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Pronouns, and, as we have just observed, no other person can have a share in conversation or declamation. An absent person or an absent thing may be the subject of conversation, but cannot be the speaker or the person addressed. HE, SHE, and IT, however, as they stand by themselves, and assume the power of nouns, are very properly denominated pronouns; but they are not personal pronouns in any other sense than as the negation of sex is the neuter gender. 38. We have already seen that nouns admit of number; pronouns, which are their substitutes, likewise admit of number. There may be MANY speakers at once of the same sentiment, as well as one, who, including himself, speaks the sentiment of MANY; speech may likewise be addressed to MANY at a time, as well as to ONE; and the subject of the discourse may likewise be MANY. The pronoun, therefore, of every one of the persons must admit of number to express this singularity or plurality. Hence the pronoun of the first person I, has the plural WE; that of the second person THOU, has the plural YE or YOU; and that of the third person HE, SHE, or IT, has the plural THEY, which is equally applied to all the three genders.

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The Greeks and Romans, when addressing one person, used the pronoun in the singular number THOU; whereas, in the polite and even in the familiar style, we, and many other modern nations, use the plural You. The second Although in this case we apply YOU to a single person, personal yet the verb must agree with it in the plural number; pronoun it must necessarily be, you have, not you hast. You used in the plural num WAS-the second person plural of the pronoun placed ber when in agreement with the first or third person singular of the verb, is an enormous, though common, solecism, which ought to be carefully avoided. In very solemn style, as when we address the Supreme Being, we use THOU-perhaps to indicate that he is God alone, and that there is none like unto him; and we sometimes use the same form of the pronoun in contemptuous or very familiar language, to intimate that the person to whom we speak is the meanest of human beings, or the dearest and most familiar of our friends. A king, exerting his authority on a solemn occasion, adopts the plural of the first person, "WE strictly command and charge;" meaning, that he acts by the advice of counsellors, or rather as the representative of a whole people. But in all cases in which the use of the pronoun deviates from the nature of things, the verb in concord deviates with it; for, as will be seen afterwards, these two words universally agree in number and person.

only one person is addressed.

35 The pro

39. But though all these pronouns have number, nouns of neither in Greek, Latin, or any modern language, do the first and those of the first and second person carry the distinctions second per- of sex. The reason is obvious (H), namely, that sex and sons have

no varia

tions to de:

note sex,

and why.

all other properties and attributes whatever, except Pronouns.
those mentioned above as descriptive of the nature of
these pronouns, are foreign from the intention of the
speaker, who, when he uses the pronoun 1, means THE
PERSON WHO NOW SPEAKS-no matter whether man
or woman and when the pronoun THOU-THE PER-
SON-no matter whether man or woman-TO WHOM
HE NOW ADDRESSES HIMSELF-and nothing more. 36
But the pronoun of the third person denoting neither In this re
the speaker nor the hearer, but the subject of the dis-spect the
course, and being merely the substitute of a noun which pronoun of
the third
may be either masculine, feminine, or neuter, must of person
necessity agree with the noun which it represents, and differs from
admit of a triple distinction significant of gender. In the first
English, which allows its adjectives no genders, this and second.
pronoun is HE in the masculine, SHE in the feminine,
and IT in the neuter; the utility of which distinction
may be better found in supposing it away. Suppose for
example, that we should in history read these words:
He caused him to destroy him—and were informed that
the pronoun, which is here thrice repeated, stood each
time for something different; that is to say, for a man,
for a woman, and for a city, whose names were Alex-
ander, Thais, and Persepolis. Taking the pronoun
in this manner-divested of its gender-how would it
appear which was destroyed, which the destroyer, and
which the cause that moved to the destruction? But
there is no ambiguity when we hear the genders distin-
guished: when we are told with the proper distinc-
tions, that SHE caused HIM to destroy IT, we know
with certainty, that the prompter was the woman; that
her instrument was the hero; and that the subject of
their cruelty was the unfortunate city. From this ex-
ample we would be surprised how the Italians, French,
and Spaniards, could express themselves with precision
or elegance with no more than two variations of this.
pronoun.

37 The cases

40. Although in every language with which we are acquainted, there is but one pronoun for each of the of profirst and second persons; and although it is obvious nouns. from the nature and import of those words, that no more can be necessary; yet the mere English reader may perhaps be puzzled with finding three distinct words applied to each; I, MINE, and ME, for the first person; THOU, THINE, and THEE, for the second. The learned reader will see at once that the words MINE and ME, THINE and THEE, are equivalent to the genitive and accusative cases of the Latin pronouns of the first and second persons. That MINE is a pronoun in the possessive case is obvious; for if I were asked "whose book is that before me?" I should reply"It is MINE (1);" meaning that it belongs to me. That

(H) The reason assigned by Mr Harris and his followers is, that "the speaker and hearer being generally present to each other, it would have been superfluous to have marked a distinction by art, which from nature and even dress was commonly apparent on both sides. This is perhaps the best reason which their description of the personal pronouns admits, but it is not satisfactory; for the speaker and hearer may meet in the dark, when different dresses cannot be distinguished.

(1) If we mistake not, Dr Johnson has somewhere affected to ridicule Bishop Lowth for considering the word MINE as the possessive case of the pronoun of the first person. According to the doctor, MINE is the same word with the pronominal adjective MY; and was anciently used before a vowel, as MY was before a consonant. This is not said with the great Lexicographer's usual precision. That MINE was anciently used before a vowel is certain; but it does not therefore follow, that it is the same word with MY. If it were, we might on every

occasion

coalescence of the pronouns of the first and second per- Pronouns, sons is likewise impossible.

Pronouns. That the word ME is the same pronoun in the case which the Latin grammarians call the accusative, is evident from the import of that word in the sentence HE ADMIRES ME, where the admiration is supposed to proceed from (K) the person spoken of to the person who speaks. It appears therefore, that though English nouns have only two cases, the nominative and possessive, the pronouns of that language have three, as 1, MINE, ME; THOU, THINE, THEE; HE, HIS, HIM, &c. That these are cases, can be questioned by no man who admits that mei, mihi, me, are cases of the Latin pronoun EGO. Both pronouns, the Latin and the English, are irregularly inflected: and perhaps those words which are called the oblique cases of each may have originally been derived from nominatives different from EGO and I; but these nominatives are now lost, and mei and mine have, beyond all dispute, the effect of the genitives of the Latin and English pronouns of the first person. These variations, however, cannot be looked upon as an essential part of language, but only as a particular refinement invented to prevent the disagreeable repetition of the pronoun, which must frequently have happened without such a contrivance. This seems to have been the only reason why pronouns have been endowed with a greater variety of cases than nouns. Nouns are in themselves greatly diversified. Every genus and every species of objects has a distinct name, and therefore the sameness of sound does not so often occur among them as it would among the pronouns, without cases, where the same I, THOU, HE, SHE, or IT, answers for every object which occurs in nature: but by this diversity in the form of the words, the cacophonia, which would be otherwise disgusting, is in a great measure avoided. It is, probably, for the same reason, that the plural of each of these pronouns is so very dif ferent from the singular. Thus from I, MINE, ME, in the singular, is formed, in the plural, WE, OURS, US; from THOU, THINE, and THEE, YE or YOU, YOURS, YOU; and from HE, SHE, IT, HIS, HERS, ITS, HIM, HER, IT, in the singular, THEY, THEIRS, THEM, in the plural. In all of which there is not the least resemblance between the singular and plural of any one word: and except in HE, HIS, HIM; IT, ITS; THEY, THEIRS, THEM; there is not any similarity between the different cases of the same word in the same number.

38

Lives.

42. I, THOU, HE, SHE, and IT, are all that are usually 39 called personal pronouns. There is another class of Pronomiwords, which are called sometimes pronominal adjectives, nal adjec sometimes adjective pronouns, sometimes possessive pronouns; and by one writer of grammar they have been most absurdly termed pronominal articles. It is not worth while to dispute about a name; but the words in question are MY, THY, HER, OUR, YOUR, THEIR. These words are evidently in the form of adjectives: for, like other English adjectives, they have no variation to indicate either gender, number, or case; and yet they are put in concord with nouns of every gender and both numbers, as MY WIFE, MY SON, MY BOOK-HER HUSBAND, HER SONS, HER DAUGHTERS, &c. But, though in the form of adjectives, they have the power of the personal pronouns in the possessive case: MY BOOK is the book of ME, or the book of HIM WHO NOW SPEAKS; OUR HOUSE is the house of us, or the house occupied by the PERSONS WHO NOW SPEAK; HER HUSBAND, is the husband of a woman who can be known only from something preceding in the discourse; and THEIR PROPERTY is the property of themof any persons, whether men or women, or both, who have been previously mentioned. Words which have the form of adjectives, with the power of pronouns, may, without impropriety, be called pronominal adjectives; and such is the name by which we shall henceforth distinguish them. To these pronominal adjectives as well as to the personal pronouns, are subjoined the words own and self-in the plural selves: in which case they are emphatical, and imply a silent contrariety or opposition. Thus, I live in my own house; that is, not in a hired house. This I did with my own hand; that is, not by proxy. This was done by myself; that is, not by another. The word self subjoined to a personal pro- The reci noun forms also the reciprocal pronoun; as we hurt our- procal proselves by vain rage; he blamed himself for his misfor- noun. tune. Himself, itself, themselves are supposed by Wallis to be put, by corruption, for his self, its self, their selves; so that self is always a substantive or noun, and not a pronoun. This seems to be a just observation ; for we say, the man came himself; they went themselves; where the words himself and themselves cannot be accusatives but nominatives, and were anciently written his self, their selves.

There are other words which are usually ranked under the class of pronouns: as who, which, what. These, when employed in asking questions, are called interrogative pronouns; though a name more characteristic might surely be found for them. Their import, however, will be more easily ascertained after we have considered another species of pronouns, which have been denominated relatives, and with which they are intimately connected.

40

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43. The pronouns already mentioned may be called The relaprepositive, as may indeed all substantives, because tive prothey are capable of introducing or leading a sentence; noun. but

The first

pronouns coalesce with the third.

41. From the account here given of the personal and second pronouns, it appears that the first or second will, either personal of them, coalesce with the third, but not with each other. For example, it is good sense, as well as good grammar, to say in any language, I AM HE-THOU ART HE-WE WERE THEY YOU WERE THEY; but we cannot say-I AM THOU—nor THOU ART I-nor WE ARE YOU, &c. The reason is, there is no absurdity for the speaker to be the subject also of the discourse, as when it is said-I am he; or for the person addressed, as when we say, thou art he. But for the same person, in the same circumstances, to be at once the speaker and the party addressed, is impossible; for which reason the

occasion substitute either of these for the other, without offending against grammar, however we might injure the sound; but we apprehend that this is not the case. "That book is MINE," is good English; but "that book is my" would be a gross solecism: the reason is, that MINE is a genuine pronoun, and stands by itself with the power of a noun; but MY, being an adjective, cannot stand by itself.

(K) See Chap. I. 18, 19. on the Cases of Nouns.

5

fer, his wisdom; but if there were such a word as pau- Pronouns.
ciloquens, that quality might very properly be ex-
pressed by it, and the phrase vir sapit pauciloquens
would express the same assertion with vir sapit qui
pauca loquitur.

Pronouns, but there is another pronoun which has a character peculiar to itself; and which, as it is never employed but to connect, sentences, and must therefore have always a reference to something preceding, is called the subjunctive or relative pronoun. This pronoun is in Greek, os,, ; in Latin, QUI, QUÆ, QUOD; and in English, WHO, which, what.

42

44. In order to determine with precision the nature and import of the relative pronoun, it will be necessary to ascertain the powers which it contains, or the parts of speech into which it is capable of being resolved. Represents Now, it is obvious, that there is not a single noun, or any noun, prepositive pronoun, which the relative is not capable of or prepo- representing: for we say, I, WHO saw him yesterday, cannot be mistaken; YOU, WHO did not see him, may have been misinformed; THEY, WHO neither saw nor heard, can know nothing of the matter; THE THINGS, WHICH he exhibited, were wonderful. From these examples it is apparent, in the first place, that the relative contains in itself the force of any other pronoun; but it contains something more.

sitive pronoun;

44

Now if a relative clause expresses that which might be expressed by an adjective, the presumption is, that it may be resolved into the same constituent parts. But every adjective contains the powers of an abstract substantive, together with an expression of connection; and may be resolved into the genitive case of that substantive, or into the nominative with the particle of pre- Of the fixed, which, in English, corresponds to the termination same imof the genitive in the ancient languages. That the port with the Engmember of a sentence, in which there is a relative, may, lish prepoin every instance, be analysed in the same manner, will sition of. be apparent from the following examples. Vir qui sapit, vir sapiens, and vir sapientiæ; a man who is wise, a wise man, and a man of wisdom;" are certainly phrases of the same import. of the same import. Again, homo, cui ingratus est animus, malus fit amicus, may be translated into Greek, άνθρωπος ἀκαρισίας κακος γινεται φίλος ; and into English, "the man of ingratitude is a bad friend."

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43 and con

tains besides the force of a connective.

45. If from any sentence in which there is a reative, that relative he taken away, and the prepositive pronoun, which it represents, be substituted in its stead, the sentence will lose its bond of union, and stand quite loose and unconnected. Thus, if instead of saying the man is wise WHO speaks little, we should say the man is wise HE speaks little, the sentence would be resolved into two; and what is affirmed of the man's wisdom, would have no connection with the circumstance of his speaking little. Hence it is evident, in the second place, that the relative contains the force of a connective as well as of the prepositive pronoun. What kind of connection it denotes, is next to be ascertained.

46. It may be laid down as a general principle, "that, by means of the relative pronoun, a clause of a sentence, in which there is a verb, is converted into the nature of an adjective, and made to denote some attribute of a substance, or some property or circumstance belonging to the antecedent noun." Thus, when it is said, homo qui prudentia præditus est, the relative clause-qui prudentia præditus est, expresses nothing more than the qua lity of prudence in concrete with the subject homo, which might have been equally well expressed by the adjective prudens. In like manner, when we say, vir sapit qui pauca loquitur, the relative clause expresses the property of speaking little as belonging to the man, and as being that quality which constitutes, or from which we in

47. Thus then it appears, that the relative pronoun contains in itself the force of the prepositive pronoun, together with that connection implied in English by the preposition of, and in the ancient languages by the ge nitive case. When one says vir sapit qui pauca loquitur, the relative clause qui pauca loquitur expresses that attribute of the man from which his wisdom is inferred: it is conceived by the mind, as stript of its propositional form, and standing in the place of a substantive noun governed in the genitive case by vir. The whole sentence might be thus translated, "the man of little speaking is wise;" or, did the use of the English language admit of it, "the man of he speaks little is wise." In like manner, when it is said, "Man who is born of a woman is of few days and full of trouble ;"—the relative clause is equivalent to an abstract noun in the genitive case, and the whole might be expressed in the following manner, "man of he is born of a woman is of few days and full of trouble."

We are sensible, that these expressions into which, in the instances adduced, we have resolved the relative clauses, will appear extremely uncouth and offensive; but we mean not to recommend them as common modes of phraseology. Against their being employed as such, present use loudly remonstrates (L). They are introduced only with a view to show the true import of the relative

(L) It is worthy of observation, however, that, repugnant as such expressions are to the present idiom of the English language, there is nothing in the nature of the thing that could render the use of them improper. All prepositions, as will be seen afterwards, are expressive of relations subsisting between these objects of which they connect the signs in discourse. Those objects may be denoted, either by single words, and then the preposition will govern a noun; or by assertions, and then it will govern a nominative and a verb. Thus, when it is said, "I came after his departure;" the preposition after expresses the relation between two events-my coming and his departure, and governs a substantive noun: but if it is said, "I came after he departed," the preposition in this case (for, as shall be shown afterwards, it is absurd to call it, in the one instance, a preposition, and in the other a conjunction), expresses the same relation as before, but governs a nominative and a verb.

This last expression is exactly similar to those employed above. When one says, for example, " the man of he speaks little is wise ;"-however uncouth the expression may appear from its not being supported by the authority of custom, the preposition of is used precisely in the same manner, and serves the very same purpose, as when it is said, "the man of little speaking is wise." In both cases it denotes the relation between the two. objects

of the subject. The sentence may be resolved upon our Pronouns.
principles, and its precise import preserved; as-" Light
is a body of it moves with great celerity; the clause-
"it moves with great celerity," is conceived by the
mind as having the force of an abstract substantive,
and is connected with the antecedent body by the pre-
position of, answering to the termination of the genitive
case. This abstract substantive thus connected expres-
ses a quality of the body light. But by this example
Mr Harris's doctrine is not exhibited in all its absur-
dity: let us try it by another.

Pronouns. relative pronoun; and for that purpose they are well adapted. That pronoun seems to be of use only when there is a deficiency of adjectives or substantives to denote some complex attribute by which we want to limit a general term or expression. Where such adjectives or substantives exist in language, we may indeed use the relative or not at pleasure. Thus we may say, homo qui grandia loquitur, or homo grandiloquus; because the adjective and the relative clause are precisely of the same meaning. But if the Latins were called upon to translate arderes avlodidaxlos, we believe they must have made use of the relative pronoun, as we know not any correspondent adjective in their language.

45 Mr Harris's mistake on this subject.

48. The learned and ingenious Mr Harris has, in his Treatise on Universal Grammar, given an analysis of the relative pronoun very different from that which has been given by us. The result of his inquiry is, that the relative is equivalent to another pronoun, together with an expression of connection of that kind which is denoted by the particle and. This analysis he exemplifies, and endeavours to confirm by the following sentence: "Light is a body which moves with great celerity." Now, says he, instead of which substitute the words and it, and in their united powers you see the force and character of the pronoun here treated. But let any one attentively consider these two expreзsions," Light is a body which moves with great celerity," and "Light is a body and it moves with great celerity;" and he will find that they are not precisely equivalent. For to speak in the language of logic, there is in the first but one proposition, of which the subject is light, and the predicate a complex term expressed by the words-body which moves with great cele rity. In the second there are two propositions, or two predications concerning light:-first, that it is a body; and secondly, that it moves with great celerity. The relative clause, in the first case, expresses a property of the antecedent body, which with that property is predicated of the subject light; in the second case, this property is removed from the predicate of which it was an essential part, and is improperly converted into a new predication

Suppose the following assertion to be true; "CHARLES XII. was the only monarch who conquered kingdoms to bestow them on his friends." Here it is evident there is but one proposition, of which the predicate is expressed by the words-" only monarch who conquered kingdoms to bestow them on his friends;" so that the relative clause is a necessary part of the predicate, and has, like an abstract noun in the genitive case, the effect of modifying the general term monarch. Resolve this sentence on Mr Harris's principles, and you have two propositions of which the first is a notorious falsehood:-" Charles XII. was the only monarch; and he conquered kingdoms to bestow them on his friends." But instead of and substitute of saying, "Charles XII. was the only monarch of he conquered kingdoms to bestow them on his friends," and you preserve the true import of the expression (M).

49. Are there no cases, then, in which the relative may be resolved into the connective and with a prepositive pronoun? Undoubtedly there are, and we shall now endeavour to ascertain them.

46

Adjectives in language have two different effects up-In some on the substantives to which they belong, according cases Mr to the nature of the attribute which they express. If Harris's analysis of the attribute expressed by the adjective be competent to the rela all the species of which the substantive is the specific tive may be name, it is plain that the adjective does not modify or admitted. limit the substantive, for this obvious reason, that nothing can modify which is not discriminative. Thus, when

objects-man and little speaking; only in the one it is prefixed to a noun, in the other to an assertory clause of a sentence, the import of which is to be taken as a noun. Custom hath indeed determined that prepositions shall more frequently govern a noun than a nominative and a verb; but they are, in their own nature, equally well adapted to answer both purposes.

But, as the pronoun of the third person is merely the substitute of some noun, an objector may ask, What noun is here represented by he?" The man of he speaks little is wise!" Who is meant by the pronoun he? We answer, the man who is declared to be wise. The objection proceeds from inattention to the radical signification of the word of, which a late ingenious writer has shown to be the fragment of a Gothic or Anglo-Saxon word, signifying consequence or offspring. If this be admitted, and, after the proofs which he has given, we think it cannot be denied, the uncouth phrase, "The man of he speaks little is wise," may be thus resolved, "The man, a consequence (of his mind is) he speaks little, is wise;" or, in other words, "The man, in consequence of bis speaking little, is wise." The same acute writer, Mr Horne Tooke, has shown that of and for, though of different radical meanings, may often be substituted the one for the other without injury to the sense. Let this substitution be made in the present instance, and the propriety of the phrase will be apparent: "The man is wise for he speaks little." It must be remembered, however, that such a substitution cannot be made in every instance, because for signifies cause, and of signifies consequence.

(M) Mr Harris was probably led into his opinion, from considering the Latin qui or quis as compounded of que and is (see Hermes, page 81, 82. edit. 3d.). But the notion of Perizonius is perhaps better founded, who in his notes ad Sanct. Minerv. considers it as immediately taken from the Greek r, which in the Doric is made is, and in the Latin quis. For it seems highly probable, as some ingenious writers have endeavoured to show, that the Latin is a dialect of the Greek. Of this at least we are certain, that many words in the former are im *mediately adopted from the latter.

Pronouns. When Horace says, "Prata canis albicant pruinis," the adjective canis denotes a quality common to all hoarfrost; and therefore cannot modify the substantive, because it adds nothing to the conception of which that substantive is the name. But when the attribute expressed by the adjective is competent to some individuals only of the species of which the substantive is the name, the adjective has then the effect of modifying or limiting the substantive. Thus, when one says vir bonus, he makes use of an adjective which modifies the substantive vir, because it expresses a quality or attribute which does not belong to all men.

47

What these

cases are.

The clause of a sentence, in which there is a relative, as it is in every other respect, so is it in this, equivalent to an adjective; it either modifies, or does not modify, the antecedent, according as the attribute which it expresses is or is not characteristic of the species to which the antecedent belongs. Thus, when it is said, "Man, who is born of a woman, is of few days and full of trouble," the relative clause-who is born of a woman, expresses an attribute common to all men, and therefore cannot modify. In like manner when we say "SOCRATES, who taught moral philosophy, was virtuous," the clause, who taught moral philosophy, does not modify. In both these instances the relative clause might be omitted; and it might be said with equal truth, "Man is of few days and full of trouble, and "SOCRATES was virtuous."

But if it be said, vir sapit qui pauca loquitur, the relative clause-qui pauca loquitur, modifies the antecedent vir; for it is not affirmed of every man, that he is wise, but only of such men as speak little. So" Charles XII. was the only monarch who conquered kingdoms to bestow them on his friends ;" and, "the man that endu. reth to the end shall be saved;" with many more examples that will occur to every reader,

Now it will be found, that it is only when the relative clause expresses such a property or circumstance of the antecedent as does not limit its signification, that the relative pronoun can be resolved into a prepositive pronoun with the conjunction and, and that in these cases the relative clause itself is of very little importance. Thus in the assertion,-" Charles XII. was the only monarch who conquered kingdoms to bestow them on his friends," where the relative clause is restrictive, the who cannot be resolved into and he consistently .with truth or common sense. But in the expression, "Man, who is born of a woman, is of few days and full of trouble," the relative who may be so resolved, at least without violating truth;"Man is of few days and full of trouble, and he is born of a woman." The only difference between the sentence with the relative who, and the same sentence thus resolved,-is-that, in the former case, it contains but one predication; in the latter two, and these but loosely connected.

50. Thus then it appears that the general analysis of the relative pronoun is into the particle of, and a prepositive pronoun; but that there are also occasions on which it may be resolved into a prepositive pronoun and the particle and, without materially altering the sense. Now what is the reason of this distinction?

If the relative clause be equivalent to an adjective, or to an abstract substantive in the genitive case, it is easy to see that the relative itself may, in every instance, be resolved into another pronoun and the particle of; but VOL. X. Part I.

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it will not perhaps be quite so evident how it should in Pronouns. any instance be resolved by and. This last analysis has its foundation in the nature of the particles of and and; or, to speak more properly, in the nature of the attribute which the relative clause expresses. Both the particles of and and are used to link or join conceptions together; but with this difference, that of has the effect of making the conceptions it connects figure in the mind as one object; whereas the conceptions connected by and are still conceived separately as before. To explain ourselves by an example: suppose we take two words, man and virtue, which denote two distinct ideas or conceptions, and join them together by the particle of, saying man of virtue; the mind no longer views them separately as significant of two conceptions, but of Take the same words, and join them together by the particle and, saying man and virtue: the conceptions denoted by man and virtue are still viewed separately as two; notice is only given that they are colla terally connected.

one.

This being the case, it follows, that when the relative modifies the antecedent, or, in other words, when the relative clause and the antecedent denote but one conception, the relative must then be resolved by of, in order to preserve this unity of conception. But when the relative does not modify the antecedent; that is, when its clause does not express any necessary part of a complex conception, then the conceptions or ideas denoted by the relative clause and the antecedent may be viewed separately as two; and therefore the relative may be resolved into the corresponding prepositive pronoun and the particle and.

To state this reasoning in a light somewhat different. As every relative clause, which expresses an attribute that is not applicable to a whole genus or species, must necessarily modify some general term, that is, restrict its signification; and as that general term must belong either to the subject or to the predicate of a proposition; it is evident, that every such relative clause is a necessary part of that subject or predicate in which its antecedent stands. If therefore a relative clause, which modifies, be taken away either from the subject or the predicate of a proposition; or if that connection, in consequence of which it modifies, be dissolved (which is always done when the relative is resolved by and); the proposition itself will not hold true. The reason is, that the subject or the predicate becomes then too general: for, in the one case, something is predicated of a whole genus or species, which can be predicated only of some individuals of that genus or species; and in the other, a general predication is made where only a particular one can be applied. Thus, if it be said, "All men who transgress the laws are deserving of punishment;" the subject of the proposition is expressed by the words, "all men who transgress the laws." Take the clause of the relative "who transgress the laws"-away, and say, "all men are deserving of punishment;" and you have a proposition which is not true, because that is affirmed of the whole species which can be affirmed only of some individuals. Retaining now the clause of the relative, but resolving it by and, you have the same proposition as before; and together with it, in this instance, another which is equally false" All men, and they transgress the laws, are deserving of punishment ;" that is," all men are deserving of punishment, and all men transgress the laws.”

D

But

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