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occur where this is the case. On the other hand, the facts and figures which we have given above, prove how unjust it is to make sweeping charges of indifference to human life against the shipowning class, to whose energy this country owes so much of its commercial prosperity. And if it is true that recklessness, whether on the part of shipowner, shipmaster, or sailor, exists, and that it does exist on the part of the latter, no one who knows anything of the class will deny, it must not be forgotten that carelessness and recklessness form the weak side of that daring character and spirit which has made England the first of maritime nations.

One, thing, however, may be positively stated with respect to Mr. Plimsoll's assertions. He has never proved them: he has scarcely attempted to prove them. Although he has stated that he would do so, although every opportunity has been afforded him of doing so in discussions in the House of Commons, in trials in Courts of Law, above all, by laying his facts before the Royal Commission on unseaworthy ships, he has not produced the proof which he has repeatedly promised. His own evidence, and that of the witnesses to whom he appealed, broke down. Indeed, the statistics of the Board of Trade, the result of their inquiries into shipwrecks, and their records of draught of water, are almost the only proved facts to which he appeals. And the use of these facts and figures, especially of those relating to the recorded draught of water, in themselves most imperfect, has been such that one is sometimes tempted to doubt the wisdom of making them public. It would be interesting to learn what assistance has been rendered by Mr. Plimsoll to the Board of Trade, in carrying into execution the stringent Acts of 1871 and 1873. He has had money and organisation at his disposal; and his attention must have been directed to the worst class of ships. But if we may judge from the evidence of the officials of the Board, his complaints have not been attended with any great success. It appears by a Parliamentary return,* that out of 418 ships reported to the Board by their own officers, 406 proved unseaworthy, and only 12 proved seaworthy; whilst it appears at the same time by the evidence of the Secretary of the Board of Trade,† that in 1873 Mr. Plimsoll made complaint to the Board concerning 26 ships, of which 16 proved seaworthy, and of which some were as fine ships as could be found in the British Merchant Navy.

Nor is this surprising to any one who understands the subject. There are among the seamen and their friends many loose and *Parl. Paper, C. 1152, 1875.

Evidence Royal Commission Question 11,730.

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bad characters who have differences with their employers, and it is not difficult for such men to impose false or groundless statements on a man whose benevolent enthusiasm can see only one side of the subject.

It is much to be desired that the public, whilst roused by Mr. Plimsoll's efforts to insist on every possible and reasonable precaution, could be warned by such considerations as these not to place implicit reliance either on his statements of fact or on his judgment in proposing remedies.

It appears to us, then, that whilst there are real evils to be met, there is at the present moment no cause for panic, no necessity for hasty, violent, and ill-considered remedies. It is a case in which a wise statesman may well take advantage of the present state of public feeling to consider what degree of disease exists; to make a careful diagnosis of it; and to apply remedies which shall act, not simply on some external symptoms, but. upon and through the constitution of the patient.

As regards the personnel of the Mercantile Marine, it has been already stated that the supply and condition of seamen is a vital point; and the remedies which have been suggested to meet this evil have been glanced at. The pressing question, however, in the present state of public feeling, relates to the ship rather than to the seaman.

As regards this part of the case, it cannot be too often repeated that there are two principles on which it is possible to proceed, and that we cannot logically or practically proceed on both. We may either leave the shipowner free to choose his means, and hold him responsible for the consequences if it proves that he has not adopted proper means; or we may choose the means for him, see by inspection that he adopts them, and then hold him free from further responsibility: but we cannot compel him to do certain specific things, and then hold him responsible for the consequences of doing them.

Pilotage is a good illustration. We may and sometimes do leave the shipowner to select his own pilot, and in that case we hold him responsible for what the pilot does; or we may, and sometimes unhappily do, compel the shipowner to place his ship under the charge of a particular pilot, and then we do not and cannot hold the shipowner responsible for any mischief the ship may do or suffer; but law and justice do not allow us to compel the shipowner to place himself in the hands of the pilot, and at the same time to hold him liable for all that the pilot does.

If people could but see this they would hesitate a little before seeking to prescribe particular things by law and to enforce such prescriptions by Government inspection. Whenever a loss

happens

happens for the want of some particular precaution, or whenever a new means of safety first presents itself, the impulse of the public is to say, 'Why is this not adopted in all cases?' and legislation, supposed to be omnipotent, is called in to enforce it. It would be impossible to give a complete list of the cases of this kind which have happened, even within our own recollection; but the following are some of them. In some instances the Legislature has interposed, in others it has not, and in some it has interposed and has subsequently withdrawn its interposition.

'Boats may sometimes save life in case of wreck ;' therefore let all ships be provided with boats according to a certain scale; which, by the way, it is often found impossible to enforce, and as often useless when enforced.* But boats may sink, therefore let them be fitted as life-boats; boats are often swamped in lowering, let them be fitted with Clifford's or some other patent apparatus; boats are useless unless properly manned, therefore let all captains be compelled to drill their crews in boat-exercise; boats' crews suffer from hunger, therefore require shipowners to carry provisions and water ready stowed in these boats; boats cannot possibly carry all the persons on board, therefore require collapsing rafts; boats may be too long in lowering to save a drowning man, therefore let there be lifebelts and life-buoys ;† life-belts and life-buoys may be of bad material, therefore prescribe their materials and make. A ship in danger should make signals of distress, require her to carry guns and rockets; when stranded she should be able to communicate with the shore, require her to carry rockets and lines for the purpose; her crew may not know how to use the rocket apparatus, require them to be drilled and examined in it; axes and tools are needed to cut away masts and rigging, require every ship to carry them; her pumps should be ample, prescribe the size and character of every ship's pumps; they may be choked by cargo, prescribe the way in which they shall be fitted and protected. Cables and anchors may part, require them to be tested; the test may injure them, require a breaking as well as a testing strain; the testing-machine may be imperfect, let it be inspected by Government; it may be fraudulently or negligently applied, place it in the hands of Government. Masts may be so large and heavy as to capsize a

* Boats are useful in the House of Commons; but in the terror and confusion of tempest and shipwreck they are too often useless. The Schiller' and the 'Deutschland' were both amply provided with boats, and they were lost within sight and hearing of our own shores. Yet in the one case, out of 372 souls on board, the ship's boats saved 27; in the other, out of 219 souls, they saved one.

In the case of the 'Schiller,' many of those who were drowned had lifebelts on.

ship; prescribe their size and character. The iron of which ships are built may be bad, prescribe its quality and let it all be tested and warranted by Government. Rivets are ill put in, let a Government inspector in every building-yard watch the workmen as they fix them. Iron bulkheads may be useful in case of leak, require them in every iron ship; they may be insufficient, specify therefore their number and size, though by so doing you actually limit what the good shipbuilder would himself do. Compasses suffer deviation, therefore require that they shall be adjusted; the adjustments may be inaccurately made, therefore let the adjusters be examined. Safety-valves are needed for boilers, therefore prescribe safety-valves; safety-valves may be tampered with, therefore require them to be locked up. Deck cargoes are sometimes dangerous, therefore prohibit all deck cargoes, or let the Government say what deck cargoes are dangerous and what are not. Ships are sometimes overloaded, therefore let the Government say how deep every ship may be loaded. Cargoes are sometimes badly loaded, therefore let Government say how every cargo is to be stowed; rules concerning stowage will be evaded, let there be inspectors to see that all ships are stowed according to rule. Crews are badly lodged, prescribe the accommodation to be given to them; they are badly fed, prescribe their food; they are badly tended in illness, prescribe their medicines; the deck-houses in which they are lodged are sometimes washed away, prohibit deck-houses altogether, and require them to be lodged below; when lodged below they want air and ventilation, and are sometimes tempted to plunder cargo, require them to be lodged in deck-houses. Seamen are often incompetent, require their seamanship to be tested, and let Government stamp and warrant every A.B.; they come on board drunk, let a Government officer see that they are sober; they come on board diseased, let a Government doctor inspect their persons, and warrant them healthy. Iron ships are dangerous, proscribe iron. Long ships are dangerous, let no ship be built whose length is more than seven times her breadth. Speed is sometimes dangerous, therefore let no steamer traverse the narrow seas by night at more than seven miles an hour. Such are a few, and only a few, of the proposals which philanthropists have urged, in many cases with success, upon Government and upon Parliament.

Now the first thing to be observed upon legislation of this kind is that it is perfectly endless. Every new accident, every new invention, every new circumstance and condition of navigation, brings with it new perils and new precautions; and if the Legislature is to adopt, define, and stereotype every detail

which it may be in some circumstances useful to adopt, it will indeed be taking on itself not only an endless task, but one which, like Penelope's web, will need undoing almost as fast as it is done.*

There is, indeed, one way in which, whilst retaining the principle of prescription and supervision, this endless detail of legislation may be avoided, viz., by vesting absolute powers and discretion in some public officer. The Legislature may abstain from saying, 'A ship shall be built, fitted, equipped, loaded, and manned in a particular manner;' and may say instead, 'Let her be built, fitted, equipped, loaded, and manned in such manner as some Government officer may require.' The Statute Book is thus relieved of a certain quantity of details, and more flexibility (assuming that the Government officers know their business) is given to the rules. But the certainty of what has to be done is less, and the chance of arbitrary interference greater. So far as regards the fettering of the free action of the shipowner, and relieving him from responsibility, the result is the same.

But in the next place, without asserting that practical legislation can be entirely guided by the logical application of any given principle, it seems to us that there are strong à priori objections to legislation proceeding on the principles we have been describing; and these objections may be summed up as follows:

1. By such interference you are setting two people to do the work of one. Double management is notoriously inefficient. One bad general is better than two good ones.

2. You set those who have less experience of management, and less personal interest in the result, to control those who have more.

3. You incur serious danger of corruption. The pay of your official is and must be small compared with the interests he has to control; and if the shipowner is the man he is represented to be, he will be only too ready to bribe. Nor can this be prevented by any exercise of administrative supervision. What, for instance, can the Government know of surveyors appointed, as Mr. Plimsoll now desires, by a Vice-Consul in some remote port

* Mr. Plimsoll, only a short year since, would have been satisfied with compulsory survey and compulsory load-line, as the two things needed for the safety of the Mercantile Marine. He has since learned that some grain ships have been lost by the shifting of their cargoes; and now he is urging the Government, with his wonted vehemence, to enforce on all corn-carrying ships a stereotyped system of stowage, elaborated to the minutest details; and this for a trade which in the year 1872 brought one hundred millions of hundredweights of food to this country, and which in the present year will probably bring more.

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