Athens. tempted to dissuade his countrymen. Even when the latter, hoping at least to procure a delay, gave an exaggerated statement of the preparations which would be necessary, the Athenians voted an immediate supply of all he demanded. Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus, were appointed commanders of the expedition. The armament consisted of 100 gallies, with a number of transports and smaller vessels, having on board 5000 heavy armed troops, besides archers and slingers. Its rendezvous was at Corcyra, whence it crossed over to the nearest point of Italy, and sailed along the coast till it came to the straits of Messina. Great expectations, had been entertained from the Italian states, several of whom were bound by alliance and former favours; but all, jealous of such mighty interference, shut their gates against the Athenians. On their arrival off the coast of Sicily, the Egestans were found altogether incapable of performing their promises. The question then came to be, What was to be done? Nicias proposed to return immediately; Lamachus to proceed without delay to Syracuse, before it had time to prepare, or to recover from its consternation. A middle plan prevailed, which was to sail round the coast, in order to collect resources and allies for the future siege of Syracuse. Alcibiades proceeded first to Naxos and Catana, with both which cities he succeeded; but, as he was Disgrace of proceeding to Messana, a deputation arrived, comAlcibiades. manding him to return to Athens. His enemies had taken advantage of his absence to press a charge of impiety, founded on the extraordinary circumstance of all the statues of Mercury having been found mutilated on the morning of his departure. It seemed countenanced by the habitual levity of his conduct. Alcibiades, aware of the little lenity exercised by Athens towards her great men, declined standing his trial, and retired to Sparta. It seems difficult to determine, whether his former influence, or his present disgrace, were most fatal to his country. Since the expedition was undertaken, he certainly, of all men, was best qualified to conduct it. The timid and irresolute character of Nicias, on whom the chief command now devolved, rendered him wholly unfit to conduct an enterprize which could succeed only by prompt and decisive measures. He spun out the summer in small and ineffective expeditions against the inferior states. By a skilful stratagem, he drew off the Syracusan army to Catana, and was thus enabled to effect his landing without opposition. An engagement soon after ensued, in which the Syracusans were defeated: But Nicias, not conceiving himself to be yet in a state to finish the siege, immediately reimbarked, and returned to spend the winter at Catana. the most extreme jealousy, the progress of the Athe- Athens. nian arms. Alcibiades, whose resentment had now impelled him to espouse their cause, strongly inculcated on them the necessity of vigorously opposing it. By his advice, they were induced to declare war against the Athenians, to send an army into Attica, and to fortify Decelia, which might give them a permanent establishment in the Athenian territory. At the same time they sent Gylippus, an able commander, with a body of select troops, to the aid of the Syracusans. The Corinthians, at the same time, sent a large fleet for the same purpose. Encouraged by the prospect of succour, the Syracusans renewed their efforts. Gylippus landed on the western coast, was joined on his march by the troops of Selinus, Gela, and Himera, and entered Syracuse in considerable force. Two actions followed, in the first of which he was repulsed, but in the second he defeated the Athenians with considerable loss. Animated by this success, the Syracusans, now reinforced by the Corinthian squadron, determined to attack the enemy on their own element. After several failures, they at length succeeded in defeating them there also; an event which filled them with the highest exultation. All Sicily now declared against the declining fortune of Athens; the supplies of provisions were withheld; and the armament gradually mouldered away, while that of the enemy received continual accessions. In this distress Nicias wrote home, urging strongly the necessity, either of his immediate recal, or of large reinforcements. Never could the latter demand arrive more unseasonably. The Lacedemonians, according to the advice of Alcibiades, had fortified Decelia, and were thus enabled, both to keep Athens in perpetual alarm, and to cut off all supplies of provisions, unless by sea. Yet such was the daring enterprise, and vast resources, of this state, that, instead of recalling Nicias, they fitted out, without delay, an armament nearly equal to that originally sent. The unexpected appearance of so mighty a reinforcement inspired the assailants with new courage, while it struck the besieged with dismay. It was commanded by Demosthenes. By his advice a general attack was resolved on. It was undertaken accordingly by moonlight, against the quarter of Epipola; having gained which, they hoped to possess themselves of the whole city. They at first succeeded; Epipole was forced; but when the Athenians pressed forward to pursue their advantage, the darkness of the night, and their ignorance of the place, threw them into inextricable confusion. They were unable to distinguish between friends and foes; the enemy gained their watchword; and, after a dreadful combat, they were repulsed with great slaughter. Demosthenes now advised an immediate return; but this proposal was unexpectedly opposed by Nicias, who dreaded to appear before the enraged assembly of Athens, and entertained hopes, from secret connections which he had formed in the city. Things remained in this state, till Gylippus arrived with a powerful reinforcement, which he had collected from the different states of Sicily. The necessity of departing was now obvious to all; but an eclipse of the sun happening, Nicias, from a prin Athens. ciple of superstition, to which he was miserably addicted, conceived it necessary to delay their departure for twenty-seven days. This was a fatal delay to Athens. Total de The Syracusans, encouraged by their increased numbers, and by the evident irresolution and timidity of their enemies, determined to attack them on their own element. A naval engagement took place, and continued for three days with various success. The valour and skill of the Athenians at first prevailed; but the Syracusans, continually pouring in fresh numbers, at length gained a considerable advantage. the Athe. We may more easily conceive than describe the con- Athens. sternation of the Athenians, when these fatal tidings arrived; when, instead of their vain and towering hopes of universal conquest, they saw themselves exposed, almost defenceless, to the fury of their enemies. The flower of their warriors had perished; and their subject-allies, whom fear alone had retained in submission, began to manifest symptoms of revolt. In Vigour of this extremity, the energy of popular government, tempered by misfortune, fully displayed itself. most able and prudent persons were set at the head of affairs; a new fleet was equipped with incredible dispatch; armaments, sent to Chios, Samos, and Ionia, secured the allegiance of those states; and Athens appeared, to astonished Greece, as formidable almost as she had been in her most prosperous days. The nians. No choice now remained to the Athenians but of immediate retreat. By the time, however, that they had brought their fleet to the mouth of the harbour, they found that the Syracusans, without losing a moment, had thrown a chain across it. Another battle The characteristic slowness of the Lacedemonians A. C.409, was therefore necessary before they could escape. On had prevented them from availing themselves of the this battle hung the fate of the whole Athenian ar- first consternation of Athens, and seeing her rise mament. It was fought long, and with dreadful ob- so rapidly to her former greatness, they began to stinacy. The armies surrounding the harbour, beheld be discouraged from the farther prosecution of the it as from a theatre, and raised cries of alternate exulwar. Alcibiades, however, urged them to proceed, tation and despair, according to the varying fortunes and endeavoured to strengthen them by the alliance feat of the of the day. Victory at length decided against the of the Persians. Finding, however, that his levity and Athenians. Athenians; all their vessels fled, and were driven on dissoluteness had ruined his influence at Sparta, he shore. Nothing could then exceed their calamity. went over entirely to the latter; and finally hoping Their only hope was to escape by land to some of the to regain his footing in Athens, offered to secure for allied cities; but the route was to be made in the face it the Persian alliance, provided an aristocracy were of a victorious enemy, through a country every where established, and placed under his authority. The Change of kostile. As in a city taken by storm, they were to Athenians, feeling the urgency of their affairs, and governfly, having lost their all. They were forced to aban- disgusted with the party which had impelled them in- ment. don their dead unburied, a thing never before done to such precipitate measures, suffered their consent to by an Athenian army; they were forced even to aban- be extorted to a change so repugnant to all their don their wounded, exclaiming in vain to gods and former habits. A singular manoeuvre now took place. men against this inhuman desertion. The character of Pisander, Antiphon, and other old aristocrats, deterNicias rose in misfortune. By every motive of hope, mined, that since this change was to take place, it of interest, of national honour, he endeavoured to rouse should be for the benefit of themselves, rather than of his countrymen from despair, and to inspire them with one so odious to them as Alcibiades. In his absence, that firmness which alone could save them. Yet, the therefore, they procured the consent of the Atheusual tardiness of his character remaining, he wast- nians to adopt a new system of government, in the ed two days in preparation, of which period the Sy room of that which they had so long idolized. racusans availed themselves to seize on the passes. popular assembly was reduced to 5000, by excluding The Athenian army, however, for some time forced the lowest of the people; while the chief power was their way, though slowly, through crowds of surround- vested in a council of 400; and, these being all choing enemies. At length, the rear guard under De- sen ultimately by five prytanes, the whole authority mosthenes was separated from the van, and forced to centered in the latter. surrender, stipulating only for their lives. The catastrophe of Nicias was still more fatal. Having reach. ed the banks of the river Asinarius, he made a desperate attempt to cross it, conceiving that his retreat would then be secure. The enemy, however, had possessed themselves of its steep banks, and had filled them with armed men. The Athenians, raging with thirst, plunged into the stream, and eagerly drank it, mixed as it was with the blood of their countrymen. The crowds pressing on confusedly, encumbered and crushed each other; their attempts to advance were vain; while showers of darts were incessantly poured down upon them from the surrounding heights. In this dreadful condition, Nicias, seeing all was lost, agreed to surrender on the mere condition of the carnage being stopped. The prisoners were conducted to Syracuse, and were treated with the utmost barbarity. Nicias and Demosthenes were put to death. The This government subsisted for some time without opposition. The people, however, soon grew impatient of restraints to which they were so little accustomed; and the new rulers, by abusing their power, aggravated the discontent. In foreign states, too, the aristocratical party, on finding themselves, to their extreme surprise, placed in power by the Athenians, chose rather to trust to the long-tried friendship of Sparta, than to this sudden favour of their inveterate enemies. Several important cities were thus lost to Athens. Meanwhile the army, with Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus at their head, loudly protested against the subversion of Athenian liberty. They recalled Alci- Recal of biades, who, with characteristic inconstancy, now Alcibiade embraced the cause of democracy. By his eloquence he charmed all hearts, and soon acquired an absolute ascendant over the troops. He gained over Tissaphernes to the side of Athens; and under his own Athens. command, and that of Thrasybulus, every thing prospered. The latter, with 55 vessels against 73, gained a victory over the Peloponnesians, taking 21 of their ships. Soon after Alcibiades gained a still more signal victory at Cyzicus. By a skilful stratagem, he surrounded the enemy, drove them on shore, took almost their whole fleet, and then landing, put their army to flight. Meanwhile all was disaster and confusion at Athens. In vain did the aristocratical leaders endeavour to conciliate the people by changes in the government; the discontents rose higher and higher, when a Lacedemonian fleet of 40 sail appeared in the bay of Salamis. Without, however, making any attempt upon Athens, it sailed to Eubœa; but the Athenian fleet sent to oppose it was completely defeated. This disaster produced the immediate dissolution of the new government: Pisander and his accomplices fled to the Lacedemonians: the people resumed their power, and exerted themselves, with their wonted activity, in repairing their losses. Alcibiades was made commander in chief, and continued his career of victory, by reducing Byzantium, and other great towns on the Thracian coast, always a favourite object of Athenian His return ambition. He then returned to Athens, where every to Athens. honour was lavished upon him which ingenuity could devise; and where he distinguished himself, by conducting the procession of the Eleusinian mysteries in safety from Athens to Eleusis, which had not been effected since the loss of Decelia. A.C. 406. nished. Alcibiades was now again sent out with the full command of the fleet; but having gone in person to raise contributions, he left the command of it to an unworthy favourite of the name of Antiochus, who, having rashly left the harbour, and being attacked by Lysander near Ephesus, was entirely defeated. The Again ba- tide of popular favour was instantly turned; Alcibiades, so late its idol, was dismissed from all his employments, and banished. Ten commanders were then appointed, who seem to have been well chosen, since, besides Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, they included Conon, one of the greatest of the Athenians, who now for the first time appears on the theatre of history. His first enterprise was, however, unfortunate. Being sent with an inadequate squadron to relieve Lesbos, he was overpowered by numbers, and blocked up in the harbour of Mitylene. The Athenians made extraordinary exertions to relieve him. A fleet of 150 sail was soon fitted out, and sent thither under the command of the other admirals. A battle was then fought at Arginussæ, in which the Athenian fleet was completely victorious. Theramenes, however, one of the commanders, raised an accusation against the rest, for having neglected the bodies of the slain, and even for having abandoned a number of shipwrecked citizens, whose lives might have been saved. The people, in a paroxysm of frenzy, condemned to death all who had not sought safety in flight; and six of the best Athenian commanders, among whom were in particular Thrasyllus, Diomedon, and the only son of the famous Pericles, were executed. Battle of Arginussa. Athenian the Lacedemcians, determining to make a great ef- Athens: fort, had fitted out a large armament, and entrusted the command of it to Lysander, the most able and enterprising of their officers. Lysander immediately proceeded to lay siege to Lampsacus, which he took after an obstinate defence. The Athenian fleet arrived too late to save it; but being superior in number, it offered battle. The offer was declined by Lysander, who kept himseîf shut up in the harbour of Lampsacus, and assumed a studied appearance of alarm and consternation. The Athenians, after battle Destruc had been thus declined for five successive days, retired tion of the and anchored in the river of Ægos Potamos, on the fleet and Thracian side of the Bosphorus. They now aban- army at doned themselves to the utmost excess of exultation Ægos Poand security. They straggled on shore, threw aside tamos. all restraint of discipline, and indulged in every kind of licentiousness. Their motions were carefully watched by Lysander, who at length conceiving the opportunity favourable, fell upon them suddenly with his whole force. They were so completely unprepared, as to be hardly in a condition to make even a show of resistance. The whole fleet of 180 sail, with the exception of nine ships, fell into the hands of the victors. Lysander then landed his army, and gained an easy victory over the detached and straggling bands of the Athenians. The few who escaped sought safety among the mountains in the interior of Thrace. Conon, after vain attempts to rally his countrymen, found means to escape, with eight gallies, to Cyprus. This This blow was mortal to Athens; yet she still continued, for some time, to protract a languishing existence. Lysander did not dare at once to attack her almost impregnable walls and harbours. He contented himself, for the present, with reducing or alienating those maritime states which she had so long held in subjection, particularly the rich and advantageous settlements on the coast of Thrace. He at the same time closely blockaded the city by sea and land, and, to increase the want of provisions, obliged the garrisons of the captured places to return into the city. Athens was soon reduced to extreme distress; yet still, with a resolution worthy of her former greatness, she struggled against her fate. Her liberty, however, was assailed, not only by foreign but by intestine enemies. The party attached to the Lacedemonian form of government, hoped, by the success of that people, to establish themselves in power. party gained continually new strength, as the probable æra of their triumph approached. At length Theramenes, a new convert to this party, but whose former conduct had gained him the confidence of the people, procured their consent to the opening of a treaty with Sparta. The negotiation continued four months, and was concluded on terms the most disgraceful and ruinous to Athens. All the fortifications both of their city and harbours were to be demolished: they were to renounce all their foreign possessions; to receive back the banished aristocrats; to follow in war the standard of the Lacedemonians: and to become in every respect on a footing with the rest of their subject allies. These terms were received by the body of the people with the deepest consternation; but their spirit was now broken by a long series of calamities; the aristocratical party were Athens. clamorous; and a gloomy and reluctant consent was at length extorted. On the 16th of May, A. C. 404, Surrender in the 27th year after the commencement of the Peof Athens. loponnesian war, the Lacedemonians entered Athens. Even the victors could scarcely refrain from tears, when they beheld this final humiliation of a city, formerly so great in arms, which had once been the deliverer, and had so long reigned the arbitress, of Greece. A. C. 403. Sparta, according to the usual system of Grecian policy, did not reduce Athens to absolute subjection: She merely established in power the party in whose friendship she could confide. Thus the government remained in the hands of Athenians, though the Lacedemonians took the precaution of placing a garrison in the citadel. It was moulded, however, into a system of the most complete oligarchy. The authority was exclusively vested in 30 persons, who, from the violence of their proceedings, and the eternal hatred of Athens to such a government, soon acquired the appellation of the Thirty Tyrants. At the head of them was Theramenes, already mentioned, and Critias, who was still more violent. They were inspired with the usual antipathy of Greeks to the opposite faction, and exasperated by the remembrance of what they had suffered from them. At the same time, the extraordinary strength of the popular spirit in Athens excited continual apprehensions, which could be quieted only by acts of severity. Their first proceedings were directed against the most obnoxious of the opposite party, whose punishment gave satisfaction to the people in general. Emboldened by this success, and urged on by avarice and fear, they proceeded to exercise a general proscription against the innocent and guilty. Every form of justice was by degrees trampled upon; all the citizens, except 3000 devoted adherents, were deprived of their arms; while Theramenes, who attempted too late to stem this torrent of violence, was accused and put to death. Amid every precaution which cruelty could devise, the tyrants still did not feel themselves secure. They dreaded the talents and address of Alcibiades; and Lysander, by his interest at the Persian court, procured him to be put to death. The storm, however, came from a quarter which they least expected. Thrasybulus, who had already distinguished himself as a successful commander, was exiled, with many other citizens of distinction. This person, having collected a few hundreds of other exiles, who had taken refuge at Thebes and its neighbourhood, seized upon Phyla, a small fortress on the confines of Attica and Bocotia. The tyrants were baffled in their first attempt to expel him; this success attracted numbers to his standard; and he soon found himself sufficient ly in force to form the bold design of seizing on the Recovered Piræus. In this attempt he succeeded: the tyrants, by Thrasy- in endeavouring to dislodge him, were defeated with bulus. great slaughter, and took shelter in the citadel, while part fled even to Eleusis. The Lacedemonians seem, on this occasion, to have displayed more than their usual tardiness. They did not rouse themselves till some weeks after the expulsion of their adherents from the Piræus. Then, however, Lysander marched with a formidable force, which Athens could not long have resisted, had not . divisions arisen among the Spartan chiefs. All parties in Sparta had become jealous of the overgrown power and influence of Lysander; and Pausanias, one of the kings, having been joined with him in the command, thwarted all his measures. Through the influence of this monarch, a negotiation was set on foot, which terminated in the removal of the Lacedemonian garrison, and the complete re-establishment of the independence of Athens. The tyrants vainly endeavoured to defend themselves in Eleusis; they were speedily reduced; several suffered, and the rest were spared by the clemency of Thrasybulus. The Athenians were not long of making an ill use of their liberty, by the condemnation and death of Socrates, the best and wisest of their citizens. For the particulars of this event, we must refer to the life of that great man. Athens A. C. 401. Athens had often astonished Greece by the rapi- Successes of dity with which she rose from her ashes; but never Conon. was this elastic power more conspicuous than on the present occasion. Conon, of whom mention has already been made, was the chief artificer of her new greatness. Having formed an alliance with Evagoras of Cyprus, and with the Persian court, he was enabled to collect a formidable navy. With this he attacked the Lacedemonian fleet at Cnidus, under the command of Pisander, totally defeated it, and took 50 gallies. A. C.394) The maritime superiority of Athens was now restored, and the fine settlements on the coast of the Lesser Asia, accessible only by sea, were soon reduced again under her dominion. Conon now returned to Athens, and with the aid of Persian treasure, actively employed himself in rebuilding the walls, without which she could never have enjoyed any lasting security. This measure, joined to the successes of the Athenians, struck Sparta with alarm. She now endeavoured to reconcile herself with Persia, against whom she had for some time been waging a successful war. Her intrigues were forwarded by the conduct of Conon, who, as was too common among the Grecian states, preferring patriotism to justice, employed the Persian fleet almost wholly in forwarding Athenian objects. Through the skilful mediation of Antalcidas, Lacedemon con- A. C. 587. cluded that treaty which goes by his name. By it she ignominiously abandoned to Persia the colonies of the Lesser Asia, which had now become, in her eyes, a secondary object. a secondary object. With regard to Greece, she sti pulated for the freedom of the smaller cities; but by never executing this article herself, and only insisting on its being executed by others, she made it the means of rendering her authority paramount in Greece. Athens, however, being allowed also to retain her possessions, made no movement. Sparta now proceeded under the guidance of Agesilaus, to extend her usurpations over the states of Greece. Mantinea and Thebes, the two most powerful states next to Athens, were subdued, the one by force, the other by stratagem. Thebes, however, under the auspices of Pelopidas, soon re-asserted her independence, and began a career of success, which set bounds to Spartan encroachment. Athens, however, did not interfere, till one Sphodrias, a Spartan officer, secretly instigated by the Theban chiefs, made an attempt to surprise the Piræus. His project was Athens again the chief state in Greece. First differences with Macedon. A. C. 360. discovered and frustrated; but when the Athenians demanded satisfaction, the influence of Agesilaus screened the offender from punishment. Athens then took up arms, and, while the Thebans were carrying on the war by land, obtained important naval advantages. Under the conduct of their distinguished leaders, Chabrias and Timotheus, they repeatedly defeated the Lacedemonians, ravaged their coasts, and re-established their own influence over the maritime states. After, however, the battle of Leuctra had raised Thebes to the highest pitch of power, and reduced her rival to the utmost distress, the Athenians, jealous of this new influence, began to slacken their efforts, and at length were even induced to interfere in behalf of Lacedemon. An army, sent into Peloponnesus under the command of Iphicrates, compelled the Thebans to retreat into Boeotia. Their promptitude also frustrated an attempt made by Epaminondas to supplant them in the dominion of the sea. A large body of Athenian cavalry was present at the battle of Mantinea, and though the rest of the allied army were defeated, this part was victorious.. Thebes and Sparta being now worn out by mutual contests, Athens, which had for some time acted only a subordinate part, again rose to be the leading power in Greece. There were many circumstances, however, in her internal constitution, which kept her far beneath the level of her ancient greatThe democracy had now acquired a complete and uncontrouled ascendency; the preceding convulsions had annihilated all the former checks on its licentiousness. The most worthless demagogues held the chief sway; and the levity, characteristic of a popular assembly, had risen to such a height, that a measure decreed was almost as uncertain as if it had never been proposed. They retained all their former enterprizing and ambitious character, but were no longer disposed to employ the same means of rendering their resolutions effectual. The bearing of arms was now considered as a burdensome duty: "the sovereign people," says Mr Mitford, "more and more dispensed with their own services." Metics (a mixed race between freemen and slaves) and foreign mercenaries, were soon exclusively employed in the army; and though the sea service, formerly the least honourable, was now preferred on account of its opportunities of plunder, yet it gradually fell into the same hands. Such troops, acting without any motive to animate them or secure their fidelity, did no honour to the Athenian name. Athens, indeed, even in her last decline, was still fruitful of great men, but these were resorted to only on pressing emergencies; at all other times, the command was vested in those who could best flatter the passions of the people. In the better times of the republic, the same person had united the characters of orator and general; these were now separated; and every commander had an orator attached to him, who supported his interest in the popular assembly. Unfortunately, about this time a power arose, to withstand which would have required the utmost exertions of Athens in her best days. Macedon, remote and barbarous, had hitherto been scarcely numbered among the Grecian nations; but the activity of some of her late sovereigns had improved her civil and VOL. III. PART I. military constitution; and in this last respect, she now united all the energy of a barbarous people, with the arts of a civilized one. Philip had recently ascended the throne; a prince of the highest accomplishments, both as a warrior and statesman, ardently ambitious of extending his dominions, and acquiring an influence in the general concerns of Greece. The first subjects of contest were the towns on the Thracian coast, which were equally objects of ambition to the two parties. The Athenians, urged particularly by the hope of recovering Amphipolis, had sent a force in support of Argæus, a pretender to the crown of Macedon. Argæus and his auxiliaries were completely defeated; but Philip, who felt it to be still his interest to court the favour of the Athenians, and who was ambitious of the fame of clemency, not only dismissed his prisoners without ransom, but agreed to withdraw his claims upon Amphipolis, and to allow the Athenians an opportunity of regaining that favourite object of their ambition. Amphipolis endeavoured to protect itself, by joining a grand confederacy of Thracian cities, which had Olynthus for its head. A ground of dissension was thus established between Athens and Olynthus, which proved equally prejudicial to both, whose interest it was to have united against Philip. Athens, however, sent an armament against Amphipolis, under the command of Iphicrates. That general reduced the city to extremity, and brought it to accept of a capitulation; but as the conditions were on the point of being executed, Timotheus arrived with a commission which superseded that of Iphicrates. The inhabitants, who had trusted to the personal character of the commander, rather than to the faith of the Athenian state, refused to place the same confidence in another man; the negociation was broken off; and the Athenian mercenaries having slipt away, the whole enterprize failed. This good understanding did not long continue between two powers so restless and ambitious. There appears reason to suspect, that the Athenians finding, through the disposition of the people, an opportunity to take possession of Pydna, a Macedonian city, did not scruple to avail themselves of it. Philip, therefore, having freed himself from his enemies on the side of Illyria and Thrace, and seeing no longer any thing very formidable in the military character of the Athenians, formed an alliance with Olynthus against them, and subdued Amphipolis, Pydna, and Potidea. To cement his alliance with Olynthus, as well as to maintain the character of ostentatious generosity, which he affected, he presented that state with the two last mentioned cities. Athens was withheld from resisting these advances, not only by her internal feebleness and disunion, but by two other wars in which she was, about this time, involved. The sacred war was then raging in Phocis; an event of which the details will be found in their proper place. The Athenians engaged in it as auxiliaries to the Phocians; but though they seem to have espoused the justest cause, yet they escaped not the suspicion of having been biassed, by receiving a share of the treasure of which the Phocian leader Philomelus had impiously despoiled the temple of Delphi. They rendered, however, an important ser E Athens. |