NAMES OF THE CASES REPORTED. COURT OF CHANCERY. By T. EDWARDS, Barrister at Law. Eads v. Williams.-(Award-Specific performance- COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. 75 76 76 77 78 80 193 VICE-CHANCELLOR STUART'S COURT-(Continued). Foster v. Cautley.-(Marriage settlement-PowerConstruction-Appointment "in lieu of original share"-Unappointed fund, right to a share of, in addition to appointed share) . VICE-CHANCELLOR WOOD'S COURT. .... 202 By MATTHEW B. BEGBIE, Barrister at Law. ...... By G. J. P. SMITH and W. B. BRETT, Barristers at Law. Pindar v. Barr.—(Parish clerk—Appointment to office Suspension of vicar- Stipendiary curate "Minister," canon 91) The Overseers of Wendron, Apps., The Overseers of Stithians, Resps.-(Settlement by estate-9 Geo. 1, c. 7, s. 5-Purchase-Consideration less than 301.) 207 Reg. v. The Inhabitants of Bedfordshire. — (Indictment-Repair of public bridge-Liability ratione tenure-Evidence-Reputation) Ex parte Christie.-(County court-Judgment debtor COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. 208 211 By W. PATERSON and W. MILLS, Barristers at Law. The Northampton Gas-light Company v. Parnell.(Deed, construction of―Covenant to pay a sum to be adjudged by a third person-Revocation)...... 211 COURT OF EXCHEQUER. 214 By W. M. BEST, Barrister at Law. Martin v. Hewson.-(Wagers-8 & 9 Vict, c. 109, s. 18—Pleading-- Cock-fights) Moreton v. Holt.-(County court-Removal of judgment Execution-9 & 10 Vict. c. 95-19 Geo. 3, c. 70, s. 4—1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 22)......... 215 own interests, or with offices guarded by the vigilance of the press and public opinion, but with such appointments as may be dealt with quietly and safely. Let it not, however, be supposed that they are unimportant in their consequences to the public. No office connected with the exercise of judicial functions can be otherwise than of public importance. How are these appointments made? Are they given to the hard-working, clear-headed, industrious men who have gained the confidence of many by their skill, their learning, and their experience, and to whom such offices would be fitting rewards, as well as material aids in their laborious career? The value to the public of such men-the proper men for the proper places-can scarcely be estimated. But all such considerations are overlooked in favour of some connexion, some claim, some friendship, or some mysterious influence with the powers that be. Men utterly unknown to the public, scarcely known even by name to the Profession, are made county court judges, stipendiary magistrates, recorders, and revising barristersfor what reason no one upon earth, except the appointor and appointee and their friends, can tell. It may sometimes be guessed by the name of the party, or his connexion, proximate or remote, with another name. If the gross jobbing of such transactions were not sad and disastrous in the extreme, it would be ludicrous in its aspect and consequences. Men not THE "cold shade of aristocracy," which is said to fall upon our civil and military departments, is not altogether absent from the legal profession. It is often asserted, that, as a general rule, success attends the industrious, able, learned lawyer, whatever may be his want of fortune or of family; while incapacity, indolence, and ignorance are soon discovered, and fall from their inherent weakness, although they may attach to wealth and station. Applied to practising lawyers, this is a tolerably accurate view, (not, however, without many painful exceptions); the real, working, public part of the Profession tries the man; and clients are seldom so hardy or so foolish as to intrust their dearest interests to an incompetent attorney or advocate after he has proved his incompetency. It must also be admitted, that the judges of our superior courts are generally the right men for the office; the appointment of them is a matter of such interest to the public and the Profession-so fully canvassed, and attended by such important results upon the administration of justice that the influence of family connexions, or college friendships, or past or future favours, dares not often to intrude upon these occasions. There are, however, pleasant, snug appointments, every now and then turn-only unfit, but the most unfit, are all at once placed on ing up, of a more limited and private character, exciting little interest beyond the district for which the appointment is made-comparatively easy berths, with good salaries—to be distributed among lawyers. The question is now no longer with clients, who look after their No. 9, VOL. I., New Series. the judgment-scat. If the Hon. A. B. happens to have had his name in the Law List as a Chancery barrister, make him a stipendiary magistrate or recorder, who has nothing to do with any law but criminal law. If the cousin of Lord C. D. knows one thing, and that one I thing happens to be criminal law, make him a county | great practical changes in our system of jurisprudence, court judge, who has no jurisdiction over crimes; and so on through the catalogue. Extraordinary notions of another character sometimes influence those in office, who have the patronage of law appointments. Acting conscientiously, they feel disinclined to bestow their favours on their own relatives, and turn a deaf ear to the voice of friendship. They fear public opinion; they are alarmed lest the capacity of their relatives or their friends should be called in question. But let some candidate present himself backed by "political influence," it matters little how incapable he may be, or how little fit to discharge, either with credit to himself or with satisfaction to the public, the duties of the appointment, "political influence" carries the day; and the virtuous patron, who has withstood the claims of kith and kin, yields to the paramount influence of "politics." They who have the power of appointment in these cases are highly culpable for its frequent perversion and abuse. We hope that the time will come when they, together with other authorities, will be called to account for their violation of a sacred trust. and forming in themselves a new code of practice and pleading in the courts of common law, have found many editors, as well as readers, of their provisions. In addition to the three books whose titles are given above, and which we must content ourselves with reviewing on the present occasion, we have just received Mr. Finlason's "Common-law Procedure Acts of 1852 and 1854, with Notes, the New Rules framed under both, and an Introduction;" and Mr. Mayne's "Treatise on Equitable Defences and Replications." Mr. Francis has kindly, and we think wisely, sheltered under one roof the Procedure Acts of 1852 and 1854, those "twin sisters," together with their respective progenies-the practice and pleading rules of Hilary Terin, 1853, and of Michaelmas Vacation, 1854. His book contains also a brief introduction to the equithe evidence amendment statutes, (14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, table jurisdiction conferred upon Courts of law, and and 16 & 17 Vict. c. 83), rendering parties to a cause, and the husbands and wives of parties, competent witnesses. These latter statutes are added as “forming an important part of the reform of common-law pro'cedure during the last few years." (Preface). Decisions of recent date are noted under the sections to which they refer, and there are copious extracts from the Reports of the Common-law Commissioners. The editor assumes that sect. 68 has given "a means at common law of enforcing specific performance of a contract or duty in matters concerning private rights," It is stated by the reporter for the Norfolk Circuit, (p. 258), which, to say the least of it, is extremely that in the calendar for Aylesbury the value of the doubtful*; and states that the intent of the section articles alleged to have been stolen is, in all the in- (sect. 83) allowing equitable defences is, that whenstances, below that which is the standard proposed in Lord Cranworth's bill, namely, 10s. He then asks, by injunction, perpetual or conditional, to stay proceedever relief in equity would be granted to either party "What test is to be applied in order to arrive at the ings at law, the same grounds shall afford a defence in value of stolen property? Is it to be the sworn judg-courts of law. The Court of Exchequer, however, in ment of an independent valuer? or is it to be the discretion of the prosecutor, backed by some sympathising policeman? Unless it be the former," he adds, "it will be almost in the power of any unscrupulous prosecutor to take the law, as it were, into his own hands; for very few persons of the class among which prisoners are found will understand the right of option' to be extended to them by the bill, any more than now they do the distinction between asking a question and making NOTES OF THE WEEK. their defence." Review. The New Common-law Procedure under the Procedure [Butterworths. 1854.] THE Common-law Procedure Acts, having worked · The Mines Royal Societies v. Magnay, (18 Jur., part 1, P. 1028), has decided that it is only where the grounds are such as to entitle the party to a perpetual injunction that they can be pleaded under this section. That this was the intention of the learned commissioners is clear by the extract given from their report at p. 269 of this book, where they say, "We think that Courts such defences by way of plea in every case in which 'of common law ought to be empowered to receive 'the party pleading them would be entitled to uncondi'tional relief by injunction." Mr. Francis points out (p. 270) that the arbitration clauses in the act have removed the objection to Courts of law entertaining questions of complex accounts; but it is very doubtful whether the objection to partners suing each other at law in respect of a partnership matter is obviated. Mr. Kerr begins with an introduction of ten chapters, a subdivision of the subject adopted "solely with a 'view to precision and brevity." (Preface). They contain an outline of the following subjects:-1. Specific performance, (which he thinks may probably be enforced with regard to contracts). (P.x). 2. Injunction. 3. Discovery. 4. Equitable defences. 5. Proceedings on the trial of issues of fact. 6. Proceedings after the trial. 7. Execution by the attachment of debts. 8. Summary proceedings in court, (affidavits, &c.) 9. Evidence. 10. Amendments in the procedure of the Courts, (new trials, revivor, ejectment, and exeto the different sections. The stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 34, cution). The act is then given, with notes appended for compelling the attendance of witnesses from any part of the United Kingdom, and a full index, complete the work. The ten chapters to which we have referred describe the state of the law as it existed at the time of the * See the article upon this subject, 18 Jur., part 2, p. 497. passing of the statute upon those subjects which are affected by it, and point out the changes which are certain or likely to ensue from its provisions. This is done for the most part in the clear and forcible language of the Common-law Commissioners, which no doubt affords on occasions a key to the language of the act, but which rather shews what was intended to be done than what has actually been done. In a recent case in the Exchequer two learned judges protested against the report being cited in argument for the purpose of construing the statute. (Martin v. Hemming, 18 Jur., part 1, p. 1002). Mr. Kerr points out the blunder committed by the Legislature in the 88th section, which enacts, that the Courts of law may, upon summary application, exercise the same jurisdiction as may, under the 53 Geo. 3, c. 159, intituled "An Act to limit the Responsibility of Shipowners in certain Cases,' ," be exercised by any Court of equity; the fact being, that the day before the passing of the Procedure Act of 1854, the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, had received the royal assent, and had entirely repealed the stat. 53 Geo. 3, c. 159. Under the latter statute, therefore, the Court of Chancery had then no jurisdiction in the matter, although it had under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, which vested afresh in the Court of Chancery the jurisdiction it had previously exercised. (See sects. D. iii-D. vi, D. xv). We think Mr. Kerr is incorrect in stating that the 18th section, altering the rules of practice respecting the addresses of counsel to a jury, does not extend to a trial before a judge without a jury, (Pref. vii, and also p. 14), because by the 1st section of the act it is enacted, that "the proceedings upon and after such trial, (i. e. before a judge alone), as to the power of the court or judge, the evidence, and otherwise, shall be the same as in the case of trial by jury." We regret to find that Mr. Kerr, when commenting upon the arbitration clauses, (p. xxxi), has cast a grave and sweeping imputation upon his professional brethren. A reference," he says, " if made to a lawyer appointed by the parties, may nevertheless continue to be the te'dious, expensive, and unsatisfactory proceeding which 'it has hitherto been; for the costs to be incurred in 'three months may easily be made to exceed the value of the subject-matter in dispute. Any party to an ac'tion on whom an arbitration is forced should therefore 'leave the reference to be made to an officer of the court, 'or to a county court judge. Neither will have any interest to prolong the proceedings by frequent adjourn ments; and the conduct of either, if faulty, may be *brought before the Court; while the parties to the 'action have in the position of the arbitrator some gua'rantie for the proper conduct of the reference." In direct contradiction to Mr. Kerr, we maintain, and we do so with some practical experience on the subject, that references to lawyers are far more satisfactory than references to county court judges or to the Masters of the courts. If it is a mere question of taxation of an attorney's bill, by all means refer it to a Master, who is better qualified than any one else to decide such matters. Meetings under a reference should be at short intervals from each other, and reasonably long in point of duration. The Masters, as well as the county court judges, however, are much employed in the exercise of their proper functions, and can seldom afford the time required to carry on references in a proper manner. From these causes, as well as from others which we need not now specify, we have known such references prove most tedious, expensive, and in several instances utterly abortive. We deny that lawyers prolong meetings for their own interest. Sometimes it is necessary to do so for the real interest of their clients; sometimes it is the fault of their clients and their witnesses. That there are exceptions to this observation we do not deny, but we are happy to know that they are comparatively rare. For honesty and fairness the awards of lawyers are above suspicion. The work of Messrs. Holland and Chandless is introduced by an able and useful treatise on Inspection and Discovery, by Mr. Charles Edward Pollock. This is in effect a new edition of his former work on the same subject, with the addition of later cases, and observations on the extended powers given by the last Procedure Act. It therefore includes the law relating to discovery, both by the inspection of documents and by the delivery of interrogatories. The subject is subdivided, so as to comprehend inspection at common law, and also under the stats. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, and 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125. The doctrine of discovery in equity is fully considered and clearly stated. This is succeeded by a treatise upon injunctions in equity and under the Procedure Act of 1854, containing the leading cases which have been decided upon the subject, alphabetically arranged. Then follow observations upon relief in equity, and, under the act, embracing equitable defences, upon which the editors express an opinion that has been subsequently confirmed by the Court of Exchequer in the case above cited, viz. "That it was not intended to include cases in which cross 'equities would arise, but to confine the jurisdiction of the Courts of common law to that broader and more simple class of cases in which a Court of equity would feel itself at liberty to give perpetual' relief against a judgment unclogged by any conditions or stipula'tions." (P. 165). The statute itself is then given, and the notes to the respective sections are carefully written, being suggestive rather than dogmatic in their character. We especially refer to the note appended to the 68th section, to which the editors give a more limited, but probably a more correct, construction than has generally been adopted, being of opinion that it alters the machinery by which a mandamus is obtained, but does not confer upon common-law Courts any power of enforcing specific performance of a contract*. The act 53 Geo. 3, c. 159, above referred to, is inserted in the appendix, probably by an oversight, although it is stated on the fly-leaf at the commencement to have been repealed, and in fact re-enacted by the stat. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 120. The Rules of Michaelmas Vacation, 1854, and a full analytical index, complete the work. In reviewing these books our object has not been to compare their relative merits, but rather to give an outline of their contents, and to call the attention of our readers to some of their principal features. THE LAW OF BLOCKADE. (Continued from p. 54). "During the short peace consequent on the treaty of Amiens, in 1802, France reverted to her policy of monopolising the trade of her colonies, and thus shut their ports against all vessels but her own. When, however, the war was in the following year resumed, she repeated her former invitation to neutral vessels, and thus resigned her colonial trade into the hands of nations not at war with this country, and which under the cover of their neutrality indirectly promoted that trade and commerce which France herself, from her maritime weakness and fear of capture of her convoys, was incapable of assisting. Thereupon the English Government published instructions which subjected to seizure all vessels carrying on trade between the colonies of France and any country save the mother country of the neutral trader; and the judge of our Prize Court (Lord Stowell) did not hesitate to enforce those in* See vol. 18, part 2, p. 497. structions; and moreover, that eminent American jurist, Chancellor Kent, although the practice strongly conflicted with the commercial interests of his own country, and was directly at variance with the principle of freedom of ship freedom of goods,' did not hesitate to say, "To me the rule of 1756 seems one of the most moderate and unobjectionable of belligerent claims.' "When the kingdom of Hanover was, in 1806, taken possession of by Prussia, at the instigation of Napoleon Buonaparte, a proclamation, emanating ostensibly from the King of Prussia, but virtually the act of Buona parte himself, was put forth declaring the ports of the North Sea, as well as the rivers flowing into it, closed against British shipping and commerce, as they were at the time when the French troops occupied Hanover.' As a measure of retaliation, the English Government declared the mouths of the rivers Ems, Weser, and Elbe blockaded, and also laid an embargo on all Prussian vessels and property in the ports of Great Britain. Less than a month afterwards another more comprehensive order was issued, extending the blockade to all ports between the Elbe and Brest, thus including the ports of Holland, those of Prussia on the German Ocean, and the whole sea-board of France. This was derisively styled the paper blockade.' Hence resulted the Berlin and Milan decrees of Buonaparte, and the Orders in Council of the British Government, put forth, the former in 1806, the latter in 1807, the combined effect of which for a time paralysed the industrial energies and all but annihilated the trade of Great Britain. "After being in force for nearly five years, the Orders in Council were rescinded, in consequence of their manifest disastrous results having been incontrovertibly proved by evidence taken before the House of Commons, and so clearly and forcibly demonstrated by Lord (then Mr.) Brougham in his well-known speech in Parliament. trade which they had carried on with neutral ports closed, or rendered highly dangerous from fear of the capture of their merchantmen, or confiscation of their merchandise, at the hands of both France and England, passed an act forbidding all friendly intercourse with either of these countries so long as their restrictive measures remained in force. This induced the English Government to rescind its orders, so far as regarded American vessels and their cargoes of American property. That relaxation, however, was based on the proviso that the Government of the United States should no longer close their ports against our vessels either of war or commerce. Before, however, these concessions were known in America, that country had already declared war with Great Britain, mainly on the ground of her offensive Orders in Council; but the right of search of American vessels for British seamen, claimed and enforced by Great Britain, was a powerful stimulant in provoking feelings of hostility. The right of search has always been a subject of contest and dispute; it is but natural that every nation should consider it an indignity to have its vessels stopped in their course, and overhauled under suspicion of having contraband articles on board, whether in the shape of merchandise or human beings; although it consists with reason, as well as with the recognised law of nations, that in time of war belligerents must insist upon that right, if they would prevent their enemy from receiving from neutrals, or by their agency, warlike implements or materials. (To be continued). LIST OF SHERIFFS AND UNDER-SHERIFFS, marked (*). The term of office of the sheriffs, &c., for cities ***Warrants are not granted in town for those places and towns, expires on the 9th November. Office hours-in Term, from 11 till 4; in Vacation, from 11 till 3. Bedfordshire-J. S. Leigh, Esq., Luton Hoo, Bedfordshire. Charles Addington Austin, Esq., Luton, Bedfordshire. Undershs., G. T. Taylor, Esq., 18, Featherstone- Berkshire-Henry Elwes, Esq., Marcham Park, Abingdon. "The history of these Orders in Council is thus briefly but graphically given in the Edinburgh Review for July, 1812: These Orders in Council took their origin in a decree promulgated by Buonaparte, at Ber lin, on the 21st November, 1806, by which, in the usual style of that personage, he declared the United Kingdom to be in a state of blockade; that all commodities of English origin, or belonging to Englishmen, were good prize; and that no ship from England or her colonies, or which should have touched there, should be admitted into any harbour belonging to France or occupied by her troops. This bravado was followed on our part by an Order in Council dated the 9th January, 1807, by which we interdicted neutrals from the whole coasting trade from one part of France to another; and in November, 1807, a series of new orders was promulgated, by which we declared that we would permit no trade with France and her dependencies except through England; all neutrals bound to those countries being required, in the first instance, to touch at our ports, and pay a duty to our Government; and that every vessel which had a certificate of origin on board should be declared lawful prize. To which extraordinary edict France finally replied by what has been called the Milan decree, declaring in substance that any vessel which in any way submitted to our orders of the 11th November, or which had been searched in the course of her voyage by an English cruiser, should be considered as lawful prize. This is the sum of these unprecedented State documents; and the consequence Camb, and Hunts-Sir Williamson Booth, Bart., Woodbury was, that between the French decrees and the English orders all neutral trade was effectually annihilated.' "The effect of these decrees of Buonaparte and the orders of the British Government did not bear alone upon the commerce of England, or even of Europe. Their baneful influence extended across the Atlantic. The United States of America, finding their maritime Undershs., James Call Weddell, Esq., Palace Deps., Pringle, Shum, Wilson, & Crossman, 3, Bristol. Undersh., W. O. Hare, Esq., Small-street, Bristol. Undersh., William Powell, Esq., Newport Pagnell. Undershs., Hall, Gamlingay, Cambridgeshire. George De Vins Wade, Esq., Baldock, G. F. Maule, Esq., Huntingdon. A.U. Cheshire-John Chapman, Esq., Hill End, Mottram in Long- Lancashire-John Pemberton Heywood, Esq., Norris Green, dendale, Cheshire. Thomas Jepson, Esq., Stockport. Undershs., John Hostage, Esq., Chester. A. U. Deps., Chester, Toulmin, & Chester, 11, Staple-inn. *Chester-John Hicklin, Esq., Chester. Undersh., John Hostage, Esq., Chester. Deps., Chester, Toulmin, & Chester, 11, Staple-inn. *Cinque Ports-The Most Noble James Andrew Marquis of Dalhousie. Undersh., Thomas Pain, Esq., Dover. Deps., Kingsford & Dorman, 23, Essex-st., Strand. Cumberland-Thomas Story Spedding, Esq., Mirehouse. Devonshire-Thomas Daniel, Esq., Stoodleigh. Undersh., Thomas Edward Drake, Esq., Exeter. Deps., Buckley & Philbrick, 39, Basinghall-street. Dorsetshire-Robert Williams, Esq., Bridehead, Dorsetshire. Undersh., Charles Burt Henning, Esq., Dorchester. Dep., Sydney Beisly, Esq., 1, Lincoln's-inn-fields. *Durham-R. Surtees, Esq., Redworth House, Darlington, near Durham. Undersh., Wm. Emerson Wooler, Esq., Durham. Essex-John Watlington Perry Watlington, Esq., Moor Hall, Undershs., Joseph Jessop, Esq., Waltham Abbey, Gepp & Veley, Chelmsford, Essex. Deps., Hawkins, Bloxam, & Hawkins, New Boswell- *Exeter-Thomas G. Norris, Esq., Southernhay, Exeter. Undersh., E. Force, Esq., Deanery-place, Exeter. Dep., W. Harris, 5, Stone-buildings, Lincoln's-inn. *Gloucestershire-Corbett Holland Corbett, Esq., Hadmington Hall, near Stratford-upon-Avon. Undersh., J. Burrup, Esq., Berkeley-street, Gloucester, (firm of Burrup & Son). Dep., G. P. Wilton, Raymond-buildings, Gray's-inn. *Gloucester-George Samuel Wintle, Esq., Gloucester. Undersh., Wm. Mathews, Esq., 15, College-green, Gloucester. Dep., W. C. Smith, Esq., 31, Lincoln's-inn-fields. Hampshire-The Hon. Sir Edward Butler, Knight, Harefield House. Undersh., Robert Harfield, Esq., Southampton. Deps., Messrs. Braikenridge, 10, Bartlett's-buildings. Herefordshire-Francis Richard W. Prosser, Esq., Belmont, near Hereford. Undersh., Richard Underwood, Esq., Hereford. Dep., C. Appleyard, 1, New-square, Lincoln's-inn. | Hertfordshire-Nathaniel Hibbert, Esq., Munden, Watford. Undershs., Longmore, Sworder, & Longmore, Hertford. Deps., Hawkins, Bloxam, & Hawkins, New Boswell court. Hunts. & Camb.-Sir Williamson Booth, Bart., Woodbury Hall, Gamlingay. Undershs., G. De V. Wade, Esq., Baldock, Herts. G. F. Maule, Esq., Huntingdon. (Jointly and severally). Deps., Trinder & Eyre, 1, John-st., Bedford-row. Kent-Sir Walter Charles James, Bart., Betshanger, near Sandwich. Undersh., Wm. Woodgate, Esq., 32, Lincoln's-inn. fields. Deps. Palmer, Palmer, & Bull, 24, Bedford-row. *Kingston-upon-Hull-J. Gee, Esq., Cottingham, near Hull. Undersh., John Earnshaw, Esq., Hull. Dep., Z. Brooke, Esq., 3, New Boswell-court. Undershs., near Liverpool. Wm. Wood, Esq., Liverpool. Wilson, Son, & Deacon, Preston. Deps., Risdale & Craddock, 5, Gray's-inn-square. *Leicestershire-William Ward Tailby, Esq., Carlton Curlieu, Leicestershire. Undersh., Samuel Berridge, Esq., Leicester. Dep., G. J. Robinson, Esq., 35, Lincoln's-inn-fields. *Lichfield-John Coxon, Esq., Freeford Farm. Undersh., John Philip Dyott, Esq., Lichfield. Deps., Baxter & Co., 48, Lincoln's-inn-fields. Lincolnshire-George Skipworth, Esq., Moortown House. George Marris, Esq., Caistor. Undershs., H. Williams, Esq., Lincoln. A. U. Deps., Coverdale, Lee, & Purvis, 4, Bedford-row. Lincoln-Charles Doughty, Esq., Lincoln. Undersh., Richard Mason, Esq., Lincoln. Deps., Taylor & Collisson, 28, Great James-street, London-Henry Muggeridge, Esq., St. Andrew's-hill. Dep., Secondaries Office, Basinghall-street. Middlesex-Charles D. Crosley, Esq., Sun-court, Cornhill. Undersh., A. Crosley, Esq., 34, Lombard-street. Deps., Burchell & Hall, Red Lion-square. *Monmouthshire-J. Russell, Esq., Wyelands, near Chepstow. Undersh., H. J. Davis, Esq., Newport, Monmouthshire. Deps., Few & Co., 2, Henrietta-st., Covent-garden. *Newcastle-upon-Tyne-Edward N. Grace, Esq., Newcastle upon-Tyne. Undersh., R. Y. Green, Esq., Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Dep., J. Crowdy, Esq., 17, Serjeants'-inn, Fleet-st. Norfolk-Brampton Gurdon, Esq., Letton, Norfolk. George Cooper, Esq., East Dereham, Norfolk. Undershs., Messrs. Taylor, Norwich. A. U. Dep., J. W. Flower, Esq., 17, Gracechurch-street. Northamptonshire-Frederick Urban Sartoris, Esq., Rusden Hall, Northamptonshire. Undersh., Henry P. Markham, Esq., Northampton. Dep., Frederick Ouvry, Esq., 13, Tokenhouse-yard. Northumberland-Rowland Errington, Esq., Sandoe. Undersh., John Stokoe, Esq., Hexham. Dep., Thomas Leadbitter, Esq., 7, Staple-inn. *Norwich-R. J. Harvey Harvey, Esq., Bracondale, Norwich. Undersh., G. E. Simpson, Esq., Tombland, Norwich. Dep., G. T. Taylor, Esq., 18, Featherstone-bdgs. Nottinghamshire-Henry Bridgeman Simpson, Esq., Babworth, Nottinghamshire. Edmund Percy, Esq., Nottingham. Undershs., J. Brewster, Esq., Nottingham. A.U. Deps., Taylor & Collisson, 28, Great James-street, Bedford-row. Nottingham-W. Vickers Copeland, Esq., Nottingham. Undersh., Christopher Swann, Esq., Nottingham. Deps., Holme, Loftus, & Young, 10, New-inn, Strand. Oxfordshire-Benjamin John Whippy, Esq., Lee Place, Oxfordshire. Undersh., John Marriott Davenport, Esq., Oxford. *Poole-William Bound the younger, Esq., Poole. Undersh., Henry Mooring Aldridge, Esq., Poole. Dep., Wm. Skilbeck, Esq., 19, Southampton-bdgs. Rutlandshire-Arthur Heathcote, Esq., Pilton. Undersh., Thomas Brown, Esq., Uppingham. |