perfect for the purposes of a siege. The General, therefore, for his own information, as well as the engineers for theirs, must approach more or less closely to the works, before the mode of attack can be decided on; and the less accurate and the less perfect is their previous information, the more does it become necessary for them to do so.

Now, in writing on the defence, Vauban recommends the garrison to keep a sharp eye upon any individual who may approach the works at this period of the operations, and points out that, as such an individual will probably be a general or an engineer of high standing, due attention should be paid to him. It cannot be doubted that this advice will be carefully followed for the future. Every soldier in a properly armed garrison will have the means of interfering with the observations of these officers, both from the ramparts and from any advanced posts that may be found convenient for the purpose; and it cannot be supposed that he will neglect to use those means to the best of his power.

Under the regime of the new rifle, it will therefore become much more difficult to obtain, in time of war, an accurate knowledge of a fortress and of the surrounding objects than it has hitherto been; and, as such knowledge is of vital importance to the operations, it is necessary to consider how this difficulty may be met.

One mode of meeting it would be by previous preparation—by collecting in time of peace correct plans of all the fortresses in the world, together with reports upon them, and, in fact, all the information in regard to them that it is necessary to be possessed of in time of war; and by recording it, and having it ready for use when wanted. This might be done without much difficulty; and it would certainly be worth a vast deal more to obtain such information, than the pay and expense of the two or three officers who might be employed in procuring it.

This is a delicate subject to enter upon at greater length in public; but it is an exceedingly important one, and well worthy of the attention of those in whose power it is to cause such information to be collected; and it is clear that by this simple means the disadvantages which we should otherwise labour under in a future reconnaissance would be more than counteracted.

The reconnaissance being finished, and the mode of attack decided on, the next operation, after sufficient stores, materials, and munitions, are collected, will be that of breaking ground.

On the night appointed for this purpose, the engineers proceed, as soon as it is dark, to mark out the first parallel and its approaches with pickets and tape; and, the troops forming the covering-party being placed 100 yards or so in the rear, with strong guards the same distance in front, the working parties are posted and set to work with as little noise as possible.

The rule giyen for the first parallel is, that it should be as nearly as may be 600 yards from the place, because the workmen are at that distance out of range of grape and musketry; because that is an advantageous distance for the first batteries and for steady howitzer practice; and because sorties are difficult to be carried out so far from the works. But this distance must, of course, vary according to circumstances; and sometimes even no first parallel at all is required, when the ramparts may be breached from a distance, when a garrison is weak, or when circumstances are favourable for a more speedy mode of operations. And here I ought to observe that the rules of attack to which I refer are very far from being absolute, and are mere samples or illustrations of what may be necessary under ordinary circumstances, though they are, at the same time, open to discussion in the general way in which I propose to consider them.

At Sebastopol the first parallel was constructed at three times the given distance from the works.

The besiegers labour, however, under very great disadvantages when they are obliged to construct their first parallel at much more than 600 yards from the place, firstly, because they have then to expend a greater quantity of ammunition to produce a given effect; secondly, because they are obliged in that case to work up the extra distance, in subsequent approaches, when the garrison are better prepared for them, and when their ground has become circumscribed, and because extra time, extra labour, and extra life are thereby sacrificed; so that it is exceedingly important not to break ground at a greater distance from the fortress than is absolutely necessary.

On the other hand, it must now be remembered that every soldier in a well-provided garrison will have the means of firing effectively upon the workmen at a distance of at least 800 yards; and it must be added that the experience at Sebastopol has shown that grapeshot may now be employed with advantage at more than double the range (300 yards) formerly assigned to it.

The question therefore arises:—Must we in future break ground at a greater distance from the place, so as to be out of the range of grape and musketry, or can we contrive any means by which it will be possible to construct our first parallel within the range of those weapons?

This is one of the most important questions that the modem rifle introduces to us, and it is deserving of our very best attention.

In answering it there are several points to be considered, which We will now take, seriatim.

These trenches, when completed, form a road 10 feet wide and 3 feet below the surface, with the earth thrown to the front to form a. protecting parapet. A portion of the work only is expected to be executed on the first night, although at times nearly the whole may be completed, when the night is long, the soil is light, and the workmen are good. On a moonlight night of course such work cannot be attempted.

It has been always an object to execute these works by surprise, and to do as much as possible of them before their position is discovered by the enemy; but the days of surprise in this matter must probably be considered as gone by. It is clear that when a garrison had comparatively little power of doing mischief to their assailants during the opening of the trenches, and none of preventing that operation, it was not so much worth their while to trouble themselves about it, and it was not, therefore, such a difficult matter to execute it unobserved; and the want of power is probably one great reason why, in former sieges, garrisons have permitted the works of besiegers to progress with so little opposition; but when the garrison is possessed of ample means of hindering the works of the besiegers, if they only keep a good look-out by day, and make free and constant use of their light-balls by night, and direct their fire upon those points where it is from time to time required, then the besiegers can no longer calculate upon being permitted to take the same liberties in their approaches, or to evade the vigilance of their opponents. Indeed, it would now be disgraceful for a garrison at the commencement of a siege, with its works untouched, its men in perfect security, firing from behind uninjured loopholes, to permit the works of the attack to be carried on in the way in which they have hitherto been done, just for want of a little vigilance on their part.

There are two principal means that the besiegers may make use of, under these circumstances, to enable them to obtain cover more quickly, and thus to establish themselves with greater facility in the neighbourhood of the place—the use of gabions, and the employment of a sufficient number of workmen well trained to the duty which is required of them.

Gabions are amongst the most useful of siege stores, and they have been employed in sieges for the last 250 years. Up to the year 1853 they were made of wicker-work, but in that year it was proposed to make them of plain sheet-iron when they were only required for a temporary purpose, and of galvanized sheet-iron when required for permanent use. They have since been made of various shapes, and in various ways. At Sebastopol, when there was a great want of them, the haybands were randed, as it is called, round upright pickets, at the suggestion of Capt. Elphinstone, R.E., and they were used by Colonel Chapman, R.E., with good effect; and more recently a gabion has been proposed by Sergeant-Major Jones, of the Eoyal Engineers, which appears to be well liked in many respects, constructed with wrought-iron bands and twelve upright pickets. Several thousand of the sheet-iron gabions were prepared for service in the Crimea on the urgent representations of Sir Harry Jones, the then Commanding Royal Engineer, but unfortunately they did not arrive there until after the conclusion of the siege.

The first parallel has usually been constructed hitherto without gabions, because it has not been thought necessary to sacrifice them for this purpose. But as a workman may get under cover in onethird of the time, by the use of gabions, that he can without them, by the method called flying sap, it is clear that it will be desirable to use them for the future in the first parallel, and that a much

VOL. II. S

larger supply of them will be required in future operations than has been employed, or has even been obtainable, in previous sieges. They are often difficult to procure at sieges, and the preparation of a sufficient quantity of them always takes up much valuable time. In the sieges of the Peninsula there seem never to have been enough of them, and the lives of the soldiers were continually sacrificed for want of them. As an illustration of this, we may quote what Sir John Jones says in regard to the siege of Burgos in the year 1812. He remarks, " There being no gabions to spare for this service, the men were set to work uncovered, but the fire of the place was immediately concentrated on the spot, and in a few minutes, several men having been killed and wounded, the attempt was relinquished."

This is an extreme example of what happens more or less in all cases in which the supply of gabions is deficient, and the cases are rare indeed where there have been a sufficient number of them in British sieges. The smallness of the force employed, the want of time for preparing them, want of transport, scarcity of material, and other circumstances, have almost invariably, and will probably again invariably, prevent their being furnished on the spot in proper quantities; and the inevitable result is the sacrifice of an article which may be estimated, singly, to be worth, in money value only, a thousand of them—viz. the British soldier.

As Sir John Jones well says, "Indeed, there is nothing more certain than that the reduction of a fortress must be paid for in materials or men, and that to save the one the other must be freely sacrificed." The great object in all the operations which Vauban so excellently contrived, and so clearly explained, and which serve, with but little alteration, as our guide in the present day, was to save men at the expense of materials and labour; and in studying his works now, we cannot fail to see how he would expand the principles which he has laid down to meet the new state of things —how he would meet new difficulties by means of new resources— how he would provide better cover, and cover more quickly obtained, when he found that better protection was required from superior weapons—and how he would teach his men to employ the means with which he provided them to the best possible advantage.