against any person for anything done in pursuance of or under the authority of the Act should not be commenced after three months next after the fact committed for which such action was brought. The Borough of Salford Improvement Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. ccv.), s. 162), constituted the defendants the surveyors of highways within the borough of Salford, and rendered them (among other things) subject to all such liabilities as surveyors of highways were subject to by virtue of any laws for the time being in force relating to highways. By 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97, s. 5, the period for bringing actions for matters done under public, local, and personal Acts is two years; and under the Public Health Act 1875 (sect. 264) a period of six months is the limit assigned to the bringing of An actions for causes arising under the Act. action, founded on negligence, was brought by the plaintiff against the defendants, in their capacity as surveyors of highways for the borough of Salford, more than three months but less than six months after the cause of action arose. Held, that the period of limitation of two years under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97, did not apply, and that the action not having been brought within the period of three months, provided by the Highway Act 1835, was too late. (Burton v. Mayor and Corporation of ...page 43 Salford.) Con

Highway board - Dissolution of district
tinuance of board-Order obtained by board-
Appeal against such order-Hearing of appeal
after dissolution of district-25 & 26 Vict. c. 61,
88. 9, 39-41 & 42 Vict. c. 77, s. 23.-A highway
district was dissolved under 25 & 26 Vict. c. 61,
8. 39, by an order of justices, which was to take
effect on the 25th March 1883. The highway board
took proceedings under 41 & 42 Vict. c. 77, s. 23,
to recover certain expenses caused by extraordinary
traffic, and in Feb. 1883 an order for payment of
such expenses was made. On the 1st March notice
of appeal against this order was given, but the
appeal came on for hearing on the 4th April, when,
objection being taken that the highway board had
ceased to exist, and therefore could not be heard
as respondents, the justices at quarter sessions
refused to hear them, and quashed the order.
Held, making absolute an order for a mandamus
to the justices to hear and determine the appeal,
that, notwithstanding the dissolution of the high-
way district, the highway board still existed, and
were the proper respondents. (Reg. v. The Justices
of Essex.)

177, 394

Main road-Liability to repair disturnpiked roadHighways and Locomotives Amendment Act 1878, s. 13. By sect. 13 of the Highways and Locomotives Amendment Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 77), any road which has, between the 31st Dec. 1870 and the passing of this Act, ceased to be a turnpike road, and any road which being at the time of the passing of this Act a turnpike road may afterwards cease to be such, shall be deemed to be a main road," and half the expenses of the repair of such main road are thrown upon the county. A private Act authorised the construction of a turnpike road from W. to S., and the collection of tolls, and provided that " no part of the money arising or to be received by virtue of this Act shall be laid out in repairing, maintaining, or improving any street, highway, or place in any part of the towns of B., S., and W." By the growth of the town of S., a portion of the turnpike road had in fact become a street in the town before the 31st Dec. 1870. The turnpike trust created by the private Act expired in 1876. Held, that the effect of the above provision was not to cause the portion of the road in question to cease to be a turnpike road" before the 31st Dec. 1870. Held, also, that an agreement made under the Local Government Act 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. 98), s. 41, before the 31st Dec. 1870, for the removal of turnpikes on a portion of a road and its repair by the corporation of S., did not make it cease to be a turnpike road. (The Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire v. Mayor, &c., of Sheffield.) Turnpike roads Liability to repair-41 & 42 Vict. c. 77, s. 13.—Where by the operation of a local Act

789

even assuming that the parties had ever been ad idem as to the agreement, specific performance could not be enforced as against Mrs. C., as the circumstances were not such as to dispense with an acknowledgment under the Act for the Abolition of Fines and Recoveries (Ireland) (4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 605 92), and that she was entitled to receive the full jointure. (Cahill v. Cahill.)... Equitable reversionary chattels real of wife not vested in possession during coverture-Death of - Whether wife Title of surviving husband By an indenture of administration necessary. settlement, dated in 1865, certain leasehold properties for long terms of years were assigned to trustees upon trust for three persons successively for life, and from and after the death of the survivor of them, then upon trust to assign and assure the leasehold premises unto M. P. for her own use and benefit absolutely. M. P. intermarried with J. C. in 1870. She died intestate in 1882, in the lifetime of her husband. In 1883 the last surviving tenant for life died, and J. C. thereupon took out letters of administration to his deceased wife in order to complete his title to the leasehold properties. Upon the question whether this course was necessary: Held, that a vested reversionary interest, subject to a life interest in leasehold property which might, by possibility, come into possession during the coverture, was not a mere possibility, which was unassignable, but the husband could assign it during the coverture and whilst it was still reversionary, and accordingly it was not necessary that letters of administration should be taken out. (Re Bellamy; Elder v. Pearson.)... 703 House settled to wife's separate use.-A man, on his marriage, assigned a leasehold house to trustees upon trust for sale, with consent of the husband and wife, and to pay the income of the proceeds of sale to the wife for her life for her separate use. Until sale, the rents and profits were to be paid as if they were the income of the proceeds of sale. The house was never sold, but the husband and Differences arising wife lived there together. between them, the wife petitioned for a decree of dissolution of marriage on the ground of adultery and cruelty, and brought an action against her husband and the trustees of the marriage settle. ment, claiming to have the trusts executed under the direction of the court, and an injunction to

restrain her husband from entering upon the settled property. She then moved for an injunction till the hearing, alleging that her husband only occasionally slept at the house, and had removed plate settled to her separate use. Held, that, as from the husband's evidence he desired to enter the house, not for the purpose of enjoying his wife's society, but for the convenience of using the house, the interim injunction must be granted. Quare, whether a wife entitled to the separate use of a dwelling-house in which she resides can exclude therefrom a husband desiring her society. (Symonds v. Hallett.) Torts committed before Married Women's Property Act 1882-Wife's right to sue alone for, after the Act-Security for costs.-A married woman, married before 1st Jan. 1882, may bring and maintain an action in her own name alone after the commencement of the Married Women's Property Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75) for torts committed against her property before that Act came into operation; and since its coming into operation the previous leave of the court or a judge is no longer necessary. (James v. Barraud and others.)...... 300

INCOME TAX.

page 380

English company-Foreign debenture holdersLiability to pay tax on interest on debentures.-An English limited company, paying income tax in respect of its gains and profits under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 35, schedule D, is liable to pay on the amount of the interest payable by the company to debenture holders in a foreign country, and therefore no deduction can be claimed in respect of such interest. (The Alexandria Water Company Limited, apps., v. Musgrave, Surveyor of Taxes, resp.) Surplus revenue - Appropriation - Profits. The appellant board was constituted a corporation by certain private Acts of Parliament for the management of the Mersey Docks, and was directed to apply the money received from dock dues and other sources of revenue to the payment of the expenses of management, and the interest due upon money borrowed. The surplus revenue (if any) was directed to be applied to a sinking fund for the extinguishment of debts, after which the dues were to be reduced, and for no other purpose whatsoever. Held, that this surplus revenue was available as 'profits and should be assessed to the income tax. (The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Lucas.)

INFANTS.

...

Ward of court-Payment into court-Administration action-Alien infant resident abroad-PracticeObtaining opinion of Court of Appeal in the first instance.-A legacy had been paid into court to which, on the death of the tenant for life, two female infants who were French subjects by birth, and resident in France, became absolutely entitled. They were both married, and by the French law, under the settlements made on their respective marriages, their husbands were absolutely entitled to receive their shares of the fund. One of the infants had since attained twenty-one. Held, that the infants not being subjects of or domiciled or resident in England, the court had a discretion as to whether or not they should be treated as wards of court, and that the money might therefore be paid out to the husbands. Whether in any case th mere fact that there is a fund in court to a share in which an infant is entitled makes the infant a ward of court, quære. (Brown v. Collins.)

INJUNCTION. Charity-Resident medical officer-Beneficiary of funds of charity-Charity Commissioners--Committee acting ultra vires-Preliminary objection under Charitable Trusts Act 1853.-In an action brought by the plaintiff, a doctor, who had been appointed by the committee of a hospital, pursuant to the charity deed by which the hospital had been founded, to be its resident medical superintendent, to obtain a declaration that he was entitled to hold and execute such office during his good behaviour, the court was moved that an interim injunction

287

781

329

might be granted to him restraining the defendants from disturbing him in his office, from ejecting him from his residence in the hospital, from suspending the work of the hospital, and from otherwise interfering with his tenure and execution of his office. It appeared that, by the rules made in pursnance of the trust deed under which the hospital was constituted, power was given for the committee to remove the resident medical superintendent by written notice of three months, on proof to them of certain acts, none of which it was suggested the plaintiff had committed; but as the committee had come to the conclusion that the funds of the hospital were not sufficient to support a resident medical superintendent, they had given the plaintiff three months' notice to leave, after he had spent 4001. on his residence in the hospital. The defendants, however, took the preliminary objection that the plaintiff, before commencing his action, had not obtained the sanction of the Charity Commissioners, which was required by the Charitable Trusts Act 1853. Held, that the objection was fatal to the plaintiff's case, as he was not claiming adversely to the trust, but claiming under it, and that the motion must be refused, with costs. (Benthall v. The Earl of Kilmorey and others.) page 127 Goodwill-Master and servant-Agreement not to carry on business.-On being employed as a shopman to C., an Italian warehouseman, W. entered into a written agreement with C. (in which the assigns were not mentioned) not to carry on a similar business within a mile of C.'s then shop. C. afterwards removed his business to other premises 450 yards away, taking W. with him as shopman. W. afterwards left his employment, and C. sold the beneficial interest and goodwill in his business to J. W. having set up a similar business at premises not a mile distant from either of C,'s premises Held, in an action by J. against W., that the benefit of W.'s covenant with C. passed by the assignment to J., and that J. was entitled to an injunction restraining W from carrying on business within the one mile limit. (Jacoby v. Whitmore.) 335

:

...

INNKEEPER.

Liability of-Property of guest-Temporary stay for refreshment. The plaintiff arrived by train at Carlisle railway station, and went to the defendant's hotel, which is connected with the station by a covered way, for the purpose of staying there for the night. He handed his luggage to the hotel porter, but, on receipt of a telegram in the hotel, he changed his mind, and decided not to remain. Wishing to get some refreshment, he went to the railway refreshment-room, which was at the station end of the covered way, but belonged to the defendants. His luggage was put in the hotel lock-up room. On his return he found that a part of it had been abstracted. In an action, charging the defendants with liability as innkeepers, the plaintiff was nonsuited. Held, that the nonsuit was right, as there was no evidence of the existence of the relationship of landlord and guest between the plaintiff and the defendants. (Strauss v. County Hotel and Wine Company Limited.)...

INSURANCE. MARINE.

Barratry Warranty" free from capture and seizure"-Proximate cause of loss-Smuggling.In a policy of marine insurance a warranty "free from capture and seizure" applies not only to capture or seizure by belligerents, but to any seizure, even if it be the result of a barratrous act of the master. In a time policy the ordinary perils, including "barratry of the master," were enumerated, and the subject-matter of the insurance was "warranted free from capture and seizure, and the consequences of any attempt thereat." the continuance of the policy the ship was seized and detained by the Spanish authorities in consequence of the barratrous act of the master in smuggling. Held, that such seizure was covered by the warranty, and that the underwriters were not liable. (Cory v. Burr.)...

During

601

78

April :6, 184.]

Sale of insured premises-Fire after contract, but before completion-Right of insurers-Subrogation. -After the date of a contract for the sale of a house which was insured against fire, and before completion of the purchase, the house was damaged by fire, and the insurance company, in ignorance of the contract, paid the vendors for the damage done. The purchase was subsequently completed, the vendors receiving the full amount of the purchase money, and also retaining the moneys paid to them by the insurance company. In an action by the chairman of the insurance company to recover the amount paid by the company to the vendors: Held, that the contract of insurance was a contract of indemnity only, and therefore the receipt of the purchase money by the defend. ants must be taken into account in calculating the amount of the loss sustained by the defendants, and, as it had the effect of extinguishing such loss, the plaintiff was entitled to recover. (Castellain ...page 29 v. Preston.)

INTERPLEADER.

Goods seized under writ of elegil-After assignment to trustees under resolution of creditors-Resolution and assignment being after writ was lodged with sheriff-Notice of writ-Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856.-The plaintiffs signed judgment against the defendants on the 12th July, and on the same day delivered a writ of elegit to the sheriff, who did not seize the goods until the 20th Sept., when they were in the possession of the claimants. On the 11th July the defendants closed their place of business in order to prevent executions being levied, and kept them closed until the 16th July, when they filed a petition for the liquidation of their affairs by arrangement or composition under the Bankruptcy Act 1869, and at a meeting of creditors on the 27th Aug. it was resolved that a composition of 78. 6d. in the pound should be accepted and secured by an assignment of the whole of the assets of the defendants to the claimants as trustees, and that a proper deed of assignment should be executed by the defendants. On the 11th Sept. the claimants received a written notice from the plaintiffs that the writ of elegit had been lodged with the sheriff, and on the 17th Sept., that is, before the goods were seized, the defendants executed the deed of assignment to the claimants in pursuance of the resolution of the creditors. Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to the goods. (Ehlers, Seel, and Co. v. Kauffman and Gates; Wendt and Charles, claimants.)...

62

(Gray v.

page 288

106

Distress-Goods fraudulently removed-Seizure off
the premises after tenant has quitted-8 Anne, c.
14, ss. 6, 7; 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 1.-Goods which
have been fraudulently removed to avoid a distress
cannot be seized under 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, unless they
Anne, c. 14, if
could have been seized under
they had remained on the premises.
Stait.)
Forfeiture-Breach of negative covenant-Proviso
for re-entry-Construction of.-A lease contained
a covenant by the lessee not to carry on any trade
upon the premises other than that of a wine and
spirit merchant, and not to assign or under-
lease the premises without the consent in
writing of the lessor. There was a proviso for re-
entry if the lessee should not well and truly per-
form and keep all and singular the covenants,
conditions, and agreements thereinbefore contained
Held, that
to be observed, performed, and kept.
the words of the proviso for re-entry were wide
enough to cover a breach of the negative covenants.
Letting the premises from year to year is a breach
(Timms v.
of a covenant not to "underlease."
Baker and others.)...
Illegal distress-Lodger-Lodgers' Goods Protection
Act 1871.-The defendant Wilding let three rooms
to S. Thwaites, the brother of the plaintiff, at the
rent of 10s. per week, who let one room to the
plaintiff at the rent of 38. 64. per week. On the
1st Sept. 81. was due from S. Thwaites to the defen-
dant for rent, and a distress was put in, and the
goods in the plaintiff's room were seized. On the
5th Sept. the plaintiff gave notice under the
Lodgers' Goods Protection Act, and on the follow-
ing day the distress was withdrawn, S. Thwaites
having paid 11. and agreed to pay the balance by
instalments. No instalments were paid, and on
the 21st Sept. a second distress was put in for 81.,
being 11. for rent which had subsequently accrued
due, and 7., the balance of the former sum dis-
trained for. The plaintiff did not serve another
notice under the Act, and her goods were sold for
51. 11s. Held, that the notice served on the 5th
Sept., in accordance with the Lodgers' Goods Pro-
tection Act, was applicable to the first distress
only, and that the plaintiff ought to have served a
fresh notice when the second distress was put in.
201, 393
(Thwaites v. Wilding and Hancock.)

LANDS CLAUSES ACT 1845.
Adverse claimants-Claim by Crown.-The Crown
cannot be forced into court as a litigant under the
Lands Clauses Act. Land to which there were
adverse claims by the lord of the manor and the
Crown was taken by a railway company under an
agreement for purchase with the lord, and the
purchase money was paid into court nnder sect. 76 of
the Act to an account which referred to the lord but
not to the Crown. The lord petitioned for payment
of the money out to himself, the Crown being no
party to the proceedings. An information by the

523

own against the lord was pending in the Queen's Bench Division, which raised the question of title to land of which the land taken by the company formed part. Held, that the petition must stand over till after the trial of the information. (Re The Manor of Lowestoft and the Great Eastern Railway Company.) Compulsory taking by a railway company of part of a house. Where a man used two houses with internal communication as one house for the purpose of one business, holding them under separate leases of even date from the same lessor, the Court held that the two houses constituted one entire house within the meaning of the Lands Clauses Act 1845, s. 92, so that, if the company took the premises comprised in one lease, they were bound to take those comprised in the other. (Siegenberg v. The Metropolitan District Railway Company.) 551 Money in court-An application by a railway company, and the person whose land they have taken under the provisions of sect. 85 of the Lands Clauses Act 1845, for payment out to the company of the money paid into court by them in accordance with that section, the sum being under 1000l., is rightly made by summons, and not by petition.