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country to co-operate in the project of the allies; and it professed not to prejudge the question, or to interfere with the course which other states might adopt: it told Austria and Prussia" that we would make no opposition to their projects, provided we had a reasonable assurance, that their views were not directed to purposes of aggrandisement subversive of the territorial system of Europe, as established by the late treaties."-Now, in his view of the subject, the whole conduct of his majesty's government had been most reprehensible; they passed an implied censure on the allied courts, while they refused to remain in intercourse with Naples. Did not the assembling of an army on the Italian fron. tier, the summoning of the king to Laybach, the suspension of the British minister at Naples, coupled with the declaration contained in the paper on the table, amount to this:-that, although we asserted the right of an independent nation to regulate its own government, we admitted that Naples must be an excepted case? The Earl of Liverpool contended, that the paper on the table furnished the best proof, that his majesty's government was acting, in respect of Naples, on a principle of perfect neutrality. This country was no party to any transactions of the holy alliance, nor had any engagement, but what appeared on the face of the papers laid before parliament. The principal objection, which had been raised to the conduct of his majesty's government, was, that, in professing a determination to act upon a system of neutrality, they yet accompanied that declaration with a disapproval of the

mode in which and circumstances under which the revolution was accomplished. Now, he had no difficulty in saying, that with that sentiment he concurred; and, though he saw no reason for interference, yet he still condemned the means by which that revolution had been brought about. He denied, that any interruption had taken place in our diplomatic relations with Naples.

Lord Holland spoke with great vehemence on the same side with lord Grey. The motion was negatived without a division.

Two nights afterwards, a similar motion was made in the House of Commons by sir James Macintosh, and supported with even more than his ordinary eloquence. The line of argument which he pursued was-that the principles contained in the circular of the allied sovereigns were inconsistent with the independence of nations, and would justify the landing of Cossacks in England, to restrain us from adopting institutions disagreeable to the Russian Autocrat, as easily as the invasion of Naples---that our ministers had, in their circular, dissented from these principles, and yet had done nothing to prevent or suspend the aggressions which were proceeding from them. He defended the Neapolitan government from the charges, which had been brought against it; but, at the same time, denied that its demerits, however great, could authorize the subversion of the law of nations, by the sovereigns of Russia, Austria, and Prussia.

Lord Castlereagh's reply was extremely moderate. With regard to the difference of principles which existed between the allied powers and the English go.

vernment, he observed, that the document, to which our circular was a reply, was by no means the final paper of the allied sovereigns on that important and difficult question-how far the interference of one government in the regulation of the internal administration of another is or is not a justifiable measure? That paper was a confidential document addressed to the different courts of Europe, informing them of the discussions that were then carried on at Troppau, but was not a document stating the manner in which those discussions had terminated. It was a notorious fact, that the minister of England and the minister of France took no share whatsoever in them. The minister of England was indeed there, to notice any territorial aggrandizement, if amy thing of that kind had been contemplated; but he was not there to commit his government by any acts or opinions of his own. The House would therefore see, that it would be doing an act of injustice to the allied powers, if it assumed as fact, that' the principles contained in that paper were published by them after a calm and deliberate consideration of their tendency. The English government, however, would have abandoned a duty which it owed to itself, to the country, and to the world, if it had not, when those principles were submitted to its notice, explicitly declared its dissent from them.

The House would also be doing as gross an act of injustice towards ministers, if it did not give them credit for being sincere in that declaration, as it would be doing to the allied sovereigns, in assuming, that the paper which

had caused that declaration was1 the final manifesto of their intentions. The allied powers had sent to the British government in order to obtain their acquiescence in it. The British government replied, that they could not acquiesce in the doctrines which it contained. If under such circumstances the allied powers had made answer, "You have pledged yourselves to the same principles that we have, and we call upon you to redeem that pledge," then the House might have some reason to doubt the sincerity of ministers, and might be justified in entering into a full examination of their conduct. But, when no such call had been made by the allied powers-when a direct negative had been given to the principles contained in their state-paper, recognised though they were, according to their statement, by the treaty of Paris in the first instance, and the treaties of Aix-laChapelle in the second, he did conceive that the House would feel it to be its duty not to accelerate the inquiry proposed.

The noble lord farther stated, that the language which he had held to Naples was precisely the same as that which he had held to Austria. He had explained the same principles to count Ludolph, as he had to the court of Austria. He had not, indeed, gone out of his way to write a declaration of them to the government of Naples, but he had not concealed them from its agents here. For though the British government had refused to receive the prince Cimitelli in his public capacity as minister of Naples, he (lord C.) had not refused to show those attentions, and to make those communica

tions to that individual, in his private capacity, which his high rank, no less than the respectability of his personal character, so justly demanded. He had never concealed from prince Cimitelli the wish of the British government to know more of the cir-, cumstances of the revolution at Naples, before it fixed upon it the formal seal of its sanction. If the hon. and learned gentleman supposed that this declaration had been productive of umbrage between the English and Neapolitan governments, he laboured under considerable mistake. The Nea politan government would have been very glad to have had its new minister received; but the refusal to receive him had not caused any interruption of friendship between the two states; on the contrary, count Ludolph, who had resigned his papers, was requested to re-assume them, and the diplomatic relations of the two countries remained on the same footing as before the revolution. Sir Robert Wilson, Mr. Brougham, and Mr. Wilberforce participated in the sequel of the debate. On a division, the numbers were, for the motion, 125; against it, 194.

On the 2nd of March, lord Lansdown moved the following address:-" To thank his majesty for having been graciously pleased to lay before this House a copy of the despatch to his majesty's missions at foreign courts, on the circular communication addressed by the courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to their several missions, relating to the recent transactions in the kingdom of Naples: to express the satis faction which we feel that his majesty has declined becoming a

party to the measure in question, considering them to be no less repugnant to the fundamental principles of the British constitution, than destructive of the established law of nations; and to express an earnest hope, that his majesty will exert all his influence with the allied powers, if not too late, to prevent or to repair the consequences of measures which may eventually disturb the general tranquillity of Europe; and which, especially when considered in combination with the doctrines that have been, advanced in their justification, are of most dangerous example to the independence of sovereigns and the security of nations."Lords Ellenborough, Calthorpe, Holland, and Darnley, supported the motion, Lord Liverpool, expressing his regret at the declaration of the three allied sovereigns, and his condemnation of the principles there laid down, maintained that we had observed a strict neutrality. We took no part against the revolu tion, because it endangered none of our interests: but had we any right to prescribe a rule of con duct to Austria? Would it be wise to deal in remonstrances, unless we were prepared, in case they were neglected, to enforce them by arms? The result of the debate was-Contents, 37; Not contents, 84.

On the 20th of March, this subject was again brought into full discussion, on a motion by sir Robert Wilson, for the production of a letter from sir Win. A'Court to the Neapolitan minister for foreign affairs, in which our ambassador, after declaring the purpose of England to remain neutral, proceeded thus;" It

will interfere in no way in the affairs of this country, unless such a step should be rendered indispensable by any personal insults or danger to which the royal family may be exposed." Sir Wm. A'Court added, that "not foreseeing the possibility of such a case, he flattered himself that nothing would alter the peaceful attitude in which Great Britain was placed." On this passage, sir R. Wilson observed, that it appeared distinctly, that sir Wm. A'Court thought that we had a right to interfere, if the royal family of Naples were exposed to personal insult or danger; and that he might consider himself justified in ordering the British squadron to bombard Naples, while some commotion took place within the walls, in which insult or danger might be incurred by any branch of the royal family. The assertion of such a power was incompatible with the rights of independent nations, and most injurious and hazardous to our own; for it ought to be recol lected, that we could apply no principle of public law to foreigners, which they, in turn, might not apply to ourselves.

Lord Castlereagh protested against the strained interpretation which had been put on sir Wm. A'Court's letter. That letter was a declaration, that we would not interfere in Neapolitan affairs; but that we should protect the royal family, if, under any circumstances, our protection should be needed. It had been so viewed at Naples, and had been received with universal sa tisfaction.

Mr. Canning discussed the question on general principles. He contended that the imme

diate effect of the course of proceeding, recommended by the opponents of ministers, would be to plunge the country into war. It was alleged, that there were means, by which this country might aid the Neapolitans without committing itself to the issue of their struggle; and it might at least give the sanction of its opinion to the cause of freedom. Not so, said Mr. Canning. If it was right that, with a view to favour the progress of liberty, we should declare our alliances broken, and make war against those powers who were now called the oppressors of the earth, in God's name let that course be decidedly taken; and let the country be told," although you are already heavily burthened, there is yet a great work to perform, and you must buckle to. True, England is saved; but that is not enough: Europe must be regenerated, and at your expense." This might be done, if it were done openly and avowedly; but to adopt such a policy, and to follow it secretly and by by-ways, would only prolong the struggle, aggravate the difficulty, and probably defeat the end. Of all modes of support, which England could extend to other countries, constructive support was the most unfair. Direct support was capable of definition: it might be stated in precise terms, and recorded in stipulations which could not be mistaken. But constructive support, by which the receiving party understood all that they could want, and the bestowing party all that they found it convenient to give, would only leave the miserable victim to finish with her single means, that which she had begun with the

assistance of another. Had England no warning of the effect of such conduct? Let the House look at the case of Parga, in which the accidental expression of a British officer had been construed into a promise on the part of Great Britain, which was to embroil her with a considerable portion of the globe. Suppose such a constructive promise to be given to Naples, and Naples, upon the faith of it, to embark in a contest, which perhaps otherwise she would not have undertaken, what eternal infamy would be cast upon England, should she fail to fight the cause, as though she contended for her own existence, with all the strength and means which exertion could command! Then away with the distinction between war and armed negociation! Unless it was proposed to go even to the last extremity and to involve the existence of England with that of her ally, all mention of support was but a fraud; and was it not romantic to talk of embark ing the country, not on account of duty, alliance, or obligation, but merely as matter of sentiment and feeling, in hostilities in which we had neither interest nor concern? Statesmen should not plunge the country into war, unless its interests coincided with their personal sympathies; and the House would act most unjustly, if they first encouraged the Neapolitans to undertake the war, and then abandoned them in the midst of their difficulties. Whatever the House might think of the paper put forth by the allied powers and no man abjured its principles more fully than he did; whatever the House might think of the condition of Naples, he

believed, that in taking either one side or the other, the country engaged in no short or trifling contest. He would call them visionary statesmen; he would say that they were an ungrateful parliament; if they suffered their feelings to run away with them, and to urge them to acts in contradiction · to the interests of the nation. He felt that he should be carrying to a precipice, over which it must inevitably fall, the panting spirit of liberty, if he should undertake to fight its cause with means so scanty, as should compel him to furl his banner before the battle was ended.

Sir James Macintosh denied, that war was either the necessary or the probable result of the po-t licy which he and his friends recommended. Did any man ever hear, that remonstrance from one nation to another must necessarily be followed by war? Did any statesman ever lay down such a principle? On the contrary, did not the history of Europe abound with instances of amicable remon-' strances against war, which had never been followed by hostilities? If France and England had expressed six months ago their opinion against the aggression on Italy, would that opinion have been despised? Were they sunk so low in the scale of national consequence, as not to be able to prevent their own allies from engaging in such a war? Was it for this, that we were called the protectors of Europe, and boasted of having set Europe free? The policy of early remonstrance. would have been pacific, and by neglecting it, war had been ultimately rendered not only more probable, but almost inevitable. Sir J. Macintosh next adverted

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