periential or intuitive knowledge of men. Hegel, in his extreme idealism, abolishes subject and object altogether as realities, and leaves only the relation between them. Subject and object are 'nothing separately considered, reality arises out of the synthesis of the two. Relation is the only reality; the universe consists of nothing else. Subject and object are one, but not in the sense maintained in some other theories of idealistic pantheism, that they are developments, opposite it may be, but developments still, of the one substance; but one because their relation forms the idea, that is, the very thing itself. "Thinking and being are in the absolute truth thoroughly identical," and "the idea in its identity is like every synthesis a process." There is nothing but pure relation, and synthesis, process, idea, Deity are synonyms. This process of thought, which is the only reality-the absolutepasses through three principal periods; the first is characterised as "bare consciousness;" the second as "self-consciousness; " the third as "absolute consciousness or reason." In this process God realises himself, and yet he is this very process, for there is no other reality. Thought not only develops all phenomena, but is in fact everything. Instead of being an endowment, quality, or attribute of a spiritual substance as is commonly supposed, it is the only reality existing, and its existence is only realised by the synthesis of subject and object, which separately considered, are nothings. This is certainly sufficiently transcendental; God, the universe, and man are reduced to a process, an idea ever in course of realisation. Some of these speculatists repudiate the name of pantheist, but to whom can the name be applied if not to those who teach that God is not a person in relation to other persons, but a universal consciousness, a totality of thought, of which no strict and proper personality can be predicated. The principal difference between the method of Schelling and that of Hegel lies in thisthat what the former endeavoured to reach by intellectual intuition, the latter sought to demonstrate by a logical definition and analysis of our conceptions, but both, unquestionably, were idealistic pantheists, and the conclusions of both are equally falsified by the common sense and fundamental beliefs of men.

Beyond Germany, speculations of this nature have never found much favour. Cousin in France has been thought by some to lean towards pantheism, but he cannot be ranked along with the German speculatists. Professor Hickock of America is an avowed admirer of Schelling, and adopts in some measure his theory of intellectual intuition, but he cannot be charged with the unintelligible idealism of the "great German philosopher." Emmerson, if he

See Morell's "History of Philosophy;" and Chalyban's "Speculative Philosophy."

can be said to belong to any class of theorists, will certainly find his place among pantheists, though whether idealistic or materialistic is difficult to decide; and much in Carlyle's profound veneration for might and force points in the same direction, though we scarcely feel at liberty to set down the "Sage of Chelsea" as a pantheist. The recent writings of J. S. Mill betray a strong pantheistic leaning, especially his "Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy." In this work Mr. Mill contends that we have no direct or immediate knowledge of external being, all that we know is our own states of mind. In Fichtean formula, nature is nothing; mind is everything; for nature is only known as imagined in the mind; and at the same time Mr. Mill argues that consciousness is not a special faculty by which the mind cognises its own operations, in other words, that mind is not conscious of its own operations; for consciousness is but the thought, emotion, or sensation of the moment. Now taking these positions together we can be conscious of neither object or subject, and we reach pure Hegelianism or something very like it.*

A general reply to pantheistic speculation may be made upon the ground that the questions discussed transcend the limits of human thought. What can man know respecting the mode of infinite existence, or the origin of things? Strictly speaking these lie beyond the province of philosophy. If an attempt be made to solve these problems of being, the method of it must be induetive, for man possesses no such faculty as Schelling supposes, and as Spinoza before him sought to demonstrate. And this very condition precludes the endeavour, for no process of induction can make man acquainted with the mode of infinite being, or the fact of origin; whatever knowledge men may have respecting these questions, is gained not by philosophic induction, but from revelation. Pantheism under both its aspects is unphilosophic in so far as it attempts to deal philosophically with questions that lie beyond the province of a legitimate philosophy of being, and in addition to this its method either ignores or contradicts certain well-known phenomena, instead of furnishing an adequate explanation of them. For the substantiation of this charge we may briefly refer to two or three points out of many.

There is but one substance of which all are parts, according to materialistic pantheism; manifestations or appearances, according to idealistic pantheism. Taking either view, the universe consists of evolutions or developments of this one essence, which takes place it is affirmed according to a necessary law of its nature. This

See Mill's "Examination of the Philosophy of Sir W. Hamilton;" and an excellent article in the "Edinburgh Review" for July, 1866.

+ See Spinoza's "Ethics," prop. xlvii.

is fatalism. God, everything, Hegel says, is a process, a process eternally going on from bare consciousness through self-consciousness up to the absolute consciousness or reason, and with this view corresponds the necessary law of Schelling with its three potencies or movements. Intelligence then is but a product, the result of a process, for it is only when the development rises up to the human that intelligence becomes a fact in existence. Now how does this agree with the real state of the case? In ourselves we know intelligence not as a product, the result of an inevitable development, but as a primary and principal power independent of any necessary process; and this intelligence, including will and personality, we regard not as last but as first in the order of the human constitution. This is at any rate the result of a rational psychology; and yet pantheistic fatalism requires us to reverse this order revealed in our own minds, and regard intelligence not as free and first in the order of absolute existence, but as the result of a necessary process of an undeterminate length. But where are the data for a conclusion like this? They are not found in man, and yet where can we look for reliable data respecting the order of existence except in the facts of our own consciousness? And here we find intelligence first and supreme, not subordinate as would be the case with a mere product. And it is difficult to conceive why the absolute order of existence should differ from that revealed in humanity, or if it does differ, how the difference could be ascertained. Pantheistic speculation evidently disregards alike the facts of consciousness and the conditions of philosophy.

This fatalistic dreaming sets aside the fact of creation and the doctrine of final causes. There is nothing but development, of which intelligence is but a last result. Intelligence, will, purpose, have had no place either in the production or disposition of things. Now how does a view like this harmonise with the results of careful observation. There are unquestionably in the relations of things adaptations, fitnesses, and adjustments impressive by their exquisite nicety. These adaptations and adjustments are not merely to be observed in the harmony subsisting between the several parts of things, but between things obviously complete in themselves, by the relation, connection, or conjunction of which results follow whose immense importance and real worth men are not capable of estimating; so that if these adjustments have not proceeded from a supreme and intelligent personality altogether distinct from the things adjusted, they are exactly what a man whose judgment is unwarped by theory feels convinced, that under the circumstances and for the ends proposed a supreme and intelligent personality would do that is intelligence recognises its highest manifestations in the process of a blind and unintelligent physical necessity. An instance of the adaptation to which we refer may be found in the

relation of the eye to light. The eye, as a piece of mechanism, is perfect in itself. Its humours, lenses, and all the constituents used in its construction are so admirably related that the mechanism is as complete and perfect as possible. Now light is altogether separate from the eye and is equally as complete in itself; and yet from these two, each complete in itself, by relation and adjustment result the phenomena of vision. We have not here the mere contrivance and adjustment of a piece of mechanism, but the designing and construction of two pieces (if we may be allowed the illustration), each complete in itself, and by the relation and adjustment of which a given result is produced. Another form of design is admirably expressed by the ordinary rule of parcimony-that nothing be employed unnecessarily, and that as much as possible be accomplished by the means used. The atmosphere we daily breathe numbers not more than three constituent elements, and yet they are so proportioned that they at once contribute to the maintainence of animal and vegetable life; constitute the medium of sound; form the receptacle for the water raised by evaporation; regulate the descent of rain; soften the rays of the sun, and answer also many other purposes. And yet pantheism teaches that all this is not design, but merely the result of necessary development; that all this has become and subsists without a supreme and intelligent personality, and in affirming this it falsifies the surest results of observation, and strips the universe of its real grandeur.

The doctrine of providence finds no place in pantheistic speculation. Necessary development shuts out the idea of an intelligent rule and wise guidance of things; and hence there cannot be any interference with the inevitable evolution of the one essence. Upon this ground miraculous intervention has been denied, and special providence declared a delusion, and upon this same ground all prayer and worship become folly. There is nothing to worship but self, for humanity is unquestionably the crowning point in pantheistic development. It is only at this point that the one essence realises self-consciousness; it then seeks to re-assume its eternal form; what is meant by its eternal form may be difficult to conceive, but it evidently is not self-consciousness. Now personality, individual intelligence, and will, are assuredly perfections; by the loss of them man, if we could conceive him to exist, would be less perfect than he is; so that to pass from a state of selfconsciousness to a condition in which self-consciousness would be merged in some general or absolute consciousness would be, not progression but retrogression. Humanity in pantheistic theory constitutes the very apex of being, and if man worship there is nothing for him to worship higher than himself. In fanatical mood and delirious dream it may be possible for men to persuade themselves

that their condition is the highest state of being, but men under the influence of calm reason and sober judgment will feel and think otherwise. These groundless theories falsify the religious feeling in man, whatever may be their pretensions to the contrary, and reduce to folly all that is most certain in the findings of human experience.

Pantheistic speculation obliterates all moral dictinctions. Good and evil are but names of the same thing. Positive evil as distinct from good is maintained as impossible. Now here again pantheism is in collision with the common experience of men. The difference between good and evil is a palpable fact, one of the first and readiest inferences of the human mind. There is not moral oneness around us, but the contrary, and we are conscious of this conflict between good and evil in ourselves. As certain as we exist, so certain to us is the difference between rightness and wrongness. No groundless and fine-spun analogy between things material and moral will convince us that evil is not a positive quality in human life and action. There is a wide and impassable gulf between decay in material substances and evil in human life, but in pantheistic theorising, the two are treated as if they were similar. Decayed matter enters into other combinations, and contributes to produce other forms of symmetry and beauty; from the weltering process of dissolution there proceeds new life and loveliness, and moral evil is considered the counterpart of this; so that man in the vilest depravity is on his way to virtue and honour. Indeed if pantheistic theorising be correct, the viler his depravity the nearer he is to a higher life, for it is from an extreme state of material decay that renewed forms of life and beauty proceed. This may be consistent enough with the fundamental position of pantheism, that there is but one substance of which all are either parts or manifestations, but it is utterly opposed to the common sense and experience of men. Decay and renovation are certainly alternating states in material things, but man is conscious of no such alternation in himself. Moral corruption is not the way to a life of goodness. Between physical and moral law there is a wide difference. The laws which rule in human life are not to be confounded with those prevailing in material existence. Between law that has to be obeyed and law as expressive of operation, there is the greatest conceivable difference; but in regarding evil in action as similar to decay in matter this difference is completely ignored. Consciousness of guilt, which is no uncommon thing in human experience, is made a delusion by pantheistic speculation, and man's sense of responsibility is falsified. That God over-rules evil for good, that he makes it subserve high and important interests, is alike sustained by revelation and experience; but that