regiment is raised. The distribution of the regiment is local; the primary system of defence should therefore, in the event of invasion, be special and local also. For, as an invasion must always partake of the nature of a surprise, it is an unnecessary, and probably perilous, anticipation of an enemy's plan of campaign to distribute the forces of resistance on certain points arbitrarily assumed, and endowed with an importance which they may not deserve. It was this error that Napoleon punished so severely by masking important fortresses in his German campaigns: and it is a fault that is least pardonable on the part of a tactician who possesses the permanent advantage of projecting defensive movements from the centre to the circumference, and consequently on interior lines of operation. It follows, then, that, to guard against surprise, the normal position of the army of reserve, pending a decisive movement on the part of the invader, should be within the district to which each regiment, brigade, or division belongs. But if such be the law of primary organization, and if it appear probable that the services of any one regiment, brigade, or division should be available first within such district, then, in order to a more complete efficiency, each should be specially trained, regard being had to the natural capabilities and features of the district.

The regiment being considered as a corps intended to act first in a particular locality, the instruction suitable to the special arm of the service should be directed to that end. For this is evident, that the essential and primary duty of militia regiments is, on invasion, to fight battles of position, on ground previously selected, and to which the troops should be accustomed, in order to gain time for the General commanding the central army of manoeuvre, with its reserves, to prepare those strategic combinations from which important movements originate and by which battles are decided.

Now this training will necessarily be governed by the nature of the arm to which the regiment belongs, as well as by the-features of the country. For instance, since the great war of 1815, a portion of the militia has been formed into regiments of artillery, raised in the maritime counties of the United Kingdom. The position and duties of these regiments designate them as the corps intended to remain on the watch, and to be prepared to fight the battles of position to which the tactics of invasion naturally determine, and which the genius of the nation specially affects. To illustrate the mode of defence which might be adopted in the maritime counties, let the district from which the Suffolk regiment of artillery is raised be topographically examined. Lying between Ipswich and Great Yarmouth, it rises towards the interior into a clay plateau, from which streams flow into the German Ocean, dividing the region into eight fluvial districts. As the inclination of the ground is gentle, it is easy to dam the course of these streams, in order to the formation of a system of defence by inundation. The valleys being laid under water, the progress of an invading force is rendered difficult for infantry as well as for cavalry, guns, and stores. For it is not the depth of an inundation that is usually to be depended on for impeding an advance, so much as the interruption the obstacles hidden beneath the flood cause to regular formations; and, when each stockaded village or bridge may be made the arena of a battle of position, the progress must needs be slow of an enemy who has to force his way across such flooded ground.* And in a war of posts the local knowledge of officers and men should be carefully turned to account. In the Suffolk Artillery the officers have been expected to possess and be able to avail themselves, for the purpose of defensive war, of

* These points would be defended by field-guns and guns of position, drawn by the active horses of the district. Calculation shows that, with a judicious distribution of guns in this district, nine guns can be concentrated within three hours on any point. These movements should be covered by masses of irregular horse and foot, on a regulated scale. Their manoeuvres should be conformed to those of the artillery, for, in defensive combat, artillery plays the first part. As respects the effect of field artillery against shipping, a remarkable instance occurs in " Straith's Work on Fortification and Artillery." He quotes a case to illustrate the superiority of ordnance on shore over that in ships. It is taken from the United Service Journal, No. 46. When Lord Lynedoch was advancing towards Antwerp in 1814, a fort of two guns, one an 18-pounder, the other a 5J-inch howitzer, was thrown up on a bend formed by the Polder Dyke, some distance below Lillo. The 18-pounder was at a right angle to the course of the river, the howitzer looked diagonally up the stream. A French 84-gun ship dropped down with the tide and anchored about 600 yards from the battery; from her position she was exposed to the fire of the howitzer only. After a constant fire, kept up for five hours, the French ship hauled off, having had 41 men killed and wounded. The howitzer was not dismounted, nor was the fort injured, and the English lost only one man killed and two wounded. An earthwork to cover three guns solidly can be thrown up by country labourers, at the rate of 40 men per 12 hours.

the knowledge which their local experience has given. And herein lies a main reason for the territorial constitution of the militia service throughout all ranks.

This system would resolve itself into one of moveable batteries of position, as organised originally by Frederick the Great, and served by militia artillery. The guns should be placed on travelling carriages in order to concentration; for coast batteries weaken by diffusion of strength, and at best only present an immoveable resistance to the enemy's plan of operations; and, again, fixed coast batteries indicate those points of strategic defence which would be avoided by a sagacious enemy.

The yeomanry being brigaded, local horse might be trained to act as rocket troops for volley firing, and to cover the guns of the militia artillery in their advance on the coast to which the nature of the service destines them, in addition to their duty of manning coast batteries and martello towers. The militia artillery can be thoroughly trained to all the duties of field gun drill, in addition to heavy gun and mortar drill, for the purpose of accumulating masses of fire on the advance of an enemy. It could be efficiently horsed from the district, and trained to the simple manoeuvres of war, and covered by the movements of local cavalry.

The militia then has its special character and uses, which should necessarily be of a local and territorial type. The commanding officer should be thoroughly acquainted with all the military circumstances of the district in which his command lies, in order to inform a general officer both on the weak and strong points of country, the practicable aud the broken ground, the coast likely to be selected for disembarkation, and where a battle of position may be judiciously offered and successfully fought. The militia arrangements of a district perfectly prepared against invasion would be these.

The commanding officer, being thoroughly acquainted with the country, would have prepared beforehand the points on which he would make a stand, protected by inundations, epaulements, and stockades, or by fortified villages, which present a very effectual defence on lines approaching to the Redan trace, and generally are very manageable polygons of resistance. The cover is good, and round shot go through the slight houses without doing injury to the defenders from splinters. The lord-lieutenant, having summoned the deputy-lieutenants, would direct them to cause the necessary works to be executed by country labourers, at the rate of a field-work to cover three guns per twelve hours' labour of forty men. Plain directions should be given, with lithographed sections and working plans. In this system there is no high amount of engineering skill or of strategic arrangement required. Nothing more is asked than that which the nation has a right to expect, namely, that the local military resources of each county should be turned to the best account through the agency of the territorial military authorities of the militia service, namely, the lord-lieutenant, assisted by his staiF of deputy-lieutenants and by the commanding officers of the county regiments. The especial grounds for employing a mobilised artillery of militia will be considered in the strategic portion of this Lecture. The system of special training that has been recommended and adopted in an artillery regiment can be applied to the varying circumstances of regiments and counties. The rifle and light infantry regiments will practise open formations; the battalion regiments will be trained to the defence of entrenched posts and to serried movements.

In a word, it is only requisite to utilise the magnificent resources which the United Kingdom places at the disposal of her rulers, to render invasion, so far as human foresight can provide, a vain threat—an impotent intention.

But no employment of insulated fragments of the national strength will be sufficient. The regimental system, however valuable, must be welded into the compact masses which form the available strength of an aggregated people, and it is to this series of combinations, and their probable results, that the argument now proceeds.

It has been shown that the original constitution of the militia service is territorial. It will be trained on its own soil, with which the commanding officer is most familiar. But to derive advantage from this incident of its character and constitution should be added the efficiency produced by combination with other bodies of troops similarly qualified and organised for the peculiar demands of defensive war. Such enlarged action will result from the formation of militia brigades and of militia divisions. Since the introduction of the divisional system into the French service it has been gradually adopted into the manual of European warfare. But the divisional system should be made to consist with the genius of the militia force, and be territorial also. The regiments raised in neighbouring districts would then be formed into homogeneous brigades, divisions, or even army corps. The brigade should be camped, during the period of training, within the brigade district, and placed under the command of a Brigadier. The late Lord Hardinge, who thoroughly appreciated the value of the militia, observed that the militia required only Enfield rifles and good Brigadiers to make them capable of any undertaking. Moreover, the local yeomanry regiments and detachments of the regular army might be at the same time attached to this command. The brigade should be under canvass, in order to keep the soldier removed from the contaminating influence of billets. "It is better to hear the lark sing than the mouse cheep," and young soldiers are more quickly taught what is useful in the open field than in the most elaborately fitted barracks. Two months under canvass are better than six in hut or barrack to teach and train the orderly and intelligent volunteer.

The accompanying map explains the formation and distribution of the militia brigades. The militia dep&t is the alarm-post at which, on the first notice of service, the regiment would assemble, the Brigadier having previously determined the rendezvous of the brigade. At this point the brigade would have been assembled for training during peace,—thence it would be prepared to commence its movements at the stern demand of war.

By this larger application of the principle of special training already noticed to the combined masses of several regiments, the anticipated advantages to be obtained from the manoeuvres of a corps on familiar ground will be augmented proportionately to the wider area over which operations are to be conducted. In illustration of the system of working by brigades, the division formed from the combined brigades of the "Waveney and the Stour may be fittingly examined. It will be observed that in this quarter of England facilities for invasion are great, owing to a long seabord, a portion of which is indented by creeks, forming natural wharfs for disembarkation of troops. If the advance be made from the coast to