this confines, with entire certainty, the disbursements of each year within that year; and an official'nest egg,' for future use, is now an impossibility. A power of meeting the call of special emergencies must be vested in the Executive; this fact is admitted by Parliament, an admission obviously unavoidable. In our world-wide Empire, sudden outbreaks of war, pestilence, or famine, periodically occur far from the seat of Government, creating as sudden a call for money. And, with the express object of answering these emergencies, sums are voted yearly, to the account of the Treasury-chest and of the Civil Contingencies Fund in the amounts of 1,300,000l. and 120,000l.* In spite, however, of this provision, the discretionary authority, of necessity lodged in the Government, of meeting new and unforeseen expenditure is an ever-recurring snare to our public servants, and the plague of the Accounts' Committee. That annual aggregate vote of 1,420,0007. barely suffices for the extraordinary demands of the Civil and Colonial Service, and does not meet at all the ordinary requirements of the Army and Navy. So Parliament has made a virtue of necessity. Acting upon the system already mentioned, the Naval and Military Departments are empowered to apply such unexpended balances as they can contrive to retain out of their annual aids, towards objects and undertakings which they feel require exceptional and immediate assistance. The practical working of this arrangement shall be illustrated by actual examples. People were used to frank speech a century ago. During the Session of 1778, the First Lord' of that day, told the House that of 135,000l. it had voted for the repair of certain ships, not one shilling' had been so spent, but had gone in other ways; and he admitted, by his silence, that those ships were rotting at Spithead. Such a confession excited the wrath of his hearers, though that wrath was exhibited in a mode more suited to those times than to our times; for, hot with indignation, Burke, by way of reply, threw the book of Navy Estimates at the Treasury bench, which, taking the candle in its course, had nearly struck Mr. Ellis's shins.' † Our own time shall now be called into evidence; taking a flight across the Admiralty records from 1778 to 1869, the accounts for that year disclose the following transaction. Owing to unforeseen delay in the progress of certain Dockyard works at Portsmouth, the Admiralty was not able to expend the sum of 100,000l. out of the grant 6 *Todd, 'Parliamentary Government,' i. 546, 592. Public Accounts' Committee, Second Report,' 1862. † February 3rd, 1778. Parl. Hist.,' xix. 729. which Parliament had devoted to that purpose for the year 1869. That sum was accordingly spent in recouping a contractor for losses which had undeservedly befallen him,-in buying a house at Whitehall,-building jetties at Hong Kong,-upon works at Malta, &c. &c. The 100,000l. designed by Parliament for our home defence were thus dispersed all over the world; or rather, to use technical and official language, the saving' on Portsmouth Dockyard was applied to deficiencies' on those other services.* 6 6 Technical and official language, at best a jargon, may be in money matters a deceptive jargon. That Admiralty transaction assumes a very different character, when criticised according to an official, or to a natural interpretation of the words 'estimate," 'saving,' and 'deficiency.' According to the most approved definition of the word, an estimate is a statement of a probable charge made and submitted to Parliament before that charge is incurred.' Taken by itself, and confiding in that definition, an estimate seems something highly satisfactory; but it assumes a different complexion when combined with those two other official terms deficiency' and 'saving.' The word deficiency' explains itself: it means an hiatus, a void space; the Admiralty had not received from Parliament the means to purchase a house at Whitehall, that outlay, therefore, must have caused a void space in the resources of the Admiralty. A saving' is a word of pleasant sound, telling of a gain, a sum free and discharged from any liability-of something, in fact, that is one's own. Such is a saving in the unofficial world; but in the world official the word means, not the extinction for ever of a cause of expense, but only a postponement of expenditure; the saving of one year may, and sometimes must become the deficiency of the next. So of these official terms, when analysed, a deficiency proves the sole reality to the taxpayer, and a saving rather like a loss. And as for the documents styled estimates,'-thus tested, most grievously do they resemble the estimates of former days, which were described by one in authority, as the usual mode of raising money, but were not meant to state the purposes to which that money was to be applied.' For, according to the estimate of 1869, the destination of that sum of 100,000l. was not Malta, or Hong-Kong, but Portsmouth Dockyard; and as 6 * Public Accounts' Committee, Second Report,' 1870, p. 10. Statement of savings and deficiencies for year ended March 31st, 1869. + Ibid., 'Second Report,' 1862, p. 108. (Mr. Gladstone's evidence.) Debate on Navy Estimates, February 13th, 1778. 'Parl. Hist.' xix. 729. that that amount must shortly have been required, if the final completion of that Dockyard was not unduly delayed, could that 100,000l. when it reappeared upon the Admiralty estimates be fairly described as a charge submitted to Parliament, before it was incurred'? Nor can the full scope of this financial practice be appreciated, without a reminder, that these so-called savings may be created, not only by unavoidable accidents, but by an intentional postponement of expenditure. These transactions surely assume a graver aspect, when savings are designedly obtained, and spring, not from necessity, but from the discretion of Departmental authorities? For that good quality discretion is capable of playing tricks 'high fantastical' with official intellects, and with the national resources; and discretion might suggest that an outlay on risky scientific experiments is preferable to the acquisition of blue-jackets' or gunpowder. What protection exists, it may be asked, with some anxiety, against the exercise by our Naval and Military Departments, of this large discretionary power without true discretion? One security lies in the check placed upon Departments by the annual surrender back into the Exchequer of all their cash in hand; another is the scrutiny exerted by the Public Accounts' Committee; and the third protection, is the distinct supervision of the House of Commons itself over the discretionary expenditure permitted to those Departments. This final safeguard was recommended by the Accounts' Committee. Those skilled advisers felt that the legislative powers of Parliament should be brought into play, not only as a restraint upon official extravagance in general, but in order that the control which the Treasury exercises over these transactions should be both limited and strengthened. A primary authority over all Imperial finance is entrusted by law and custom to that Office; and it is prescribed that no Department may apply any surplus which may exist under one vote, to supply the deficiency on others, without the previous express sanction of the Treasury.' If this regulation could be enforced with strictness, it would be highly effective. But the Treasury sanction, though always express,' is never a 'previous' sanction: the liability for the outlay, even the outlay itself, first occurs, then follows the application for approval. This is unavoidable: an active control over other people's expenditure cannot be assumed, without assuming as active a share in their daily work. This, of course, is not possible to the Treasury. So, as the money is gone; and as-to use the saying of a thrifty people- there's no getting a pound of butter out out of a black dog's throat,' the Treasury invariably sanctions that mode of applying savings' to 'deficiencies,' which we have illustrated by a specimen from the Naval records of the year 1869. That sanction, however, under the last modification of the system, is not final and complete until ratified by the deliberate vote of the House of Commons. This vote of ratification is accompanied by all the Parliamentary ceremonial which governs the actual grant of money, and is made as formal-the word is used in its best sense-as possible. The precise efficacy of the procedure was, however, gauged by the Commons themselves, at the outset of the practice. In the Session of 1864, when, for the first time, their approval was desired, of the temporary sanction obtained from the Treasury by the Navy and Army Departments to expenditure not provided in the grants for that year;' it was pertinently asked, what would be the positive result, if the House refused that approval?' The answer-a happy escape from a perplexing suggestion-was: My reply, must be very like Mr. Speaker Onslow's reply, when questioned as to the consequence of his naming a member-Heaven knows!' Still, it was added, if ministers misused the financial powers entrusted to them, a vote of censure might be moved.† Thus brought up hard and fast against the extreme limit of their authority, the Commons finding that they could do nothing better than to follow the example of the Treasury, conferred their Parliamentary sanction on what had received Departmental sanction. And to the present day they continue so to act, always without a murmur, almost always without even a word of comment. The last proposal, indeed, of the sessional resolution approving the application by our Naval and Military establishments of the supplies entrusted to them, provoked remarks on the import of the procedure; and those remarks were answered by the Secretary to the Treasury, with a clearness and brevity, which equally deserved and gained his hearers' applause. But on the ten previous occasions, when this procedure took place, that resolution,-read to the House by their Chairman, usually between one and two in the morning,-was accepted by his hearers, all wrapt in a discreet silence. To class forms and prescribed usage among things indifferent, is somewhat the inclination of the hour; and although our readers may be inclined to surmise, that the Parliamentary cere * 'Parliamentary Practice,' Sir T. Erskine May, 618; Todd, 'Parliamentary Government,' i. 556; Public Accounts' Committee, Report,' 1864. + Debate on Navy and Army Expenditure, July 18th, 1864; Hans. Deb.,' 3rd series, 176, 1695. monial, monial, just described, wears no very terrifying aspect, still it must not be deemed inoperative, but as acting in reality most beneficially upon the public service.* That final resolution of the House of Commons is but the end of a long chain of delegated trust, guarded throughout its length by that faithful public servant, Publicity.' The discretionary expenditure entrusted to the Departments is always exposed to the test of protracted correspondence, occasionally to strong remonstrance: appeal, too, lies to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and from him to the Cabinet. And as the statements and documents which these transactions have occasioned are laid before Parliament, the outside world is supposed to take a share of the responsibility. By the action, also, of the Exchequer and Audit Act, 1866, the exact destiny of every shilling which passes from the Treasury is exposed to the view of all, and especially of the Accounts' Committee.† As every movement, however advantageous, must be fraught with attendant dangers, and may even inflict incidental injuries, -having claimed for the financial progress of the last twenty years an admiration it deserves, we will pass round to the reverse, or gloomier side of that subject, and study, for a few minutes, the lessons it conveys. One lesson is, that immediate danger attends the slightest deviation from a long-established method for the receipt or disbursement of money, because the moment of change is the defrauder's special opportunity. A sinecure place, for instance, was not long since abolished; whilst it existed, the office to which the post was attached, was an absolutely faithful custodian of its funds. But, the socalled sinecurist removed, forthwith that portion of the nation's income which was collected in that office, flowed away to the extent of 65,000l. And the same hazard attends the slightest displacement of the superintending authorities in a financial hierarchy. The mere temporary appointment by the Treasury of a Finance Committee to improve the system of its accounts, provoked and concealed a serious defalcation, which recently occurred from the receipts of the Science and Art Department ;§ and the conflicting action of Committees and Commissioners, undoubtedly both fostered, and shielded from view, the irregular expenditure upon the palace at Westminster which came to light in 1861. The Telegraph Service *Todd, 'Parliamentary Government,' i. 567; Public Accounts' Committee, Report,' 1865. Parliamentary Practice,' Sir T. Erskine May, 618. Debate, July 26th, 1854. Hans. Deb.,' 3rd series, 135, 787. § Public Accounts' Committee, 'Second Report,' 1872, p. 9. 'scandal' |