providence. It may be argued that those plagues were the natural results of natural causes not then understood, and not since explained, because circumstances equally remarkable have been clearly traced to their natural sources. Without calling in question the correctness of the premise, so far as individual circumstances are concerned, it may be safely assumed that such a combination of terrible calamities has never yet fallen upon a people, and been traceable to natural causes. But admitting each of those fearful visitations to be traceable to, and the results of, natural laws, there is still a sufficient speciality in them to justify us in regarding them even as the understood results of explained causes, as remarkable interpositions of a watchful providence, and signal visitations of outraged justice.

The idea which very generally prevails, that results which are contrary to the laws of nature are necessary to sustain the doctrine of Divine Providence, is manifestly an error, arising out of ignorance and misconception. It is not one whit more marvellous, as a result of the divine will, that Elijah should be fed by the ravens, than that the millions of human beings in the world should from day to day be supplied with the necessaries of life.

The laws which regulate and govern the germination of seed and the growth of plants, through the means of which the daily wants of man and the beasts of the earth are continually supplied, are simply operations of the divine will, so uniform and unchanging since the day of creation that we have come to regard them and to speak of them, in our ignorance, it may be, rather than in our wisdom, as fixed laws of nature. But those very terms imply another idea, which we are apt to lose sight of, namely, that those laws are not in themselves either material or vital forces, creating or destroying, by an independent energy of their own, but simply methods of operation, in accordance with which a Being of infinite intelligence and infinite power carries out his purposes in the government of his moral and material universe.

To us the budding and blooming of spring and the ripening of autumn are divested of the marvellous, from the fact of their constant and certain repetition from year to year. But when we are told of a man having been fed by ravens, and of a multitude having been preserved from starvation by manna sent to them direct from heaven, there is something in such facts contrary to all our experience, and we speak of them distinctively, as the putting forth of the power of God for a purpose necessary to the well-being of those over whom he watches and for whom he especially cares.

The theory of a General Providence, we may safely take for granted, is accepted by every Christian. That the ordinary necessities of man are liberally provided for is a patent, every-day fact, of which every man's daily experience will assure him, whether

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he accept or whether he reject the verities of the Christian religion. The fool who says in his heart "there is no God," knows this, though his confession of it may be wrapped in atheistic or pantheistic phraseology, and knows, too, that to dispute it would be an indication of complete mental imbecility. The doctrine of a General Providence, therefore, regarded as a Christian doctrine, is something more than a mere theory having reference to results. Of the fact accomplished in the daily supplying of the daily wants of mankind, sceptics and Christians are equally and severally cognizant. The difference of opinion is in reference to the means by which the fact is accomplished. The infidel tells us, that it follows as a natural result from the influences and operations of the laws of nature; and so far we agree with him. But when he tells us that these laws have a power inherent in themselves, that they are not the mandate of any lawgiver, that they are subject to no control, except their own operating and opposing forces, we challenge the correctness of his theory; and though our challenge has been assailed with hosts of assertions, it has never yet been fairly taken up and answered with proof. The Christian says, that the laws of nature have been framed and established by an infinitely wise God, that they are the mandates of his will, the medium through which he exercises his power, and momentarily subject to his control; that all blessings which they supply are his beneficent gifts, that he is the general provider for all his creatures, and that by the power of his own will he controls, guides, and governs, for the accomplishment of his purposes, the actions of men, the affairs of nations, and the destinies of the world.

But is there a Special Providence? Is it consistent with the logic of known facts to believe, or to suppose, that there are in the economy of good moral government special provisions for special needs, or positive interferances with the known laws or developments of nature having a direct bearing upon the interest and happiness of individuals or communities? As we have before intimated, our knowledge of the laws of nature is so limited that it would be impossible for us to determine, with the certainty of actual demonstration, what is contrary to natural law. If we base our opinions upon our present knowledge of things it is possible that we may regard as a contradiction to nature that which the discoveries of the next few years may demonstrate to be one of the most inevitable results of one of her simplest, though at present unknown, principles.

To the Christian mind, however, the doctrine of a Superintending Providence does not rest upon any foundation so uncertain as the supposition that nothing is providential which is not a result of supernatural interference with the common order of things. He has been taught to believe that the God whom he worships, and

upon the strength of whose right arm he rests, is omniscient, seeing the end from the beginning, and tracing throngh all their intricate labyrinths causes and effects, operating forces, and consequent results, beginning before the day-spring of time, and stretching to that eternity into whose unfathomable abysses time shall at last merge its years and epochs. It may be, therefore, that in his wisdom he has provided beforehand for those contingences, so called, which so often arise in human affairs. Should it, therefore, be clearly shown that the ravens were prompted only by their natural instinct when they carried food to Elijah, and that the supply of manna to the Israelites in the wilderness was a result of, or plainly traceable to, natural law, as the distilling dew or the falling rain, it would not interfere in the slightest possible degree with the Christian's faith in the special care and providence of God. For what matters it to him, if he receive the blessing, whether it come to him through the visible channels of know law or through the supernatural agency of that omnipotence from which the laws of nature have each and all received their delegated power.

It is necessary, in order to a right understanding of the subject, that we should bear in mind another fact, namely, that many of those events which happen to us, seemingly from their unaccountable character, as the results of an over-ruling providence, cannot in themselves be said to be blessings at all; and many of those occurrences which are manifestly and unmistakeably blessings are intimately connected with, and actually arise out of, our bitterest experiences and severest trials. In the face of such a fact, how is it possible that we can, with any show of consistency, insist upon the theory of a Beneficent Providence? For what great love can there be in first surrounding a man with difficulties and dangers, and then bringing him safely out of them? in first threatening him with starvation, and then in the very last extremity supplying his wants? If it was a merciful providence by which the children of Israel were rescued from the tyranny of Egypt, in how much higher a sense would it have been such had they been saved from all those years of suffering through which they had passed? If the succour afforded to their starving multitudes in the wilderness, when they were fed with manna, was an instance of providential care, why was it that that same care was not exercised to prevent those pressing necessities which called for such a departure from the natural order of things? In speaking of the watchful care and goodness of God to him, the Psalmist, with evident thankfulness says, "He helped

me."

But he prefaces that statement with another, suggestive of other thoughts, "I was brought low, and he helped me.' Facts like these very naturally suggest to our minds the thought that

there is something either very contradictory or very mysterious about the economy of Divine Providence. Which of the two may we suppose it to be? In reference to the God of providence, the words of inspiration are most emphatic, declaring that "with him is no variableness nor shadow of turning." If this be true, he cannot contradict his words by his ways, nor act at one time in a manner inconsistent with his actions at another. If "order is heaven's first law," we may justly assume that it is as applicable to the method of his moral administration as to the principles upon which he governs his physical universe. If we apply ourselves to study the objects and designs of Divine Providence, it is likely that we shall meet with mysteries far too profound for our limited intellect to fathom. It would be a marvel indeed if the finite could measure the Infinite, and if the objects and purposes of the Deity could be known by an appeal to those standards by which the motives and designs of human actions are ascertained.

A knowledge of certain facts will, however, assist us very greatly in reconciling some of the apparent contradictions we meet with in the economy of human life.

A correct knowledge of ourselves and our relations to God and to each other will not unfrequently enable us to perceive a wise and good purpose in those dispensations which seem to promise nothing but hopeless and life-long sorrow. At present we are being instructed and educated for the future; and such is the blindness of our hearts and the perverseness of our wills, that we often need to be dealt with in a manner which carries with it the appearance of undue harshness and severity. Our self-sufficiency and pride, our love of the world, and our growing attachment to its follies, our forgetfulness of God and the natural tendency of our hearts to depart from him, need to be constantly restrained and checked; and means not the most gentle are necessary to do this effectually. If we bear this in mind, it will frequently help us to solve many mysteries which perplex us in our own experience, by showing us how necessary is the process of "bringing low," to enable us rightly to appreciate the help which may afterwards be afforded; and then we shall ourselves be able to mingle our heart-felt gratitude with that of the Psalmist, when with him we can thankfully say, "I was brought low, and he helped me."

The promises of the Bible have about them a remarkable definiteness and distinctness, as though intended to fortify the believer against the many doubts which so often intrude their disquieting influences upon his mind. What can be more plain and distinct than the assurance that "all things work together for good to them that love God." The terms of that declaration are surely sufficiently clear. If words have any certain meaning, the meaning of those words cannot be mistaken. "Them that love God" are the subjects

of the assurance, without any other qualification or distinction. "All things work together for good" is the plain and unequivocal assurance in reference to them. But how can this be true, inquires a doubting disputant, since many things do not work together for their good, but rather tend to their disadvantage and unhappiness? Do they? then the words are false and deceiving. "All things," include everything, and if everything in the "all things" is not promotive of good to "them that love God," the words, as a declaration of providential watchfulness and care, are mere worthless and empty sounds.

What shall we say of the trials and cares which bear with such an oppressive power upon many of those whose confidence is in God and whose desire is to serve him? Let us take the case of Joseph, for example. He is a stranger in a strange land; there, too, under circumstances eminently calculated to shake his confidence in the sleepless watchfulness and unceasing care of God and to destroy his faith in the humanity of man. A favoured son of an imprudently fond father, he suddenly finds himself transferred by the jealousy and treachery of his brothers from the care of home to the charge of a band of trading Ishmaelites, to be dealt with as a piece of merchandise. He is sold by them to Potiphar, in whose home he conducts himself with such diligence and fidelity that his master gives the management of his whole household to him. He himself taking no note of what came in or what went out, trusted all to the care and honesty of Joseph, his slave. While in this position of trust Joseph was tempted and entreated to commit a great sin; but he repelled the tempter with the question which his honourable virtue has rendered ever memorable: "How can I do this great wickedness and sin against God?" Sin against God, indeed; what was he or his deeds to God? What care or thought had the Almighty for him, that he need be so solicitous to please him? what? See in what a providential manner he has been raised from the humble position he occupied when first he entered the house of Potiphar, an unknown and friendless slave, to his present position of honour and trust. A marvellously kind providence, forsooth, it was which, to give him this honour, had taken him rudely from the hearth whose light and joy he was, and from the home of which he was the cherished idol, and sent him, an unwilling wanderer, to a strange and distant land. What a perfect healing it would be to his sorrowing soul, yearning for the freedom and affection of home, to know that his honour and worth were appreciated, and that he was a trusted and valued-slave! But let us follow him a little further. The base woman, whose solicitations he had rejected, seeing that he was proof against her wicked wiles, now determined to be revenged upon him, by charging him with attempting the very crime he had refused to commit. The anger