that if the report is not excepted to the court shall frame a verdict or decree thereon, as may be proper.1 Parts of a report not excepted to are admitted to be correct, not only as regards principles, but also as relates to the evidence on which they are founded. A party may at any time abandon his exceptions to a master's report, and under United States Equity Rule 83 the report will stand confirmed in one month after such withdrawal. So, too, he may, at any time, withdraw such exceptions, and by such withdrawal the correctness of such findings is admitted. Such abandonment or withdrawal leaves the case precisely as if no exceptions had ever been taken. If no objections to the report are filed before the master, an order entered by the chancellor "that the objections filed before the master stand as exceptions to the report" is futile, because there is nothing to which the order can apply.' 444. Time of filing. In all cases where a dissatisfied party desires to contest a matter in which exceptions are necessary, counsel should see that his exceptions are filed in time. The time in which such exceptions must be filed is regulated either by the general practice in courts of chancery, or the time may be limited by a rule of court, or by statute. In case there is no rule of court or statutory provision controlling the manner, the regular time for excepting to a master's report, where it requires confirmation, is before it is confirmed absolutely; but there are instances where the court has permitted exceptions to be filed after the confirmation of the master's report.s 1 Code, sec. 4601. 2 Thompson v. Catlett, 24 W. Va. 524, 540; Perkins v. Saunders, 2 Hen. & M. 420; Wyatt v. Thompson, 10 W. Va. 645; Smith v. Smith, 4 Johns. Ch. 445; Hyman v. Smith, 10 W. Va. 298; Baxter v. Blodgett, 63 Vt. 629, 22 Atl. 625; Scofield v. Stoddard, 58 Vt. 290, 5 Atl. 314; Chapman v. Chalfant, 14 W. Va. 531; Appeal of Dickey (Pa.), 7 Atl. 577; Ward v. Ward, 21 W. Va. 262; Singer v. Steele, 125 Fl. 426, 17 N. E. 761; Wilkes v. Rodgers, 6 Johns. 566; Smalley v. Corliss, 37 United States Equity Rule 83 provides that "the parties shall have one month from the time of filing the report to file exceptions thereto; and, if no exceptions are within that period filed by either party, the report shall stand confirmed on the next rule-day after the month is expired." The term "month,” as used in the federal rule, limiting the time to file exceptions, means a calendar month and not a lunar month. In the federal courts the month allowed by rule for filing exceptions to the report of the master does not begin to run until the report is filed in the clerk's office. And where the report as filed is so incomplete that a final decree cannot be made on it, and, to avoid a recommittal, the parties by stipulation supply the facts necessary to complete it, such stipulation takes the place of a further report. Until the complete report was filed, “or something equal to it," the month allowed for filing exceptions did not begin to run. This equity rule has no application to a report of sale made by a master.3 2 In Arkansas all questions as to the correctness of the master's report or of his rulings made during the progress of a reference are raised by objections and exceptions made during the hearing, which the master, upon request, is required to state in his report. Under the statute evidence is taken in writing and returned with his report into court. After his report is filed the parties have four days to file exceptions to the same. The section relative to exceptions is as follows: "Exceptions may be allowed to the master's report where he admitted incompetent testimony, or where he excluded competent testimony, or for any other cause which may be adjudged good by the court, or when it shall be apparent from the face of the report that injustice has been done.”5 In Pennsylvania it is provided by a supreme court equity rule that, where exceptions to the findings of a referee have been filed with him and returned into court with his findings, the party so excepting may at any time within ten days take exceptions to the action of the referee, and that "the case shall 1 Gasquet v. Crescent City Brewing Co., 49 Fed. 493. 2 Bridges v. Sheldon, 7 Fed. 17, 36. 3 Pewabic Min. Co. v. Mason, 145 U. S. 349, 12 Sup. Ct. R. 887. 4 Sandel & Hill's Digest, Code, $5956; Roberts v. Totten, 13 Ark. 609, 618. Id., § 5960. thereupon be placed upon the equity argument list next to be heard in said court, and the exceptions heard by the court or judge acting as chancellor in the case, and disposed of; whereupon the proper decree shall be made and entered, subject to the right of appeal to the supreme court, as provided by law.”1 By Chancery Rule No. 95, in Alabama, it is provided that: "Reports of the register, read in open court on one day, may be confirmed the next, unless excepted to." It is further provided that: "The chancellor may extend the time for excepting to reports, and for hearing exceptions, to such day or days as he may deem proper." In Georgia it is provided by the Code, section 4589, that "within twenty days after the report is filed and such notice given, either party may file exceptions, to be separately classified as 'exceptions of law,' and 'exceptions of fact."" § 445. Time of filing Continued. Where the court has. by an order limited the time for filing exceptions to a master's report and that time has expired, exceptions cannot be thereafter filed except by leave of court upon good cause shown. When exceptions have not been filed within the time allowed for that purpose, it is within the discretion of the court to permit them to be filed thereafter upon proper cause shown. Where a party desiring to file exceptions to a master's report fails to file the same within the time limited by rule, because of an agreement between his solicitor and the solicitor of the complainant, such exceptions may, in the discretion of the court, be afterwards filed and argument heard thereon, notwithstanding his laches. Application for leave to file exceptions after the time has expired for so doing must be seasonably made, or a reasonable excuse made for delay, as well as for failure to comply with the rule. Such motion must be accompanied with proof of the facts constituting an equity which would take the case out of the rule. 11 Brewster, Eq. Pr., § 5177. 2 Cook V. Com'rs of Houston County, 62 Ga. 224, 228; Suttles v. Smith, 75 Ga. 830, 833; Lane v. Macon & Atl. Ry. Co., 96 Ga. 630, 644, 24 S. E. 157. Stewart v. Crane, 87 Ga. 328, 13 S. E. 552; Hoppock v. Ramsey, 28 N. J. Eq. 166; Miller v. Miller, 26 N. 4 Hoppock's Ex'rs v. Ramsey, 28 N. J. Eq. 166. 5 Cook v. Com'rs of Houston County, 62 Ga. 223; Burnett v. State, 87 Ga. 622, 13 S. E. 552. 6 See Foster v. Van Ranst, 1 Hill's Parties will not be permitted by unreasonable delay to protract litigation; hence where delay has occurred, some reasonable excuse must be shown to the court or leave to file exceptions will be denied. The chancellor should not arbitrarily allow new and distinct exceptions to be filed after the expiration of the time originally limited. An exception filed after the argument and decision of the court in the cause will not generally be considered by the court in the case. Where the report was returned October 11, 1838, and the exception was not made until April 24, 1845, and not until the case had been heard without objection, had been argued by counsel, and the opinion of the court pronounced against the parties excepting, the exception was disregarded. But an exception may be filed even after confirmation of the report where to do otherwise would work injustice. In Georgia, however, a statutory provision limiting the time for filing exceptions received a harsh construction in a recent case. The code provides that exceptions are to be filled within twenty days after notice of filing the report, and it is held that this law makes no provision for extending the time in the event counsel is prevented by providential cause from filing exceptions within the time named, and in the absence of a provision to this effect, that the court had no authority to allow exceptions to be filed after the expiration of the twenty days." It was therefore held that the fact that counsel was "taken violently, suddenly and unexpectedly sick" was no excuse for failure to file the exceptions within the time limited. Where a party files objections not within the time limited, and no objection is made, the default is waived." Eq. 185; Gasquet v. Crescent City 1 Cook v. Com'rs of Houston County, 62 Ga. 224, 228; Suttles v. Smith, 75 Ga. 830, 833; Lane v. Macon & Atl. Ry. Co., 96 Ga. 630, 644, 24 S. E. 157. 2 Arthur v. Gordon Co., 67 Ga. 220; Suttles v. Smith, 75 Ga. 830, 833; Lane v. Macon & Atl. Ry. Co., 96 Ga. 630, 644, 24 S. E. 157. 3 Miller v. Holcomb's Ex'r et al., 9 Grat. 667; Chapman's Adm'r v. Shepherd's Adm'r et al., 24 Grat 377. 4 Wooding v. Bradley, 76 Va. 614. 5 Littleton & Lamar v. Patton &. Co., 112 Ga., 430, 442, 37 S. E. 755. " Id. Ex parte Jordan, 94 U. S. 248; Bryant v. McCollum, 4 Heisk. 511. For local rule as to extending time for filing exceptions in Rhode Island, see Clapp v. Sherman, 17 Atl. 130. § 446. Grounds of exceptions.— The dividing line between matters which must be reached by exceptions and those which can only be raised by a motion or petition is not sharply defined. On principle the rule is easily stated as follows: If a party desires to contest a finding upon matters submitted to the master, he must do so by an exception; but if he desires to question a ruling of the master in a matter which, if wrong, amounts to only an irregularity or an error in procedure, he should do so by motion or petition. This subject has been fully discussed in a previous section; but some additional suggestions will be offered in this connection. First. It is clearly settled that, if a party seeks to question a conclusion of fact reported by the master, he must do so by exception and not by motion. The rule may be stated thus: The province of exceptions to the report of a master is to call in question the conclusion to which he has come upon the subjects referred to him. That is, exceptions to a master's report are only proper when he has made an erroneous decision upon the matters referred to him, and must be to the conclusions, holdings or findings of the master, and not to the evidence.* Second. Such an exception may be upon the ground that the conclusion is not supported by the evidence or it may be that the conclusion is not warranted by the pleadings. If a party excepts to the findings of the master on the ground that they are not warranted by the averments of the bill, or, in other words, that the allegata and probata do not correspond, he must point out specifically in what the alleged variance consists, and thus allow an amendment of the bill if desired." Third. Such exception can only be taken to a material holding or conclusion of the master. An exception to a master's report on the ground that the master failed to find a certain immaterial fact must be overruled. Where a party excepts to an immaterial finding of 1 See "Irregularities in Proceedings How Corrected," ante, §§ 313323; also ante, §§ 427-431. 2 Douglas v. Merceles, 24 N. J. Eq. 25, 26; Weber v. Weitling, 18 N. J. Eq. 39; Tyler v. Simmons, 6 Paige, 127. 3 Taylor v. Robertson, 27 Fed. 537. 4 Friedman v. Schoengen, 59 Ill. App. 377. 5 Thornton v. Commonwealth Loan Ass'n, 181 Ill. 456, 458, 459, 54 N. E. 1037. Dierks v. Com'rs of Highways, 142 Ill. 197, 205, 31 N. E. 496; Anderson v. Moore, 145 Ill. 61. 67, 33 N. E. 848. |