that inexplicable chance, which, to man's natural reason, appears good luck, and which a religious faith, like that of Jackson, terms Providence. But while the perpetual and essential influence of the divine power is asserted, which alone sustains the regular connexion of means with ends, it will be shown that these conceptions are erroneous; that General Jackson's campaigns were guided by the most profound and original applications of military science, as well as sustained by the vigor of their execution; and that they are an invaluable study for the leader of armies. The reader has now reached the commencement of that wondrous campaign in the Valley of Virginia, which created his fame. Before the narrative is begun, it will not be unprofitable to pass in review the general theatre of the war, and the posture and advantages of the two parties. This survey, as well as the subsequent history, will involve the use of a few technical terms, whose definition may be helpful to the unprofessional reader. In accordance with the best usage the word Strategy will be employed to denote the art of giving the proper direction to the movements of an army upon the theatre of war. A Strategic Point is a place, which, from geographical or other reasons, secures for its occupant some advantage in strategic movements, and thence, some control over a part of the theatre of war. Thus, Manassa's Junction was an important strategic point for the Confederates in 1861, because the two railroads meeting there gave them the decisive advantage in all movements over the territory through which they pass. So, an important fortress, a focus where many highways meet, a mountain defile constituting the main entrance to a region, may be such a point. The phrase General Tactics expresses the art of arraying and using an army successfully upon a field of battle; while special tactics is the drill which is taught to the single soldier, the company, or the battalion, in the several branches of infantry, cavalry, or artillery. A Base of Operations is that line, or series of neighboring points, in secure possession of an army, whence it sets out to assail its enemy, whence it continually draws its supplies and reinforcements, and to which it may retreat for safety. Its Line of Operations is the zone along which an army advances from its base toward the object of its attack; and its Line of Communications is but the same tract, usually, viewed in the inverted direction. It might appear from this definition, that an army's line of operations would be projected always at right angles to its base, or in a direction approximating this; but while this is often true, it is not necessarily so, and instances arise in which the most successful line of operations may be oblique, or even almost parallel to the base. Other terms which occur will now casily explain themselves to the attentive reader, without the formality of definitions. The one decisive advantage, to which the North owes all its successes over the South, has been, not its larger territories, or population, or armies, or geographical position, but its superiority upon the water. And this is true, as will be made clear, notwithstanding that it has been chiefly a war upon land. At the division of the Union, the Government of Washington retained all the Federal Navy. Many of its States were maritime and manufacturing communities; while those of the South were chiefly agricultural; hence the multiplication of ships and sailors, from the river transport up to the man-of-war, was far more |