to prevail in the first battalion, 27th Regiment, a longer residence on shore was deemed necessary for the men, and the regiment did not in consequence arrive in Egypt until the month of April.

The glorious victory under the walls of Alexandria had therefore been gained before the first battalion, 27th, reached the coast of Egypt, but there still remained much arduous work to be done by the troops, and the position of the army was one which might well excite anxiety in the mind of the General, demanding as it did the utmost prudence and skill on his part. When General Hutchinson assumed command, he did so undoubtedly under favourable auspices, inasmuch as the campaign had commenced with a decided and brilliant success, but as yet no material superiority had been gained. An army more numerous than his own was opposed to him, strong places had to be taken, climate to be endured, supplies to be obtained from the interior, and a communication to be established with the Vizir, as well as with the army expected from India under Baird, and, independent of these formidable difficulties, the plague, and other diseases menaced to reduce his force. Lord Keith also assured him that after October he could no longer remain on the coast with the shipping, on account of the weather, and the state of the vessels.

General Hutchinson fortunately proved himself equal

SOUTH SIDE OF ALEXANDRIA INUNDATED. 239

to the position in which he was placed, possessing prudence and daring as each in turn became necessary.

The want of provisions for his troops, as well as the want of water for the fleet, demanded his first attention, and he therefore as speedily as possible directed an attempt to be made on Rosetta and Fort St. Julien, with a view to obtaining command of the Nile.

A letter from General Menon, which was found in the pocket of General Roiz, killed in the action of the 21st, had disclosed the advantage to be expected from cutting across the isthmus separating the lake of Aboukir from the dry bed of lake Mariotis, thus inundating the latter, and circumscribing the means of communication between Alexandria and the interior. Great as were the advantages to be expected from this measure, it was not adopted by General Hutchinson without much anxious consideration, for the Arabs could give no idea as to where such an inundation might stop, or what might be its mischievous effects, and although it promised to prove serviceable to the operations of the British army, it was also evident that it would at the same time strengthen the south front of the French position.

The advantages appearing to outweigh the disadvantages, the cut was made on the 13th April, and the torrent of water immediately rushed violently down a declivity of six feet, carrying away large portions of the

embankment, and speedily producing an inundation sufficiently deep for a flotilla of gun-boats.

The castle of St. Julien, commanding the mouth of the Nile, surrendered on the 19th April.

The capture of this important place encouraged General Hutchinson to press on his operations against the interior, and leaving General Coote to hold the lines against the east front of Alexandria, he advanced against Rahmanieh on the 9th May. Having gained possession of that place, he continued his march to Cairo, and his operations in that direction were crowned with complete success, by the surrender of General Belliard, with his whole army, as prisoners of war, on the 28th June.

During these operations, the 27th had remained in camp with the force in front of Alexandria, and nothing of any great importance had occurred, except an attempt made by the French to form an inundation between the lines of the two armies on the eastern side of the town, by making a cut in the canal in front of Green Hill. Had the French succeeded in their design of leading the waters of the canal into the plain before the eastern front of Alexandria, the front for operations against that side of the town would have become too contracted. General Coote therefore very judiciously caused a dam to be constructed so as to check the inundation, in which way their scheme was completely frustrated.

In order to complete the investment of Alexandria,

ATTACK ON THE WESTERN FRONT.

241

it was necessary to organize an attack on the western front of the place.

The execution of this portion of General Hutchinson's plan was intrusted to General Coote, who received instructions to proceed with a force of about 4000 men in boats, by the inundation which had been formed on Lake Mareotis, and effect a landing at the most convenient and eligible spot.

General Hutchinson's opinion of the difficulties before him, is thus expressed in a despatch written about this time :

"The siege of Alexandria will probably be attended with many difficulties; the works towards the east side where we are encamped are prodigiously strong, and can hardly be approached on account of the narrowness of the space between the lake and the sea, and the nature of the ground; towards the west the works are not so strong, but, however, the difficulties in approaching them are also numerous; the corps there is completely in the desert, the communication with us (by whom they must be supplied with everything) is tedious, and the boats employed have most severe duty to perform: on the whole, I cannot flatter myself that Alexandria will be in our possession in such a short time, unless some event takes place of which we are not at present aware."

On the evening of the 16th August the boats as

M

sembled in the inundation on the left of the British

position, and embarked the troops destined for the expedition to the westward—

Consisting of the brigade of Guards under Lord

Cavan.

Two battalions 27th Regiment, and the 44th, under Major-General Lord Ludlow.

26th, and two battalions 54th, under Major-General Finch.

men.

With 100 of the 20th Dragoons,-in all about 4000

The flotilla sailed to the westward as soon as the troops were received on board.

To distract the attention of the enemy, and favour the landing of General Coote's division, an attack on the outworks of the eastern front of Alexandria was organized for the morning of the 17th.

It was General Coote's intention to have landed between Alexandria and Fort Marabout, but seeing a corps of the enemy in occupation of some commanding ground above the shore, he left General Finch's brigade to make a feint at that point, while the remainder of the division stood on and landed without difficulty about three miles further on.

The first measure after landing was to get possession of Fort Marabout, which was accomplished on the 21st. On the following morning General Coote advanced