BATTLE OF GREENBRIER RIVER.

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All this country, to the Alleghany crest, was included in General Jackson's military district. The frontier, which he was required to guard against the enemy, was the whole line of the Potomac, from Harper's Ferry to its source in the mountain last named, and from that ridge to the place where the troops of General Lee were posted, after their ineffectual attempt upon Northwest Virginia. That commander had been recalled, to be employed in a more important sphere; and his troops were left along the line which he had occupied under the command of Brigadier-Generals Henry Jackson and Loring. The first of these, with a detachment of that army, had, on the 8th of October, repulsed the Federalists with the aid of Colonel Edward Johnson, in a well-fought battle upon the head of the Greenbrier River, in Pochahontas county. But the only fruit of this victory which the Confederates gathered, was an unobstructed retreat to a stronger position, upon the top of the Alleghany mountains: another striking evidence of the soundness of General Jackson's theory concerning the campaign in the Northwest. Yet more surprising proof was furnished a few weeks later. On December 13th, the same gallant little army was attacked in its new position on the Alleghany; and, under Edward Johnson, now Brigadier-General, the result was a brilliant victory over their assailants. As soon as General Jackson heard of it, he again wrote, to urge that this force should be sent to him, and predicted that, if it remained where it was, it would, before long, have no enemy in its front, and find the foe which it had beaten, threatening its communications by the way of the South Branch. This was exactly verified. His advice was rejected; and it was not many weeks until the victorious army was retreating to another position, on the Shenandoah mountain, forty miles to the rear. The explanation was, that the Federalists being in undisturbed possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, were

able to occupy Hampshire and Hardy, and to threaten thence the communications of the Confederates.

General Jackson had not reached Winchester, before his foresight of these results induced him to urge upon the Government that plan of campaign which was explained in the last chapter. Possessed of the keen appreciation of the value of time in war, he begrudged the loss of every day. On the route to Winchester, he paused at a station, to write to an influential friend in Richmond, asking his aid to further his views; and, through every proper channel, he continued to press them, until events forbade ,their execution. He proposed the immediate organization of a winter campaign in the Northwest, to be conducted from Winchester, by the way of the railroad and northwestern turnpike. He requested that all the forces of Generals Loring and Johnson should be hurried to him, so as to constitute a body sufficient to sustain itself. If it was suggested that the Federalists might take advantage of their withdrawal, to invade the central parts of the State, by crossing the mountains, his reply was, that it would be so much the worse for them. While they were marching eastward, involving themselves in those interminable obstacles, which had proved so disastrous to our arms there, he would be rapidly pouring his masses westward by railroad and turnpike, would place himself upon their communications; would close behind them, and would make their destruction so much the more certain, the farther they advanced towards their imaginary prize. If the Confederate Government, he argued, delayed its efforts to recover the Northwest, it would then find the Federalists more firmly scated there; the loyalty of the inhabitants would be more corrupted by their blandishments and oppressions; the supplies, which should feed our soldiers, would be consumed by our enemies, and the country too much exhausted to sustain a vigorous campaign from its own re

sources; fortified posts would be created where none now existed; and, above all, the constant development of the military power of the United States under the management of General M'Clellan, might occupy all our forces elsewhere.

His representations were so far successful, that about the middle of November, his old Brigade was sent to him, with the Pendleton battery, now under the command of Captain M'Laughlin. Early in December, Colonel William B. Taliaferro's brigade from the army of the Northwest, consisting of the 1st Georgia, 3d Arkansas, and 23d and 37th Virginia regiments, reached Winchester. Near the close of December, the last reinforcements arrived from that army, under Brigadier-General Loring, consisting of the brigades of Colonel William Gilham, and Brigadier-General S. R. Anderson. The former of these brigades embraced the 21st, 42d, and 48th regiments of Virginia, and the 1st battalion of State Regulars, with Captain Maryc's battery; the latter, the 1st, 7th, and 14th regiments of Tennessee, and Captain Shurmaker's battery. He now, at the end of December, found himself in command of about eleven thousand men, of whom three thousand were militia, while the remainder were the volunteer forces of the Confederacy. But the delay in. assembling these was such, as nearly to blast his hopes. He had continued to urge that the command of Brigadier-General Edward Johnson, from the Alleghany, should be sent to him, or else directed to march northward through Hardy and Hampshire counties, to effect a junction with him near Romney; but his advice was not adopted. This subtraction from his expected means, he declared, would be decisive against his cherished plan of penetrating to the Northwest. For, contemplating the repeated failures to which the Confederate cause had been con-demned in that quarter by inadequate means, he was determined:

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not to make an attempt without such forces as would make success possible.

Just before General Jackson came to the Valley, Romney was occupied by a Federal force, which was speedily increased to 6000 men. At Williamsport, and neighboring points, were as many more. Beyond Harper's Ferry, General Banks was organizing a force of 26,000 men, for the invasion of the Valley. Before the arrival of General Loring's command, General Jackson had to oppose nearly 40,000 enemies, with only 4000 men, inclusive of his undisciplined militia; yet, if this force was increased to so many as 15,000, he had resolved to attempt the audacious enterprise of clearing away the foes who hung around his own district, and then invading another, occupied by an army as strong as his own.

But his genius taught him that his safety lay in audacity. Winchester is the centre to which great thoroughfares converge, from Harper's Ferry on the northeast, from Martinsburg and Williamsport on the north, and from Romney on the northwest; while another highway from the south branch would place his enemics twenty miles in his rear, at Strasburg. He said that unless Romney and the south branch were held, Winchester was untenable. It was true that his central position gave him the interior line of operations; but, to employ this advantage, it was necessary for him to strike one of his adversaries promptly. If he waited until they approached near enough to co-operate, and to hem him in by their convergent motions, he would have no alternative except precipitate retreat or surrender; hence his, burning anxiety to be in motion. His purpose was to assail the Federal General Kelly at Romney, first, so as to secure the western side of his district, as a preliminary, either to his expedition into the Northwest, or, if that were surrendered, to his approaching contest with General Banks. It has already been

WOULD HE HAVE SUCCEEDED?

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indicated, that the late arrival of General Loring's brigades, and the refusal of the Government to send General Edward Johnson's, doomed the hopes of General Jackson to disappointment as to the former enterprise. It may be useless to speculate upon the results which he would have attained, if it had He never concealed his belief

been undertaken in good time. that the attempt was hazardous; but many would perhaps conclude that it was utterly rash; and, in the latter opinion, it would appear the War Department concurred. The facilities which the Federalists enjoyed for pouring troops and supplies into Northwest Virginia, must ever have rendered its occupation by a Confederate force, an arduous task. Had General Jackson gone thither with 15,000 men, the countless hordes of United States troops, who, a little later, crushed the Confeder ates at Fort Donelson, in spite of most heroic fighting, might have been directed upon him. If the skill and courage with which he evaded similar dangers in the famous campaign of the ensuing spring were forgotten, the conclusion would be reached, that in such an event his situation in the Northwest would be desperate. But the issue of that campaign has taught the world, that there is no limit to be set to the possibilities which genius, united to generous devotion, may achieve. Success would have turned mainly upon the degree of support which the people of the Northwest would have given to the cause, when rallied under their favorite leader. And these speculations may be most safely dismissed, with a thankful acquiescence in the orderings of Divine providence, which forbade Jackson's making the great experiment, and preserved him for the service. of his country on a still more important and glorious field.

About the middle of November, General Jackson, busying himself, while he awaited his reinforcements, in organizing his command, adverted to the condition of his cavalry. This