tions of Russia, and allowing her to pass the Pruth without considering this as an act of war. Had negotiation, as she asserted, been her only object, it could have been carried on quite as well from the northern as from the southern side of that river.

Had Turkey determined, or rather, had she been allowed by her allies to take her stand alone, it is obvious that on the promulgation of Count Nesselrode's letter of the 31st of May, her troops would have hastened to meet the invaders on or near the banks of the Pruth. If forced to retire from this position, and even if obliged ultimately to abandon the defence of the Principalities, the Sultan's forces would, in the worst case, have been able to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of their resources, and gaining, as he has been allowed to do, the left bank of the Danube without firing a shot.

But this would not have been the case. Judging from what Turkey was able to do during the campaigns we have described, when unanimity of purpose and military organization were wanting, we can scarcely doubt what would have been the result now, had she been allowed to meet her invaders on the Pruth, with her fine army, her well-appointed artillery, and, above all, with the unanimous and ardent spirit of her people.

The advantage arising from the uncontested possession of the Principalities, was not the only advantage gained by Russia by the postponement of hostilities. In addition

to the inactivity which had been recommended to the Ottoman fleet, the revenue and finances of Turkey suffered to an alarming extent by this delay; which could also scarcely fail to damp the almost unparalleled enthusiasm of the Turkish people.

The natural impatience of those who had come from the most distant parts of the empire to repel an unjust aggression on their country, obliged the Porte at length to take the initiative, in order to appease the growing, and even alarming discontent which prevailed among them.

CHAPTER XI.

ON THE PRESENT RESISTANCE OF TURKEY TO RUSSIA, AND

THE MEANS OF DEFENDING THE EMPIRE.

Turkish and Russian forces at the commencement of hostilities-Affair of the Russian flotilla-Omar Pasha crosses the Danube-Battle of Oltenitza-Avowed peaceable intentions of the Emperor Nicholas-Destruction of the Turkish flotilla at SinopePredicted fall of Turkey-Commerce of Turkey-Her importance to Europe-Possible invasion of India-Disadvantage caused to Turkey by delaying hostilities-Commerce of Odessa-Attacks of fortresses by fleets-Supposed movement against SebastopolState of Turkey in 1828-Russian fleet and army-Turkish fleet and army-Kurds and other irregulars-Supposed coup-de-main march towards Constantinople-Proposals for defending Turkey-Supposed marches of the invaders, and their probable Results.

WHEN the well-known patience of the Turkish people had been so completely exhausted that the Porte was constrained to declare war against Russia, the most advanced troops belonging to each of these powers were separated from each other by the river Danube.

The Turkish force in the field at this period, which occupied various posts in Bulgaria, under the Seraskier Omar Pasha, was called 100,000 men, but in reality scarcely exceeded 70,000 Prince Gortschakoff's troops,

which amounted to about 79,800 men, before sickness

thinned their ranks, were stationed at different places in Moldavia and Wallachia.

On the 23rd of October hostilities were commenced, by two Russian steamers with eight gun-boats attempting to force the passage of the Danube. On this occasion, the Russians had a lieutenant-colonel and twelve sailors killed, and fifty-nine men wounded, by the fire of the fort of Isaktchi.

A glance at the map will show that Omar Pasha's position in Bulgaria partly out-flanked that of the enemy, by the bend of the Danube above Widden, and again still more completely by its northerly sweep at the Dobrudscha.

The Turkish commander, therefore, might either have broken through the Russian line by a central movement towards Bucharest; or, by crossing the Danube at one or other of the preceding points, he could have turned either of Prince Gortschakoff's flanks, and thus have obliged him to change front, and concentrate with all speed to meet an attack.

The centre and left appear to have been the choice of the Pasha, and he effected the passage of the river at three points in the vicinity of Giurgevo, at Khalafat, and again at Turtukai. Several attacks made by the first corps, failed against the strong tête-de-pont of Giurgevo, but Khalafat and Turtukai were occupied by the Turks on the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of November.

This most brilliant operation will be best described in the modest language of Omar Pasha's bulletin; which has been confirmed from several sources, including even

the Russian all agreeing substantially with this account of their defeat.

"The possession of the island situate in front of Turtukai having been considered indispensable, I had effected the passage of troops, and in the space of the night of the 1st managed to raise tolerably strong fortifications. On the following day, the 2nd, two battalions of infantry, three pieces of cannon, and a hundred of the mounted police, were conveyed in large boats to the locality, with ammunition, provisions and great coats.

66

They had scarcely landed, when from the batteries of Turtukai we opened a fire on the lazaretto situate on the left bank. After the first discharge, the Russians quitted this position, and the imperial troops took possession of the building, which is of solid construction, with vaulted chambers. Without loss of time 400 workmen, under the direction of staff officers, commenced raising fortifications, for which purpose 2,000 gabions had been already prepared. On the 3rd, again, other troops were sent to fortify the tête de pont.

"As soon as the imperial troops had landed on the left bank of the river, the Russians, quartered in a large village at about an hour's distance, turned round, and began to retreat. A body of cavalry was despatched to reconnoitre, and, having encountered at Oltenitza an outpost of Cossack cavalry, they killed five, and rejoined our lines with a loss of three men. We found at Touzla, on the left bank, a great number of boats, which were sent to Turtukai.

"The number of boats at our disposal having facilitated the construction of the bridge, we were enabled without delay to place in the fortifications twelve large guns, which were brought from Schumla.

"On the 3rd, at 4 P. M., three battalions of Russian infantry, with eight cannons, a regiment of cavalry, and a party of Cossacks, entered the village of Oltenitza. Our troops, posted within the works constructed on the left bank, awaited them with firmness. This same night I caused a bridge to be constructed at the conflux of the Argisch and Danube, and flanked it with redoubts.

66 Yesterday, Nov. 4, at 6 A. M., we began to perceive the movement of the Russian forces. As soon as their march was well defined, I caused a reinforcement of one battalion to be embarked and conveyed