the want of hands, to withdraw six or seven hundred thousand men from productive industry, is to throw away what ought to be the means of ensuring her rapid advance in greatness. If a part of the money spent in keeping up an army so much larger than she could use were devoted to extending and improving her railways, and other means of communication, she would probably be able, whenever she may be engaged in war, to bring to the scene of action a more numerous, as well as a more effective force, than she will succeed in making available by adhering to her present policy.

As to France, we may hope she is wise enough not to cherish those purposes of vengeance, which the use by the Germans of their power as victors might naturally lead her to form; but she must earnestly desire to recover such strength and such a position, as not to be at the mercy of a power which, after severely exercising the hard rights of conquest, still maintains towards her an overbearing, if not a threatening attitude. But in order to recover her strength and her position, France, for a time at least, needs to reduce as low as possible the demands of the Government upon the nation for men and for money. By doing so she would much more quickly regain the power of defending herself from aggression than she can hope to do, if after the terrible losses she has sustained she calls upon the people to furnish conscripts enough to fill the ranks of an enormous army, and to bear taxes sufficient to pay for it. In former days, when it was Prussia that was trodden down without pity by triumphant France, this policy of husbanding her resources was that adopted by Prussia, not indeed by her free will, but with instructive success. In the treaty which closed the disastrous war of Jena, Prussia was compelled to bind herself not to keep up an army of more than 42,000 men. By imposing upon her this condition, her conqueror unconsciously did her a great service, as it obliged the Government for a time to moderate its demands upon the resources of the people, thus enabling the nation more speedily to recover its strength after its misfortunes. The condition they had been forced to agree to, suggested to the Prussian statesmen the plan of dismissing recruits as soon as they were trained into a reserve, in order to prepare the nation for another great struggle for independence; and there can be little doubt that the success of this scheme, by which Prussia was enabled to take so large a share in the uprising of Europe to throw off the French yoke in 1813, was greatly promoted by the limitation of the number of her army which had been imposed upon her with very different views by the first Napoleon. Now that France has in her turn suffered the calamities of a disastrous

disastrous war, her statesmen might have drawn from this example a useful lesson that does not seem to have occurred to them. And if what France is seeking were not merely security from Germany, but vengeance also, this object would be far more likely to be attained by the policy which has been described than by the steps that are being taken to increase her army. It is notorious that the German people are becoming exceedingly impatient of the heavy burden of their military system, and what mainly contributes to make them submit to it, is that the measures in progress for creating so large an army in France lead them to believe in the continual assertions of their rulers, that France is determined to renew the war as soon as she feels herself strong enough. Were it not that this is believed, it is most improbable that the severe strain of the German military system would long be borne, even if the power of the Government over the Parliament should be sufficient to prevent its being abandoned at once. A military law, bearing so hardly on the population as that now in force, could hardly be maintained in the German Empire, and especially in that part of it lately torn from France, if it were known that in France itself the numbers of the army had been reduced, and the oppressiveness of the conscription greatly mitigated.

Other important consequences in Germany might also be looked for, if the change suggested were to take place in the policy of France. One fact that helps to make the vast military power of Germany so formidable to her neighbours is, that it is practically wielded almost without control by a single statesman, whose well-known audacity and ambitious desire to aggrandise the empire he has formed, render it impossible to conjecture for what purposes it may be used. But the unbounded authority exercised by the Chancellor of the German Empire rests in no small degree upon the same apprehension of a new and deadly struggle with France, which for the present induces the German people to submit to the oppressive demands made upon them for military service. It is this apprehension that keeps together in support of a system of government almost arbitrary in its character men of very various opinions, including some of strong democratic inclinations. Were this bond of union withdrawn, men so differing from each other in their views would be likely soon to break up into conflicting parties. And were the public attention set free from the engrossing subject of providing for the national defence from dangers supposed to be imminent, difficult domestic questions could hardly fail to arise, those more especially which relate to religion and are already so embarrassing, would probably become far more so. France, by her

warlike

warlike preparations, is thus effectually playing the game of Prince Bismarck.

Turning, however, from these speculations, we would remark that it is the common interest of all the European nations, including Germany, that they should be relieved from the system which is now, as we have said, subjecting them in the midst of peace to a great part of the burdens of war. But much as it would be for the advantage of all countries to cease from wasting, in enormous military establishments, resources which, if differently applied, would add much to the welfare of their people, formidable obstacles stand in the way of so desirable a change. Though it is true that any nation which had the wisdom and courage to set the example of largely reducing the demands of its Government on the people for the army, would in a few years gain a great advantage in its relative position as regards real power over those that acted on the opposite principle; still it would be difficult to deny that in the first instance there would be at least some apparent danger in the experiment. The nation which first reduced its army among neighbours that continued to maintain a constant preparation for war, until it had had time to reap the benefit of the change, would seem to be left in a position of insecurity; and this is a hazard there is naturally an unwillingness to incur. Yet a general reduction of the continental armies could hardly be brought about by negotiations and agreement among the several Powers of Europe, since there is a just reluctance in every high-spirited nation to bind itself by engagements with others to keep its force within prescribed limits. Such engagements are so easily evaded that it is difficult to be sure that they will be fairly executed, while there is an obvious risk in one nation's giving to another a right to find fault with the arrangements it may deem it expedient to make for its own security.

In former times, any need for nations to keep themselves always ready for war was to a great extent obviated by the understanding, which prevailed among the European Powers, that they were all interested in maintaining the general peace, and that unjust aggression by any one of them would provoke combined resistance from the others. While this understanding prevailed, the nations of Europe felt that they were sufficiently safe with armies very small in comparison with those they are now forming; thus the evil of excessive armaments was averted, while the general peace was maintained with very slight interruptions for more than thirty years after the close of the great revolutionary war in 1815. A new state of things has now

arisen.

arisen. Nations no longer rely with as much confidence as they did either upon being exempt from unjust aggression, or upon finding, if they should be exposed to it, effective support from others. Hence the eagerness they show to make preparations for bringing the largest possible armies quickly into the field in case of need.

This is an unfortunate change for the world, and it has been. brought about in no slight degree through the fault of this country. For a good many years it has been the popular doctrine among us, that the right policy for England is one of what is called 'non-intervention' in the affairs of the Continent. When, some five-and-forty years ago, non-intervention' began. to be talked of as the rule we ought to follow, the words were used in a very different sense from that which has since been put upon them. It was non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States, which was then proclaimed as the policy of the Whig party. Its leaders justly held, in opposition to the system of the Holy Alliance, that every nation ought to be left free to determine its own form of government, and to manage its own internal affairs as it might judge best, and that any interference with this freedom by other nations was both unjust and impolitic. But in those days hardly any one ventured to assert that it would be wise for this country to stand quite aloof from the affairs of the Continent, and to look on with indifference if acts of injustice should be perpetrated, especially against any of the weaker nations. Non-intervention so understood would have been alike condemned by both of the two great parties of the State, and was the very opposite of the policy which each pursued when entrusted with the administration of affairs. Under the one, Portugal was effectually protected from Spanish interference, and under the other, even at the imminent risk of war, and not without some actual use of force, the right of Belgium to separate herself from Holland, and establish a Government of her own, was maintained by England in conjunction with France against Russia, Austria, and Prussia. The firmness in very critical circumstances shown by England on the last of these occasions saved Belgium from oppression, without producing a European war, maintained this country in the high position it had won, and for several years secured to the world the blessings of peace with a general sense of safety.

A different view of what is the interest and the duty of England in its relations with other States from that which was. then acted upon has since prevailed. In 1864, an attack was made upon Denmark by Austria and Prussia, which has been condemned, with scarcely a dissenting voice, by all who were

not.

war.

not parties to it, as most unjust and iniquitous. By the British Government it was emphatically disapproved, but, unfortunately, it was at the same time made manifest that no interference on its part beyond this expression of opinion need be apprehended. The language held in Parliament, not only by the Ministers of the Crown, but by the great majority of other statesmen, was to the effect that, although the attack of the German Powers upon Denmark was unjust, yet, as this country had no direct interest in the question, we ought to take no active steps to prevent it. Looking back at all the circumstances of the time, there seems no reason to doubt that it was in the power of England to have effectually protected Denmark without incurring any appreciable danger of being involved in If in a conciliatory tone, but still in such a manner as to show that it was in earnest, the British Government had intimated that it would not without opposition allow the commission of what it had declared to be a wrong, or any hostilities to be commenced against Denmark till the question that had arisen between that country and Germany had first been referred to arbitrators in accordance with the agreement come to by the European Powers in 1856, it is scarcely possible that such an interposition could have failed to arrest the contemplated aggression. Firmness like that displayed in behalf of Belgium thirty years earlier would have been almost certain, in 1864, again to prove successful in protecting a weak nation; while the danger to be faced in the last case would have been trifling indeed as compared with that which in the first had been encountered without dismay. But an alteration, as has been observed, had taken place in the views of our leading statesmen as to the principles that ought to guide the conduct of England in her relations with other nations, and it had been proclaimed that the right policy for us to pursue was one of the strictest and coldest selfishness; that we ought never to incur even the slightest hazard in order to prevent a flagrant wrong from being done, unless our own interests were threatened by it. This was the doctrine laid down by the leaders of the Opposition not less distinctly than by the Ministers in the discussions of 1864 on the affairs of Denmark. They blamed the Government for having mismanaged the negotiations, and for having excited delusive hopes of assistance in the Danes, but they fully adopted its opinion that British power ought not to be used to prevent an act of gross injustice and oppression when British interests were not directly affected.

Looking to the result, we may well doubt whether a policy of less ostentatious selfishness would not have proved better